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1. Introduction 
Emerging economic regions play a critical role in global economies. The economic context of 
countries in emerging world is of crucial importance both for incumbent firms as well as new 
entrants and has a significant relationship with the strategies of these firms. India's announcement 
of new economic policy in July 1991 was a milestone in its efforts to open up the economy and 
move to the center stage of international business. As a result of this change, many multinational 
companies entered India through various strategic alliances to improve chances of their success. 
locally and globally. 
After opening up of India's economy, the GDP growth rate which was hovering at 3.5% has now 
reached to 9% and Information technology (IT) has emerged an important driver of this economic 
change in India. Almost all top software companies of the world have products or services which 
have been developed or supported in India. 
The Indian IT industry has experienced an increasing trend in the formation of strategic alliances 
in recent times, more particularly between the domestic and foreign firms. The industry is 
characterized by high degree of environmental uncertainty, short product life cycles and even 
shorter development cycles. The incidences of alliances are on rise due to the unavoidable 
structural linkages, increasing information dynamism and changes in organizational capacities. 
With the increasing turbulence and causal ambiguity in the business environments of today, the 
need of inter-organizational alliances has increased immensely. Particularly in the IT industp.. 
there is an increasing propensity to enter in strategic alliances. Since India is an emerging 
economy, the domestic IT firms are yet to reach the maturity level of handling the international 
strategic alliances; therefore factors that motivate formation of alliance, cost of governance and 
its effect on performance of strategic alliances is an important area of study. 
1.1. Need for Research 
There have been several empirical studies of strategic alliances. In a study that examined over 
800 alliances, it was found that only close to forty percent managed to survive four years and that 
less than ten percent managed ten years (killing 1983 and Harrigan 1983). Other studies have 
found that more than sixty percent of all strategic alliances disappear or get reorganized within 
less than five years of their formation (Bleeke 1993). A study by Ernst (1993) showed that close 
to seventy percent of the alliances face problems within first two years of creation. The high 
mortality rate provides pointers on the complexity of relationships expressed by alliance 
managers. Therefore there is a need for insight into characteristics of strategic alliances and their 
key factors of success. 
The Indian IT cos like TCS, Infosys, Wipro have always faced tough competition from global IT 
cos like IBM,Accenture while fighting for global contracts. To bolster its image Indian IT 
companies have started hiring foreign nationals for consulting positions. To further boost up its 
image as a global company Indian IT companies have strategic alliances with global majors 
which in turn facilitates them to bag such huge contracts. Such tie-ups, which marry technology 
and logistics as well as negate the pervasive reach of an IT multinational, provide a glimpse into 
the fiiture of India's $60-billion outsourcing industry. Such tie-ups present the truly global face of 
IT industry. 
Thus India and Indian IT industry provides a great environment to do such a research. 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The focus of proposed study would be international strategic alliances between domestic 
and foreign firms in Indian IT Industry. Broad objective of this research is as follows 
• To study the factors that drive domestic IT firms in India to enter into an 
international strategic alliance 
• To study the factors that influence governance costs of these alliance 
Such a study on IT industry in India does not exist to date. This could be a value to both 
theorists and practitioners, as IT industry has emerged as a high growth industry for the 
Indian economy, which itself has been one of the emerging economies in the world. 
Alliance formation would be looked from three perspective- resource dependenc>. 
environmental uncertainty and internal organization. Researchers have proposed different 
models for alliance formation and governance ( Brouthers, Brouthers and Harris, 1997). 
However, with the high degree of uncertainty in the environments of firms, the 
management of alliances is becoming increasing challenging. The large number of 
failures of alliances (Duysters, Kok and Vaandrager, 1999) suggests that there could be a 
gap in understanding alliance formation, alliance management and the relational and 
performance risks involved (Das and Teng, 1999). There have been theoretical work ( 
Spekman Forbes III, Isabella and MacAvoy, 1998) to bridge this gap. However, fresh 
empirical research, especially in Indian context, which can bridge this gap in 
understanding, would be great use both for academia and practitioners. 
2. Literature review 
To define strategic alliances, literature provides a range of terminology such as alliances, 
cooperation, joint venture, coalition, plus collaborative agreements such as joint 
manufacturing, technical assistance, joint marketing, cross-distribution, cross licensing, 
research pooling, and consortia. 
To gain further understanding, a literature review of the definitions of strategic alliances 
is as follows: 
Tabic 1 Definitions of Strategic Alliances 
Douma, 
1997 
A strategic alliance is a contractual, temporary relationship between 
companies remaining independent, aimed at reducing the uncertainty 
around the realization of the partners' strategic objectives (for which the 
partners are mutually dependent) by means of coordinating or jointly 
executing one or several of the companies' activities. Each of the partners is 
able to exert considerable influence upon the management or policy of the 
alliance. The partners are financially involved, although by definition not 
through participation, and share the costs, profits and risks of the strategic 
alliance. 
Dussauge 
& 
Garrette, 
1995 
An alliance is a cooperative agreement or association between two or more 
independent enterprises, which will manage one specific project, with a 
determined duration, for which they will be together in order to improve 
their competences. It is constituted to allow its partners to pool resources 
and coordinate efforts in order to achieve results that neither could obtain 
by acting alone. The key parameters surrounding alliances are opportunism, 
necessity and speed. 
Faulkner, 
1995 
A strategic alliance is a particular mode of inter-organizational relationship 
in which the partners make substantial investments in developing a long-
term collaborative effort, and common orientation. 
Gulati, 
2004 
Strategic alliances are voluntary arrangements between firms involving 
exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or 
Phan, 
2000 
Porter, 
1990 
Yoshino 
& 
Rangan, 
2005 
services. 
Alliances are long-term, trust-based relationships that entail highly 
relationship-specific investments in ventures that cannot be fully specified 
in advance of their execution. 
Strategic alliances are long-term agreements between firms that go beyond 
market transactions but fall short of merger. Forms include joint ventures, 
licenses, long-term agreements, and other kinds of inter-firm relationships. 
A strategic alliance is a partnership between two or more firms that unite to 
pursue a set of agreed upon goals but remain independent subsequent to the 
formation of the alliance to contribute and to share benefits on a continuing 
basis in one or more key strategic areas, e.g. technology, products. 
There exists an abundance of literature in management that discusses strategic alliances 
in IT sector; however, there is limited research that covers strategic alliance in Indian IT 
industry. 
2.1. Reasons for alliance formations 
Alliance formation can be explained from various perspectives. According to Economic 
Geography ( Krugman, 1009; Scott, 1996; Rosenfiled, 1997; Baptista and Swann, 1998). 
firms form alliances in order to exploit the complementarities in resources and 
competencies. 
The key idea of the resource-based perspective is that a firm's competitive advantage 
resMlts from unique, firm-specific resources, and that this competitive advantage may be 
sustainable over time if 'isolating mechanisms' are present that prevent other firms from 
imitation (Wemerfelt (1984) and Rumelt (1984). 
Theorists in the field of Organization Learning (Doz, 1996; Hamel, 1991 ; Inkpen. 
1998; Tsang, 1999) argued that alliances are formed to facilitate inter-partner learning. 
Alliances could also be used for "Pursuing Increasing Returns (Arthur, 1989, 1996) with 
firms seeking to increase rents from knowledge intensive competencies. 
Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Arrow, 1971) also 
provides explanation for formation of alliances, wherein firms seek to share risks with 
their alliance partners. 
Market Power Theory was also used to explain the formation of alliances ( Porter, 1980; 
Porter & Fuller, 1986), wherein it was proposed that partner firms tend to overcome the 
market uncertainties by collective power gained out of strategic alliances. 
Some researchers have proposed that alliances are a result of firms adapting "Game 
Theory " approach (Axelrod, 1984; Parkhe, 1993; McAfee and McMilan, 1996) for 
strategic decisions under uncertainty. 
Alliances are also used as part of information set that allows players to gauge the 
intention of other players. Give the variegated nature of the study of alliances, it is very 
important to incorporate these multidimensional elements (Osborne and Hagedoom. 
1997; Yan and Zeng, 1999; Langley, 1999; Albrecht, Pagano and Phoocharoon, 1996) 
while undertaking a study to understand the reasons for alliance formation. 
In dynamic environments like those experienced in the IT industry, strategic alliances 
enable the participating firms to pool or exchange resources for mutual benefit, to 
diminish competitive attacks and collectively manage the environment (Astley 1984; 
Bresser and Harl, 1986; Gupta and Lad 1983, Harrigan 1985; Nielson 1988). In such 
dynamic environments, the notion of a firm as an autonomous vertically integrated profit 
maximiser waging a solitary struggle for survival within the limits of a hostile, 
deterministic environment is not valid. 
Apart from resource dependency, alliances also are results of firms pursuing Strategic 
Behavior (Porter and Fuller, 1986; Kogut, 1988; Lewis, 1990; Larson, 1993; Hagedoom, 
1993; Doz, 1988). Firms could seek to reduce the uncertainties of operating in a foreign 
country by teaming up with a domestic firm or enter into partnerships for managing host 
country dynamics, gain market access, cope with governmental pressures, cultural 
distance etc. Firms could also use alliances to efficiently organize their activities in 
uncertain environments; Alliances could also be technological partnerships, used to 
predict technical requirements (Heide and John, 1990; Bala & Wemerfelt, 1986; 
Moxon, 1987). 
Starting and successfully continuing an international alliance is more troublesome than 
many managers expect, and there are many principal causes of failure or difficulties in 
business partnerships (Rodrigues, 1996; Griffin & Pustay, 1998; Van der Zee & Van 
Wijngaarden, 1999; Taylor, 2005). Davidow & Malone (1992) suggest that two key 
aspects of organizations, namely relationships and technology, must be successfully 
managed. 
This is in line with the observation that organizations that are linked together to cooperate 
should examine their policies, systems, structures, and culture to see if they support 
collaboration. 
Table 2 Various perspective on strategic alliances 
Strategic 
Transaction 
Cost 
Defimtion 
Partnership between firms that work together to attain 
some strategic objectives or as part of the marketing of 
the product as a stream of value chain activities where 
alliances enable each value chain activity with help of 
alliance partner 
Collaboration between firms in which they agree to 
jointly carry out tasks that are difficult or costly to 
carry out alone 
Aitthor 
Porter and 
Fuller 
Contractor & 
Lorange 
Kogut 
Bleeke & 
Ernst 
Stafford 
Sanker et A! 
Das & Teng 
Hoffman & 
Schaper 
Kale et Al 
Vecianana J 
M 
Williamson 
Hennart 
Gray & 
Wood 
Faulkner 
Smith, 
Year 
1986 
1988 
1992 
1998 
2002 
2006 
2008 
2009 
2008 
1985 
1985 
2006 
2008 
2009 
2008 
Learning 
Resource 
based view 
Co-alignment between firms in which partners hope to 
learn and acquire from each other the technologies, 
products, skills and icnowledge that are otherwise not 
available 
Voluntary cooperative inter firm agreement to achieve 
competitive advantage 
Canoll & 
Ashford 
Gulati 
Kogut 
Doz et a! 
Hammel 
Lie and 
Siocum 
Parkhe 
Lane 
Van de Ven 
Kogut 
Blodgett 
Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven 
Das & Teng 
2008 
1998 
2005 
2006 
2006 
1999 
2007 
1976 
2000 
2002 
2006 
2007 
Researchers have found that alliance governance leads to cost in sustaining alliance 
(Williamson, 1985,1991; Galbriath, 1973; Human and Provan, 1997; Gerunger and 
Herbert, 1989; Schann, 1983; Gulati, 1998). These costs could be a result oi partner 
opportunism ( Williamsonm 1991), trust building (Parkhe, 1998; Larson, 1992;Arrow. 
1974, Granovetter, 1985; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar. 
1998; Bhattacharya, Divinney and Pillutla, 1998; Das and Teng, 1998), bureaucratic 
costs (Milgroom and Roberts, 1992; Jones and Hill, 1998), renegotiation between the 
partners (Pearce, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998), Conflict resolution (Yukl. 
Falbe and Youn, 1993). 
2.2. Gaps in contemporary literature 
The identified gaps in the literature are as follows: 
• Business strategy literature has plethora of research articles related to issues like 
strategic advantage, collaborative relationships, information sharing, trust can be 
found but a research gap exists from a practitioner perspective. 
• Existing literature on strategic alliances do provide an understanding of various 
reasons why companies in USA or Europe form alliances but there is very little work 
done on emerging economies like India which face various uncertainties due to 
evolution of institutional mechanisms and forces of globalization. There have been 
studies which delve in the factors of strategic aUiances but there is no research which 
determines factors which drive domestic IT firms in India to enter into an 
international strategic alliance. 
' There is very little literature which explains the factors which influence governance 
costs of these alliances and the effect of governance costs on the performance of these 
alliances 
• Resource-based perspective has made an important contribution to the literature 
because it emphasizes the differences between firms and shows that the performance 
of firms is not determined by their industrial structure but by the resources that they 
possess and the way managers build and exploit them. Apart from its contributions. 
the resource based perspective has some flaws which are as follows 
o Priem and Butler (2001) argue that the resource-based view was originally 
started as a dynamic perspective that emphasizes changes over time (cf. 
Penrose, 1959, Wemerfelt, 1984). However, much of the subsequent literature 
has been static in concept. According to Priem and Butler, these static 
applications have several limitations with respect to strategic management 
research. One important limitation they point at is that these static approaches 
do not take into account the role of 'learning' (or exploration), while the abilit\ 
to learn to develop effective resources is in itself a resource. 
o Another important flaw of the resource based perspective is that it considers 
processes as a black box. In other words, the resource-based view does not 
provide insight into how resources can lead to competitive advantages. 
According to Priem and Butler, the literature contains many references arguing 
that resources are useful, but they do not explain when, where and how they 
lead to competitive advantage. 
The identified gaps provide motivation for the present research. Issues related to 
strategic alliances in Indian IT industry have not been investigated to much extent. 
There is no work post liberalization on Indian IT firms and therefore there is a need for 
such a research. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Nature of Study and Justification of Methodology 
Research related to alliances and inter-organi2ational network management encompasses a broad 
set of organizational and environmental variables. Issues like trust and other socio-cultural 
parameters need to be incorporated into the analysis. Researchers have suggested that a rigorous 
multidimensional research needs to be used in these settings. Uncertainties in the relationship 
between various intra and inter-organizational strategies, structures, processes and other traits 
result in difficulties in measuring the alliance performance and effectiveness (Glaister and 
Buckley, 1998). Such research is best done with qualitative research methods (Sofaer, 1999), as a 
good qualitative research provides a rich description of complex phenomenon, track unique or 
unexpected events and draw insights from the experience and interpretation of events by actors. 
The above are typical environments in which Indian IT industry operates in. However these 
findings need to be tested for generalizability (Geringer, 1998). The generalizability of the 
findings derived from the case studies would be established through a survey using the variables 
obtained in stage two. 
In order to improve validity and reliability, this research also employs quantitative research 
methods to collect specific and definite primary data. The study is made more scientific and 
generalisable through an intensive questionnaire survey. 
In addition to the questionnaire survey, it was decided to conduct a small number of case studies. 
The case study method was used in order to investigate some aspects of the research in more 
detail and to discover any new and unexpected perspectives. 
3.2. Research Questions 
This research had following objectives 
• To study the factors that drive domestic IT firms in India to enter into an international 
strategic alliance 
• To study the factors that influence governance costs of these alliance 
Such a study on IT industry in India does not exist to date. This could be a value to both theorists 
and practitioners, as IT industry has emerged as a high growth industry for the Indian economy, 
which itself has been one of the emerging economies in the world. 
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3.3. Data Description 
The Indian Information technology (IT) industry was be taken up for research. In Indian IT 
industry the focus of research was on domestic IT firms and MNC's operating out of India 
would not be taken up for research. The industry consists of electronics, telecom, hardware. 
software and IT enables services. The industry has a high degree of technical intensity and 
uncertainty. The product and project life cycle of this industry is less than a year. The percentage 
of technical manpower in these companies is very high. For the initial sample for the mail 
survey, the NASSCOM (National Association of Software and Services Companies) Directory 
would be used. A preliminary search would be done to identify firms in the NASSCOM 
directory having strategic alliances. The questionnaire would be mailed to the identified firms. 
Only the alliances between an Indian firm and foreign firms would be considered for the study. 
3.4. Primary Data 
To carry out the undertaken research work, the researcher has heavily relied on primary data by 
preparing the questionnaire to collect the information. Different set of questions were prepared to 
get the required information. The questionnaire was sent to companies 
3.5. Secondary data 
Apart from the first hand information through the questionnaire, lot of literature was also 
consulted like theses, NASSCOM directory, annual reports, projects, industrial journals, 
publications, books, magazines, articles, websites of different organization, text books, reports 
etc. to support the undertaken work in regard to conceptual part of human resource management, 
balance scorecard approach, theories, models, structures. 
The Research work was started by setting up of the objectives of the study. The hypotheses were 
framed to be tested. On the basis of the hypotheses, the data was collected and presented in the 
desired manner. The suitable statistical tools like t- test, chi-square test, Cronbach's alpha. 
Spearman Rank correlation Test were used as these tools were the most suitable in the given 
conditions. The interpretation was made to test the data. At the end of the chapter of analysis and 
interpretation, the accepted and rejected hypotheses are given in the form of table. 
3.6. Population 
The list of IT companies was picked ft-om NASSCOM Database. NASSCOM® is the premier 
trade body and the chamber of commerce of the IT-BPO industries in India. NASSCOM is a 
global trade body with more than 1200 members, which include both Indian and multinational 
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companies that have a presence in India. NASSCOM's member and associate member companies 
are broadly in the business of software development, software services, software products. 
consulting services, BPO services, e-commerce & web services, engineering services offshoring 
and animation and gaming. NASSCOM's membership base constitutes over 95% of the industry 
revenues in India and employs over 2.24 million professionals. 
3.7. Sample 
As the number of companies in NASSCOM database is large hence a sample size was determined 
using the method suggested by Nargundkar (2008). For interval scaled variables the following 
formula given by Nargundkar (2008) has been used. 
N=( Z* S / E) 2 
Where N= sample size, Z= Confidence level. S= Population standard deviation for the variable 
which we are trying to study,E= Tolerable error, expressed in the same units as the variables 
being measured. Substituting Z, S, E in above formula we get sample size to be 128 . Assuming a 
response rate of 30% the limit for number of firms that were selected for sending questionnaire 
was 350, to be on the safer side. Random Stratified sampling procedure was used in this study. 
3.8. Survey Instrument 
The objective during this stage of analysis was to choose representative firms whose alliances had 
a large spread in terms of motivational factors and also the business areas being addressed. Each 
alliance was mapped for the business area it addressed and also the benefits the Indian firm 
sought to gain. 
The data from the questionnaire were analyzed. Data was available for 238 alliances. The number 
of alliances addressing each of business areas and also the various motivational factors are 
mapped. While doing the analysis it was found that quite a few alliances figured in multiple 
categories. 
While choosing the firms to be studied for the next stage, those firms which had alliances 
addressing the maximum number of motivations and also the maximum numbers of business 
areas were considered, in order to get a good spread of the observations on alliance strategies. 
during the case studies. The number of alliances the chosen firms had were also considered. 
Firms with more number of alliances were preferred for the case studies, in order to get a better 
perspective on the alliance strategy of the organization. Care was also taken to include alliance 
partners from various geographical regions. Outlier firms were also looked at while making 
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choices for case studies, in order to avoid missing out strategy or alliance relationships which 
were unique. 
The cases were selected in order to cover the most widely addressed business areas, as well as the 
most widely addressed motivational factors. As it was difficult to find firms with a diversified 
focus on multiple business areas, the firm choices were made in such a way that the industry 
groups with high occurrence of alliances were covered from the cases selected, even if each case 
focused on just one or two business areas. Apart fi-om this, care was taken to select alliances of 
the non equity and equity type. Preference was given to the firms having a large number of 
alliances. It was also taken care that different geographical areas were represented among the 
alliance partners, in order to understand the factors relating to cultural and inter regional 
differences. The following cases were selected for the analysis in stage 2 
- Bharti BT Ltd 
Wipro Technologies Ltd 
C MAC Centrum Electronics Ltd. 
D'gipro Design Automation and Marketing Pvt. Ltd. 
Sonata Software Ltd. 
3.9. Reliability and Validity of data variables 
In this research a considerable amount of attention has been given to ensure reliability and 
validity of the results. Related earlier research have been used while developing constructs and 
measurement items. Statistical methods have been carefully selected and employed after ensuring 
fulfillment of assumptions. Finally results and conclusions have been carefully analyzed to ensure 
their feasibility. 
For reliability, the survey was administered to key executives as suggested by John and Reeve 
(1982). Survey was carefully designed with several rounds of revisions. Several interviews gave 
confidence that the respondents would not have problems in understanding the questions and that 
they would be knowledgeable about the issues covered in the questionnaire. Spector (1992) 
suggested this method to ensure reliability of data. Prior to analyzing a multi-item variable, the 
reliability and internal consistency were of vital concern. In this research, the researcher 
calculated Cronbach's alphas, namely coefficient alphas or reliability coefficient in order to 
ensure the reliability capabilities of all mufti-item variables. Values of the reliability coefficients 
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indicated correlation of various items in each variable. According to Nunnally (1967), a multi-
item variable receiving a value 0.7 over is considered very reliable. 
For face validity an extensive review of literature was carried out in order to understand the 
relevant concept both in theory and in practice. The constructs and measurement items were 
developed on the basis of previous research as far as possible. The questionnaire was developed 
and pretested to ensure that measures were in line with common understanding of concepts. 
For content validity an extensive review of literature was carried out in order to understand the 
relevant concept both in theory and in practice. The constructs and measurement items were 
developed on the basis of previous research as far as possible. The questionnaire was developed 
and pretested to ensure that measures were in line with common understanding of concepts. The 
draft questionnaire developed in stage 2 was tested in two phases. Pilot surveys for 6 firms to 
eliminate redundant variables and also to reframe the question in a fashion that would be 
understood by the respondent. The revised questionnaire after the pilot surveys was administered 
to 3 companies fi-om the 5 cases chosen in stage 2 in order to check out whether the responses to 
the questionnaire were conforming to the patters in those cases. It was found that the 
questionnaire resuUs matched with the patters in the respective case studies. 
The questionnaire was mailed to a large sample of 367 firms. These were firms from which the 
questionnaire sent during stage 1 were not rejected back due to either lack of interest or address 
change. The responses to the questionnaire had data for 130 alliances in all. 
Where-ever needed, relationships were sought to be established further through correlation 
analysis( using spearman's correlation coefficient). The data for the large samples was subjected 
to a sign test in order to understand whether there was any significant change in the motivations 
of the alliances, from time of forming the same. 
3.10. Research Design and Methodology 
The concurrent study aimed at identifying the various factors related to the governance, 
motivation /reasons and performance of strategic alliances. The focus here was to explore factors 
related to various propostions postulated earlier, based on what factors the domestic IT forms 
have considerd as important. 
Following sections give details of the three stages of research. 
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Stage 1. Broad based questionnaire survey 
A preliminary survey was carried out to understand the nature of alliances domestic IT firms 
enter into. A questionnaire was sent to 367 firms by mail. These 367 firms were selected from the 
NASSCOM list, as it covered a wide variety of Indian IT firms. Only domestic firms would be 
chosen from this list and the subsidiaries of MNCs would be left out. The responses from these 
firms was used to gain insights into the types of alliances and alliance strategies of domestic IT 
firms. Such a survey helped in stratifying the overall sample into clusters of firms, with similar 
types of alliances and similar alliances strategies. The objective of this survey wase to select few 
representative firms out of clusters formed to carry out an in-depth study. 
Stage 2. Case Studies 
Representative firms were chosen from the above clusters in order to understand the management 
of alliances better. Case studies were carried out on these firms. These studies were based on in-
depth interviews and reports. Multiple interviews were done to take into account rival 
explanations (Patton, 1999; Yin, 1999). In order to gain richer data, apart from informant 
interviews, a content analysis of relevant documents was also be done (Yin, 1984; Webb. 
Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest, 1972; Gummesson,I991). The objective of the case studies 
was to generate measureable variables that could be tested for generalizability. The cases was 
chosen in such a way that each case would represent a wider variety of reasons/ motivational 
factors and also a wider representative of industry presence. 
Stage 3. Validation of variables 
The variables generated from the previous stage were used to design a questionnaire. The 
variables generated fi-om stage two were subjected to statistical analysis in order to establish the 
generalizability of the variables. 
Both the surveys in stage 1 and 3 were mail surveys and had telephone / email reminders and 
interaction as follow up acfion and thus followed Total Design Method (Salant and Dillman. 
1994;Dillman, 1978). 
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4. ANALYSIS 
The findings are based on the questionnaire survey for a large sample. The methodology for the analysis 
was outlined in the last section of previous chapter. 
The results of the analysis carried out for the whole sample are presented below. The section below 
discusses the basic motivational factors for the formation of the alliances. This is followed by the section 
on the support of the hypothesis. These sections are followed by a section highlighting some general 
observations. A statistical analysis was done for the overall sample and complete group of non equity 
alliances and the non equity alliances for marketing and learning. For the other groups however, since the 
sample size was small o statistical analysis could be done. However only in the cases where an 
overwhelming trend was observed the findings were elaborated. 
4.1. Statistical Analysis 
While looking for support for the hypothesis, the analysis was carried out to identify factors falling into 
the following categories: Significantly relevant factors, Significantly Important factors, Significantly non-
relevant factors 
4.2. Resource Dependency Argument 
Hypothesis 1: Internal strategic alliances do not allow domestic IT firms to access spatially differentiated 
resources and are not entered into for gaining access to technology. 
Two sub hypothesis, one dealing with spatially differentiated resources and the other dealing with 
technology were tested. 
Alliances for Accessing Spatially Differentiated Resources 
Table 3 Hypothesis 1.1 testing 
Hypothesis l.I posits that spatially 
differentiated resources are not 
accessed by domestic IT firms 
from International Strategic 
Alliances. 
The data shows that domestic IT fin 
N 
130 
ns sought t 
Std 
deviation 
3.2 
0 gain the p 
t 
3.1 
roducts o: 
Significance 
value 
0.001 
' the partners {K 
Reject 
Hypothesi 
s 
= 130; propor 
indicating factor as relevant=0.73, ;proportion indicating factor as important=0.60; upper conf limit of 
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proportion=0.58). The products and the knowledge of the technology in terms of using the products were 
the important resources sought to be gained by these firms (N=130;proportion indicating factor as 
relevant=0.76 ;proportion indicating factor as important=0.63; upper conf limit of profx)rtion=0.58). 
These resources are not available locally, as the product makers are situated outside the country. 
Table 4 Hypothesis 1.2 testing 
Hypothesis 1.2 posits that access to 
technology was not perceived to be a 
factor by domestic IT firms to gain fi-om 
International Strategic Alliances. 
"Richer and faster access of technology t 
TV 
86 
hrough trs 
Std 
deviation 
3.9 
lining progran 
/ 
4.2 
is" stooc 
Significance 
value (p) 
0.008 
Rejecl 
Hypothesis 
out as a motivational facto 
with a high degree of importance (N=91;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.67 ; proportion 
indicating factor as important=0.73 ;upper conf limit of proportion=0.60). 
4.3. Environmental Dependency Argument 
Hypothesis 2: Environmental factors and constraints will not initiate the use of international strategic 
alliances by domestic IT firms in an emerging economy and they are not used to overcome uncertainties 
related to vertically linked activities. 
Alliances for overcoming uncertainty in vertically linked activities 
Table S Hypothesis 2.1 testing 
Hypothesis 2.1 : International 
Strategic Alliances are not used 
by domestic firms in an 
emerging economy to overcome 
uncertainties related to 
vertically linked activities 
N 
30 
Std 
deviation 
1.96 
t 
-12.10 
Significanc 
e value (p) 
0.007 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
The data shows that there were no demand related uncertainties which were sought to 
overcome through the alliances. As majority of alliance partners were not marketing partners, 
enabling customer interaction for the domestic firm and since the marketing interactions were 
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handled predominately by the Indian firms, the expectations from the foreign firms for 
mitigating the risks of customer behavior or the market/ players related uncertainty and also 
uncertainties related to capacity fluctuation were low. 
Table 6 Hypothesis 2.2 testing 
Hypothesis 2.2: Domestic IT 
firms do not enter into 
international strategic alliances 
to overcome interregional 
differences associated with 
policy and culture. 
N 
28 
Std 
deviation 
5.4 
t 
3.915 
Significance 
value (p) 
0.002 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
This hypothesis was considered significantly relevant and important only on the factor of Indian firms 
seeking endorsements in intemational markets from foreign partners (n=84; proportion of respondents 
indicating the factor to be relevant =0.62; proportion of respondents indicating the factors to be 
important=0.61; L)CL=0.61) 
The data shows that forms did not face any major issues relating to difference in policy or culture across 
the geographies they operate in. They however seek to leverage on the association they have with the 
partner, by seeking their endorsements for their capabilities partners (n=84; proportion of respondents 
indicating the factor to be relevant =0.62; proportion of respondents indicating the factors to be 
important=0.61; UCL=0.61). 
Alliances for Overcoming Competitive Uncertainties 
Table 7 Hypotlicsis 2.3 testing 
Hypothesis 2.3 : Domestic IT firms in 
an emerging economy do not use 
International Strategic Alliances to 
overcome competitive uncertainty. 
N 
82 
Std 
deviation 
1.96 
t 
-4.40 
Significance 
value(p) 
0.0002 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
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This hypothesis was considered significantly relevant and important only the for the factor of Indian firms 
seeking to reduce dependence on a narrow range of customer (n=91; proportion of respondents indicating 
the factor to be relevant = 0.67; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be important = 0.76 : 
Upper confidence limit of proportion =0.60). 
Table 8 Hypothesis 2.4 testing 
Hypothesis 2.4 Technical 
changes do not drive domestic IT 
firms to form international 
Strategic Alliance. 
N 
32 
Std 
deviation 
3.89 
t 
34.216915 
Significanc 
e value(p) 
0.009 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
This hypothesis was considered significantly relevant and important only on the factor of Indian firms 
seeking to cope up with technology change by accessing forums / material of the partners (n=86; 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.64; proportion of respondents indicating 
the factor to be important =0.73;UCL=0.61).Since the domestic IT firms were more of technology users 
rather than developers, the expectation from the partners for sharing R&D expenses and helping in 
establishing / coping with standards was low. However, the Indian firms had a high expectation for the 
partners to give access to their forums and material, in order to stay abreast with new developments to be 
able to provide solutions to customers in a better way. Sharing of beta versions, technology trends etc by 
the foreign partners were also found to be a relevant motivational factor, though not important. 
4.4. Internal Organization Dependency 
Hypothesis 3: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not enter into International Strategic 
Alliances to exploit competitive advantages and International Strategic Alliances do not distribute risks 
and do not help in gaining flexibility in the organizational activities for domestic IT firms. 
Table 9 Hypothesis 3.1 testing 
Hypothesis 3.1: Domestic TT will not 
enter into strategic alliances to exploit 
competitive advantages related to 
vertical disaggregation and spatial 
separation offitnctions. 
N 
74 
Std 
deviation 
2.3 
t 
-4.1 
Significanc 
e value (p) 
0.001 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
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The hypothesis was significantly relevant and important only for the factor of Indian firms seeking to use 
the alliance partner as a supplying partner for supplying inputs at cheaper prices. (n=99; proportion of 
respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.73; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to 
be important =0.63 ;UCL=0.60) 
Alliances for Distributing Risks and Gaining Flexibility in Operations 
Table 10 Hypothesis 3.2 testing 
Hypothesis 3.2 International 
Strategic Alliances do not distribute 
risks and do not help in gaining 
flexibility in the organizational 
activities for domestic IT firms. 
N 
23 
Std 
deviation 
6.55 
t 
3.553 
Significanc 
e vaiue(p) 
0.03 
Reject 
Hypothesi 
s 
This Hypothesis was looked from two perspectives 1) facilitating reduction in operational risks and b) 
more operational flexibility for Indian firms. Manpower was the key strength of the domestic IT firms and 
is showcased as a complementary resource to the foreign partners. Once this was in place, domestic IT 
firms do not seem to perceive any operational risks that could be mitigated through alliances. The 
products /equipment supplied by the partners being well established , domestic IT firms do not consider 
failure of these as risks to be mitigated by partnering with the suppliers of these products. 
4.5. Cost Driver 
Effect of partner behavior on Alliance Governance costs 
Hypothesis 4: The behavioral uncertainty and partner asymmetry between alliance partners do not 
influence the governance costs in International Strategic Alliances. Partner reputation will not serve as a 
credible commitment and trust and cooperation between partners will not reduce the cost of International 
Strategic Alliances. 
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Effect of partner reputation on Alliance Governance costs 
Table 11 Hypothesis 4.1 testing 
Hypothesis 4.1 posits that partner 
reputation will not serve as a 
credible commitment in 
International Strategic Alliance 
relationships for domestic IT firms. 
N 
124 
Std 
deviation 
1.96 
t 
-12.1 
Significance 
value(p) 
0.021 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Factors related to market strengths future outlook, technology strengths and market reputation were 
considered important for an effective relationship. Issues relating to how the market feels about the 
partner and also about what the partner feels about the market and the partner's technology strength 
apf)ear to be considered.. Overall the respondents have indicated that an understanding of the reputation 
of the partner has helped them to manage the alliances better and also to reduce the governance costs. 
Effect of trust and cooperation on Alliance Governance costs 
Table 12 Hypothesis 4.2 testing 
Hypothesis 4.2 posits that trust and 
cooperation between participating 
firms will not reduce the cost of 
associated with an International 
Strategic Alliances for domestic IT 
firms in an emerging economy. 
N 
93 
Std 
deviation 
3.38 
t 
3.4 
Significance 
value(p) 
0.001 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
This hypothesis was supported by the data as majority of the alliances were relationships with a high level 
of trust. The respondents indicated that the efforts put by their firms to build trust with the partner 
increased trust in the alliance. Majority of the respondents felt that the efforts put in by their companies to 
build trust between them and their partners have not added to the governance cost of the alliances (n= 118: 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.87; proportion of respondents indicating 
that the efforts for trust building have not added to the governance cost=0.70; UCL=0.50). 
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Effect of physical, cultural and organizational distance on alliance governance costs. 
Table 13 Hypothesis 4.3 testing 
Hypothesis 4.3 posits that for domestic 
IT firms in an emerging economy, 
physical, cultural and organizational 
distance between partners will not 
contribute to governance costs of 
international strategic alliances. 
N 
47 
Std 
deviation 
4.04 
t 
5.4 
Significanc 
e value(p) 
0.006 
Reject 
Hypothesi 
s 
The data showed that the administrative, travel and communication costs resulting from the 
distance between the firms whether physical, cultural or organizational had added to the alliance 
governance costs. This was triggered by the differences in business and operational culture and 
also due to the differences in work ethos. The costs due to differences in language were not 
found to be relevant. 
Effect of Alliance Experience on Alliance Governance Costs 
Table 14 Hypothesis 4.4 testing 
Hypothesis 4.4 posits that for domestic IT 
firms in an emerging economy. International 
Strategic Alliances cannot be cheaper for 
firms with experience at forming and 
maintain relationships. 
N 
16 
Std 
deviation 
3.3 
t 
2.6 
Significanc 
e value(p) 
0.015 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
The learnings have been different for the different groups. Effect of cost reduction on account of 
these learnings increased as the number of alliances increased. For firms with just two alliances 
the most important learnings were the ability to choose a good partner and effective structuring 
of the alliance. 
For firms with 3-5 alliances, the most important learnings were better understanding of 
expectations and behavior of partners and effective structuring of the alliance. For firms with 
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more than 5 alliances, the most important learnings were a better understanding of the purpose of 
the alliance and a better understanding of the expectations and behavior of the partners. 
Effect of Alliance Structure on Alliance Governance Costs 
Table IS Hypothesis 5 testing 
Hypothesis 5 posits that for 
domestic IT firms in an emerging 
economy the structure of an 
International Strategic Alliance will 
not influence its governance costs. 
N 
38 
Std 
deviation 
3.18 
t 
19.386 
Significance 
value(p) 
0.005 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
It was found that the factors decreasing the flexibility in the alliance structure added to the governance 
costs and the factors increasing the flexibility reduced the governance costs. It can thus be concluded that 
the way the alliance structure would have an impact on the governance costs. 
Effect of Alliance Function on Alliance Governance Costs 
Table 16 Hypothesis 6 testing 
Hypothesis 6 posts that for domestic 
IT firms in an emerging economy the 
function of an International 
Strategic Alliance will not influence 
its governance costs. 
N 
41 
Std 
deviation 
4.04 
t 
5.46 
Significance 
value(p) 
0.001 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
The variables relating to the function of the alliance were not found to be relevant for alliance governance 
costs in the sample considered. It was found that an overwhelming majority of the respondents who 
indicated that the factors were relevant also indicated that these factors added to the governance costs. 
The costs of adapting to the strategic reorientation of the partner firm strategic reorientation of the Indian 
firm and also the change in the alliance/project scope added to the governance costs. It may also be noted 
here that the alliances were found to be extremely flexible. This could also have led to the finding that the 
alliance function did not have a significant impact on the alliance governance costs. 
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5. RESULTS 
The following section summarizes the findings and also captures the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the findings elaborated in the previous chapter. 
5.1. Summary of findings 
Summary of the findings of this research is as follows 
Table 17 Summary findings 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1.1 
Hypothesis 1.2 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2.1 
Hypothesis 2.2 
Hypothesis 2.3 
Hypothesis 2.4 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3.1 
Hypothesis 3.2 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4.1 
Hypothesis 4.2 • 
Hypothesis 4.3 
Hypothesis 4.4 
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 6 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
5.2. Implications for theory and further research 
A suggestion for further research is to conduct a 'real' longitudinal study in which the responses of are 
traced in 'real time' over a longer period of time. 
Earlier research on strategic alliances looked at the motivations for alliance formation and also the 
governance costs drivers and its relationship to the alliance performance. The current work helps in 
understanding the variations with respect to the above across various types of alliances viz.. marketing, 
learning and technology alliances as well as non equity and EJV type of alliances. 
Earlier research have also found that IT firms tend to form alliances with firms on the supply side in large 
numbers ( Bonefiled, 1995). This was found to be true in current research also. It was also found by 
researchers ( Hagedoom, 2002) that R&D alliances were concentrated mostly in developed nations. This 
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research in its attempt to understand the alliances in an emerging has found further support to 
Hagedoom's finding specifically in the context of IT firms as majority of the alliances were not R&D 
alliances but alliances meant for commercialization of the products of the innovators. 
Knowledge being a critical resource in the IT industry it is difficult for innovators to protect the 
knowledge. Strategic Alliances and social networks (Deroian, 2002) help them to diffuse this knowledge 
for commercial gains (Rosenbaum, 1993). This learning helps Indian firms in delivering effective 
solutions to their own clients. Institutional theorists (Scott and Meyer, 1994) have also argued that firms 
tend to increase their legitimacy in a field through interorganizational relationships. This could be true 
with the foreign firms trying to have a larger customer base through their partnerships with the Indian 
firms. 
The findings of the research are also in line with recent work (Supphellen, Haugland and J|Komeliussen, 
2002) who have found that in International strategic alliances, the closeness of the partner to the strategic 
core of the firm, the degree of dissimilarity among potential partners, degree of expected opportunism and 
prior experience with cooperation are critical for the success of the alliance. 
A clear distinction emerges between marketing and learning alliances. These distinctions and 
observations help us to arrive at the following hypothesis, which need to be tested in a larger sample and 
in different types of industries. 
Hypothesis A: For domestic IT firms in an emerging economy, spatially separated resources can be 
leveraged on spatially disaggregating functions and entering into alliance relationships outside the 
clusters. 
Hypothesis B: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy entering into learning alliances with foreign 
firms do not have motivations of overcoming uncertainties relating to internal organization of activities b\ 
participating in such an alliance relationships. 
Hypothesis C: IT firms in an emerging economy entering into learning alliances with foreign funds do not 
have motivations of overcoming uncertainties relating to internal organization of activities by 
participating in such an alliance relationship. 
5.3. Implications for Managers and Practitioners 
The findings of this research have shown that Indian firms have used the International Strategic Alliances 
extensively to gain a footprint in the customized software and systems management segments of the IT 
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industry and have been fairly successful. These are in line with the recommendations of korwar (1991). 
Korwar's work which was written prior to liberalization and much more earlier compared to the 
formation of many of the alliances considered here, proposed that the strengths of the Indian IT firms viz.. 
technical manpower and the weakness of foreign firms viz., shortage of trained manpower are 
complementary. Similarly the strengths of the foreign partners viz., credibility \, experience etc and the 
weakness of the Indian partners viz., lack of knowledge , credibility in solving business problems etc are 
complementary. It was put forth a good leveraging on these synergies would lead to effective 
international strategic alliances for Indian IT firms. This trend appears to have happened over the years 
and the Indian IT firms have indeed exploited the synergies well. 
The findings are also supportive of some of the propositions put forward by Dargo (1997) for strategic 
alliances in the IT industry. It was proposed by him that alliances are most sought after in highly 
innovative industries with firms which produce component parts of a larger technological system, in 
situations where it is important to set industry standard and firms entering into new markets. 
While many of the variables dealt with for the various hypothesis in this study were not found to be 
relevant for the firms in the sample these can be used for developing metrics for devising and measuring 
the deliberate strategies of firms. 
The study suggests the following for practitioners for effectively managing alliances: 
• The governance costs of managing alliances are lower for alliances with a high level of trust. 
Efforts put in for building trust can reduce governance costs and result in an effective 
relationship. 
• Governance costs can be lower if the firm has past experience in managing alliances. Firms which 
do not have high experience in managing alliances need to look for hiring managers with priori 
experience in managing alliances for reducing governance costs 
• The partner asymmetry leads to higher governance costs. Firms need to put in efforts to 
understand the organizational, national and societal culture of their partners. 
• Firms need to put in efforts to select partners with good reputation. Having a reputed partner can 
result in an alliance with lower governance costs. 
• Firms need to flexibly structure their alliance relationship for being able to adapt to the changes in 
the environment. This leads to lower governance costs. 
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5.4. Limitations of the study 
The study was primarily done for companies that had registered with NASSCOM. Though there should 
not be many exclusions ( specially the important ones), still that is a limitation of this study and might 
require a wider coverage of companies that have not been registered with NASSCOM. 
This study has shown that strategic alliances are non static and more dynamic than assumed in current 
work across the world. Therefore, more research is required that assumed strategic alliances as dynamic. 
Such approaches also involve requirements with respect to the methodology. According to Langley 
(1999), research on dynamic phenomena has been approached in two ways. Some researchers have used 
coarse-grained research approaches in order to test a-priori formulated theories, while others have used 
fine-grained qualitative research approaches in an attempt to build theory. However, a great deal of 
literature calls for more in-depth process research, which helps understand organizational phenomena 
over time on more levels than just the superficial one. 
The sample for EJVs and also for non equity alliances for technology was small to generate rich 
comparative findings. Due to time and logistic constraints further attempts to expand the sample were not 
made. 
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PREFACE 
The Indian IT industry lias experienced an increasing trend in the formation of strategic 
alliances in recent times, more particularly between domestic IT firms and foreign firms. 
The industry is characterized by a high degree of environmental uncertainty, short 
product lifecycles and even shorter product development cycles. The study in this 
research would look into motivational factors and governance costs of strategic alliances 
in Indian IT industry. 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter deals with providing an 
introduction to strategic alliances. It introduces concept of strategic alliances and traces 
its origin. The chapter also discusses rationale behind present research. It discusses the 
objectives of study and provides a background and scope of the study Chapter two 
discusses the environment of the study from both country and industry perspective. 
Chapter three undertakes an extensive review of the literature on motivations and 
governance costs pertaining to strategic alliances. It gives an overview of various 
classifications and taxonomies of strategic alliance literature as identified by different 
researchers. Thereafter it elaborates on the major research stream. It then discusses the 
reasons for alliance formations and cost drivers of strategic alliances. It then identifies 
strengths and research gaps in the existing literature on factors that motivate formation of 
strategic alliances and governance costs. It then seeks out the problem areas existing in 
the literature. The gaps relate to both theory and practice in motivations and governance 
costs and apply to both Indian and global studies. 
The fourth chapter deals with discussion on the need of research and research objectives. 
It elaborates the research design and methodology. A discussion of population, sample, 
primary and secondary data is undertaken. Brief overview of justification of methodology 
and survey instrument is also covered in this chapter. The research questions and research 
hypothesis considered for the study are stated. 
VI 
The fifth chapter commences with the discussion of the data analysis. The data for 
hypothesis is analyzed in this chapter. The hypothesis are grouped on basis of Motivation 
(resource dependency. Environmental dependency and Internal organization) and Cost 
drivers. 
Sixth chapter undertakes a discussion of the findings based on analysis undertaken. It 
then presents the conclusions of the study. Implications for theory and further research is 
highlighted along with limitations of this study. The chapter concludes with Implications 
for Managers and Practitioners. 
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In the past 20 years, the world has witnessed a phenomenal growth in strategic alliances 
across industries especially in high tech industry. During 2000-209 there was hardly a 
month where strategic alliances were not signed between the companies. Since the cost of 
developing a new product is increasing by the day hence strategic alliances have become 
an important lever to become more competitive by gaining access to external resources 
(Schlosser 2001). Strategic alliances are becoming more common in the new economic 
landscape, especially those which are international in nature and are between firms across 
the countries (Hoffmann 2000). 
However, the strategic alliances area is dominated with failures. Reasons for the failures 
are more often attributed to the dynamic nature of the alliance (Harrigan 1998). The 
relationship between the partners change due to the changing nature of the business 
(Faulkner 1995). Information asymmetry has also been cited as one reason of failure of 
strategic alliance (1988 Bleeke & Ernst 1993). The partners also have issues in handling 
organizational interdependence. The social and cultural differences also play a major role 
in the success / failure of the alliance (Walmsley, 1982; Lorange & Roos 1992). The 
nature of international strategic alliances brings inherent unstable elements in picture like 
clash of interests, multiple decisions making, etc (Arino ,1998). 
Emerging economic regions play a critical role in global economies. The economic 
context of countries in emerging world is of crucial importance both for incumbent firms 
as well as new entrants and has a significant relationship with the strategies of these 
firms. India's announcement of new economic policy in July 1991 was a milestone in its 
efforts to open up the economy and move to the center stage of international business. As 
a result of this change, many multinational companies entered India through various 
strategic alHances to improve chances of their success, locally and globally. 
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After opening up of India's economy, the GDP growth rate which was hovering at 3.5% 
has now reached to 9% and Information technology (IT) has emerged an important driver 
of this economic change in India. Almost all top software companies of the world have 
products or services which have been developed or supported in India. 
The Indian IT industry has experienced an increasing trend in the formation of strategic 
alliances in recent times, more particularly between the domestic and foreign firms. The 
industry is characterized by high degree of environmental uncertainty, short product life 
cycles and even shorter development cycles. The incidences of alliances are on rise due to 
the unavoidable structural linkages, increasing information dynamism and changes in 
organizational capacities. With the increasing turbulence and causal ambiguity in the 
business environments of today, the need for inter-organizational alliances has increased 
immensely. Particularly in the IT industry, there is an increasing propensity to enter in 
strategic alliances. Since India is an emerging economy, the domestic IT firms are yet to 
reach the maturity level of handling the international strategic alliances; therefore factors 
that motivate formation of alliance, cost of governance and its effect on performance of 
strategic alliances is an important area of study. 
Emerging economies like India face various uncertainties due to evolution of institutional 
mechanisms and forces of globalization. Apart from this, owing to high degree of 
technical change, the level of uncertainfies in industries like IT is very high. 
LI Need for Research 
There have been several empirical studies of strategic alliances. In a study that examined 
over 800 alliances, it was found that only close to forty percent managed to survive four 
years and that less than ten percent managed ten years (killing 1983 and Harrigan 1983). 
Other studies have found that more than sixty percent of all strategic alliances disappear 
or get reorganized within less than five years of their formation (Bleeke 1993). A study 
by Ernst (1993) showed that close to seventy percent of the alliances face problems 
within first two years of creation. There are many alliances which get terminated midway. 
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The high mortality rate provides pointers on the complexity of relationships expressed by 
alliance managers. Therefore there is a need for insight into characteristics of strategic 
alliances and their key factors of success. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The focus of proposed study would be international strategic alliances between domestic 
and foreign firms in Indian IT Industry. Broad objective of this research is as follows 
• To study the factors that drive domestic IT firms in India to enter into an 
international strategic alliance 
• To study the factors that influence governance costs of these alliance 
Such a study on IT industry in India does not exist to date. This could be a value to both 
theorists and practitioners, as IT industry has emerged as a high growth industry for the 
Indian economy, which itself has been one of the emerging economies in the world. 
Alliance formation would be looked from three perspective- resource dependency, 
environmental uncertainty and internal organization. Researchers have proposed different 
models for alliance formation and governance ( Brouthers, Brouthers and Harris, 1997). 
However, with the high degree of uncertainty in the environments of firms, the 
management of alliances is becoming increasing challenging. The large number of 
failures of alliances (Duysters, Kok and Vaandrager, 1999) suggests that there could be a 
gap in understanding alliance formation, alliance management and the relational and 
performance risks involved (Das and Teng, 1999). There have been theoretical works 
( Spekman Forbes HI, Isabella and MacAvoy, 1998) to bridge this gap. However, fresh 
empirical research, especially in Indian context, which can bridge this gap in 
understanding, would be great use both for academia and practitioners. 
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1.3 Background and Scope of the study 
The term 'strategic alliance' refers to various forms of cooperation among/ between 
firms, 'fi-om one off cooperation oriented firms to more strategic forms of cooperation' 
(Nooteboom, 1999, p.l). The term alliance refers to various forms of cooperation 
between firms that go beyond one time transaction. In various forms of alliances 
governance of the alliances plays an important role in success /failure of the alliance 
(Nooteboom, 1999). Although firms interdependence is a common characteristic, there is 
a wide range of alliances. Therefore, researchers need to take into account the different 
forms and functions of alliances and their unique capabilities and limitations (Osbom and 
Hagedoom, 1997). 
In the last few years, researchers have agreed to the fact that there are various forms of 
alliance. Various forms of differentiation among firms are based on alliance functions and 
motivations (Osbom and Hagedoom, 1997). The different motivations that alliance 
partners may have, has been divided into two categories: a motivation to exploit existing 
resources ('exploitation alliance') and a motivation to explore new opportunities 
('exploration alliance') (Koza and Lewin, 1998). Exploration includes issues such as 
search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, and innovation 
whereas exploitation involves aspects such as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, 
election, implementation, and execution. 
Expected Return of Investment varies based on the type of motivation, exploration or 
exploitation. Organizations that engage in exploration with the exclusion of exploitation 
may find that they suffer the costs of experimenting without gaining a great deal of its 
benefits. On the other hand, organizations that engage in too much exploitation might 
become inert and unable to adapt to their environments in the long run. 
The present research would be an effort to understand, with empirical support, the factors 
which are responsible for the formation of international strategic alliances by IT firms in 
India and the factors which contribute to the govemance and performance of strategic 
alliances. Emerging economies like India face various uncertainties due to the evolution 
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of institutional mechanism and the forces of globalization. Apart from this, owing to the 
high degree of technical changes and resource dependency, the level of uncertainty in 
industries like the IT industry is very high. The focus of this study is international 
strategic alliances that domestic Information Technology firms in India have with foreign 
IT firms. 
L4 Key Definitions 
This chapter elaborates on the definitions of various key terms used in this research. 
Apart from defining the key terms, the chapter also has explanations for various concepts 
and premises used in this study. 
The Information Technology Industry covers the entire gamut of sectors like computer 
software, computer hardware; IT enabled services, medical electronics, 
telecommunication equipments (NASSCOM, 2010). A firm operating in Information 
Technology industry is defined as an IT Firm. 
An IT firm promoted by any Indian whether resident or nonresident, whose major 
operations are executed out of India is considered to be domestic IT firm for this study. 
Strategic alliances have been defined in various ways by different researchers, from the 
point of view of their research focus. Chan and Hiede (1993) have defined strategic 
alliance as a contractual agreement among firms to cooperate, to obtain an objective. 
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) have defined Strategic alliances as relationships involving at 
least two partner firms that i) remain legally independent after the alliance is formed ii) 
share benefits and managerial control over the performance of assigned task iii)make 
continuous contributions in one identified strategic areas. 
Other researchers (Harrigan,1987 ; Hamel, Doz and Prahalad,1989; Porter and Fuller, 
1986) have included a gamut of inter-organizational relationships in their 
19 
conceptualization of strategic alliances ranging from licensing agreements to equity joint 
ventures. 
For the purpose of this research, the definition given by Spekman, Forbes III, Isabella and 
MacAvoy (1998) has been adopted. Strategic alliances are defined as close collaborative 
relationships between two or more firms with the intent of accomplishing mutually 
compatible goals that would be difficult for each to accomplish alone. 
International strategic aUianc&, which are one of the focus areas of the current study, 
are subset of strategic alliances. These are cooperative arrangements, with cross border 
flows and linkages that utilize resources for autonomous organizations headquartered in 
different countries (Parkhe, 1991). Strategic Alliances where the partner of the domestic 
IT firm is an overseas firm were considered as International Strategic Alliances. 
Environment^ Uncertainty as defined by Milliken (1987) is the perceived inability of an 
organization's key management to accurately assess the external environment or the 
future changes that might occur in such environments. They could be on a scale of simple 
to complex or static to dynamic (Duncan, 1972). Dess and Beard (1984) have found that 
characteristics of the organization environments is based on munificence (capacity 
based), complexity (homogeneity to heterogeneity. Concentrated or dispersed) and 
dynamism (stability and degree of turbulence). 
IT firms operate in dynamic, complex and munificent environments, owing to high 
degree of technology change and the short product development and product life cycles. 
For the purpose of this research, environments similar to the "turbulent-field 
environments" conceptualized by Emery and Trist (1965) are considered. Such 
environments are characterized by firms developing new products and services on a 
continual basis and also reevaluating the relationship to government agencies, customers 
and suppliers continually. 
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Emerging Economies are rapid-growth countries which are using economic Hberalization 
as their primary engine of growth. Resource commitments are critical for the growth of 
business in emerging economies (Isobe, Makino and Mongomery, 2000). Historically, 
planned economies were ruled by power relations and bureaucratic controls. 
In emerging economies, market supporting institutions such as property rights, capital 
markets, labor markets and regulatory institutions are also in process of learning and 
adopting new concepts. 
For the purpose of this research, the definition of Arnold & Quelch (1998) is adopted. An 
emerging economy is the economy which satisfies two major criteria: rapid pace of 
economic development and government policies favoring economic liberalization. 
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CHAPTER 2: INDIAN IT ENVIRONMENT 
The current chapter provides and overview of the Indian economic context as well as 
the Information Technology industry. This provides an understanding of the 
characteristics of a typical emerging economy and also those of a technology 
intensive Industry like the IT industry. 
2.1 India : An emerging economy 
Emerging economic regions have been playing a critical role in global economy. 
Emerging economies use a variety of policy reforms in order to fuel the growth of 
business and also to integrate faster into the global market place. These reforms could 
include minimizing state intervention, establising free market economy and 
integrating the economy with the global economic system (Erdal and tatoglu, 2002). 
Market reforms, in particular establising macroeconomic and fiscal stability and 
liberlising trade regimes are a prerequisite for integrating developing nations into the 
global economy (Graham, 2001). Countries also use economic liberlization for 
fueling growth. The import substitution strategy of development pursued until the 
early 1980s was one of the primary cause of the low levels of FDI 
(Balasubramanyam, 1996). 
Prior to the liberlization, because the state possessed a legal monopoly on coercion 
and was present in the background of every major economic transaction (North, 
1990), it posed a threat to the revenue stream of all private firms. In emerging 
economies the pattern of the government involvement in private corporate activities 
range from string price subsidization to heavy income taxation (Havrylyshyn and Van 
Rooden, 2000). 
The economic context of the country is of crucial importance both for the incumbent 
firms as well as new entrants and has a significant relationship with the strategies of 
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these firms. Entry mode for multinational enterprises into emerging economies is 
influenced by situational contigencies related to nation, industry, firm and project 
(Lou, 2001). As a result firms may enter into various allainces either for marketing or 
for gaining knowledge through learning or formal technology transfer agreements. 
The changes brought about in the recent past in the Indian economy would place it 
well under the category of emerging economies. The policy changes brought about by 
the government of India in the recent past and their implications to the industry are 
elaborated below. 
After averaging about 3.6 % a year in GDP growth during the past 30 years between 
1950-80 GDP growth accelerated to 5.6 % in 1980s and averaged even higher at 6% 
in the last decade. Now it is hovering aroung 8%. 
The announcement of a new economic policy in July 1991 was an historic event. The 
new industrial policy, launched in conjunction with a liberlized trade policy and 
vigorous reform of the monetary and fiscal sectors, is part of a comprehensive and 
ongoing porgram of economic reforms that aims at realizing country's immense 
economic potential. The underlying rationale of economic reforms has been to move 
from a closed economy to an open economy that is more responsive to market signals 
and thus achieveing greater efficiency (tarapore, 1997). The new measures spanned a 
wide area covering industrial and import licensing, foreign investment, financial 
markets and exports. 
Financial reforms 
Financial reforms inlcuded measures such as opening up of capital markets with the 
abolition of Capital Issues Control Act 1947, giving way to free pricing of capital 
issues and making equity finance an attractive source of funds. Foreign Institutional 
investors have also been allowed to invest in both equity and debt markets. Measures 
also included changes in the exchange regime leading eventually to a market-
determined exchange rate, and current account convertability facilitating a more 
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libera] exchange control system. The exchange rate imbalance has been brought down 
with the effective exchange rate of rupee depriciting by 36% in real terms between 
1990-93. Access to foreign funds has been increased through a liberlised external 
commerical borrowings (ECB) policy and allowing recourse to Global Depository 
Receipts (GDRs), American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Foreign Currency 
Convertible Bonds (FCCBs). This enabled enterprises to take advantage of interest 
rate differentials between domestic and global markets and rasie cheaper funds. 
Foreign Investment Related Reforms 
The foreign Investment Promotion Board was contstituted for expediting approvals 
after amending archaic Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and bringing in Foreign 
Exchange Management Act, to liberlize the operating environment for firms with 
foreign equity and also to make it easier for Indian business operating aboard. A new 
policy was promoted by the FIls in the secondary market for the Indian Stocks. 
Portfolio foreign investment was also encouraged through the medium GDRs and 
ADRs, floated abroad by Indian firms. FDl approval, up to 51% of equity was made 
automatic in large number of industries. 
The Results of Liberlization 
India's exports have grown much faster as compared to past few decades. Several 
factors appear to have contributed to this phenomenon including Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) which has been rising consistently especially from the early 1990s. 
FDI in India has grown considerably since reforms began in 1991, with FDl flows 
rising fi-om less than $300 million in 1992/93 to $25.5 billion during 2007-08 ( RBI 
Bulletin, May 14,2008, VI. The External Economy). 
The global economy expanded by 4.9 per cent in 2007 as against 5.0 per cent in 2006. 
After a stronger than expected growth in the third quarter of 2007, growth in most of 
the advanced economies decelerated sharply in the last quarter of 2007, mainly on 
account of the financial crisis that has spread beyond the US sub-prime mortgage 
market. In contrast, emerging and developing economies continued to grow above the 
trend, despite some slackening of exports and industrial production towards the end r. 
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Effect of Liberlization on foreign collaboration 
From Apr 2000 to July 2010 there has been increaing inflow of FDl and the number 
is growqing by leaps and bounds. 
Table 2-1 FDl Inflow 
CUMULATIVE FDl FLOWS INTO INDIA (1991-2010): 
(Equity inflows + including data on 'Re-invested earnings' & 'Other 
capital', which is available from April 2000 onwards. These are the 
estimates on an average basis, based upon data for the previous two 
years, published by RBI in their Monthly Bulletin) 
CUMULATIVE AMOUNT OF FDl EQUITY INFLOWS(from 
August 1991 to July 2010)* 
Million 
USS 1,72,108 
US$ 1,40,020 
Src: hnp://dipp.nic.in/fdi_statistics/iiidia_FDI_July2010 pdf 
1 able 2-2 Foreign Iraosfcr ApprovaU 
COUNTRY-WISE FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER APPROVALS 
Amount Rupees in crores 
Ranks 
1 
2 
3 
4. 
5 
6 
7 
8. 
9 
10 
Counuy 
MAURmUS 
SINGAPORE 
U.S.A. 
U.K. 
NETHERLANDS 
JAPAN 
CYPRUS 
GERMANY 
FRANCE 
U.A.E. 
TOTAL FDl I N F L O W S ' 
2008^9 
lApril-
Uatchi 
50.7M 
(11.2081 
16.727 
(J.454) 
8.002 
(1.802) 
3.640 
(864) 
3.922 
(883) 
1.8S& 
(405) 
5.963 
(1.287) 
2.750 
(629) 
2.096 
(467) 
1.133 
(257) 
123.025 
(27.331) 
2009.10 
(April. 
March) 
49.633 
(10376) 
11.29f-
(2.379) 
9.230 
(1.943) 
3094 
(657) 
4 263 
(899) 
5.670 
(1.183) 
7.728 
(1.623) 
2.980 
(626) 
1.437 
(303) 
3.017 
(629) 
123.378 
(25.888) 
i91Q-11 
( Apnl-
July) 
11.541 
(2.512) 
4.416 
(974) 
2.713 
(586) 
1.101 
(239) 
2.091 
(455) 
2.210 
(489) 
630 
(137) 
220 
(48) 
1.125 
(243) 
834 
(179) 
34.777 
(7.592) 
Cumulative 
Inflows 
(April '00. 
July -10) 
222.447 
(49.751) 
45,562 
(11.164) 
35.902 
(8.864) 
27.055 
(6.123) 
22.217 
(4.942) 
15.104 
(4.204) 
18.407 
(4.036) 
12.6S8 
(2.847) 
8,043 
(1.773) 
7.6f7 
(1.728) 
551.280 
(123,320) 
tUSS in million) 
%3ge 10 
total 
Inflows 
(in terms of 
USS) 
4 2 % 
9»o 
8 ' . 
5 % 
4 % 
4 % 
3', 
3', 
2 « . 
1 «0 
-
Src: littp://dipp nic.in 
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labie 2-3 Sector Wise Approvals 
SECTORS-WISE FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER APPROVALS 
Ranks 
1 
2 
3. 
4 
c. 
6 
7. 
8 
9 
10 
Secior 
SERVICES S E C 1 0 R 
(financial & norvfmancia) 
COMPUTER SOFTWARE & 
HARDWARE 
TELECOMMUNICATtOMS 
(radio paging, cellular mobile base 
telejwone services) 
HOUSING ft REAL ESTATE 
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES 
(mchiding roads i hi^rmays) 
POWER 
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
METALLURGICAL I M O J S T R C S 
PETROLEUM « NATURAL GAS 
CHEMICALS 
(other than fertilizes) 
2008^ 2009-10 
(AfHlh (Aprlh 
Uardi) Much) 
2£,411 20.958 
(6.116) (4.392) 
7,329 4.350 
(1A77) ( 9 1 9 
11.727 12.338 
( 2 i 5 8 ) (2.554) 
i ; , 621 13.586 
(2.801) (2.844) 
£.792 13.544 
(2.028) (2.S6Q 
4.3S2 6.90« 
(985) (1.437) 
E,212 6.609 
(1.152) (1.177) 
4.157 1.535 
(961) (407) 
1.931 1.328 
(412) (272) 
3,427 1.70T 
(749) (3621 
ioio-ii 
(Apifl-
July) 
4.948 
(1.0T9) 
1.892 
(413) 
4.632 
(1.034) 
1.932 
(412) 
1,1S3 
(2J-8) 
3.119 
(677) 
412 
(fO) 
2.61 S 
(572) 
955 
(218) 
471 
(1C2) 
Cumulative 
Inflows 
(Aprf '00. 
July 10) 
110.178 
(24.680) 
45.726 
(10.286) 
45.398 
(9.964) 
39.271 
(8.769) 
36,67g 
(8.311) 
24.038 
(5.304) 
21.234 
(4.687) 
t 6 06C 
O.702) 
12.49C 
(2.883) 
11.746 
(2.598) 
%aga to 
total lnr.ows 
(In terms of 
OSS) 
21 U 
9U 
8 »c 
T>x 
7»e 
S " . 
4 ' c 
3=< 
2 \ 
7\-
Src: http://dipp.nic.in 
lable 2-4 StatcWise .Approvals 
STATE-WISE FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER APPROVALS 
Ranks 
1 
2 
.3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Total of al 
Stare 
Maharashtra 
Tamil Nadu 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Delhi 
Other States 
States 
No. of Technical 
Co//abora0of» awreved 
1.371 
660 
608 
356 
315 
4.631 
7,941 
%ag9 with total 
tecA. approvals 
1726 
831 
766 
4.48 
3.97 
5832 
100.00 
Src: http://dipp.nic.in 
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2,2 Indian TTIndustry 
Information Technology is emerging as an important driver of economic change in 
India. Areas of potential IT growth in India are product software, internet related 
applications, data processing and support centeres. According to Carnegie Mellon 
Software Engineering Institute, 6 of the world's top 12 software development centers 
are located in India. 
The markets for IT products are unique. These markets are generally young and there 
is dearth of historical evidences/ examples and patterns to analyze for planning future 
demand (Langabeer and Stoughton,2001). Product life cycles are often unpredictable, 
Tactical planning is crucial but it requires so much attention that the strategic outlook 
is sometimes neglected. The rapid pace of technological evolution makes long range 
planning extremely difficult, new developments can create new markets almost 
overnight, driving existing products into early obsolescence. 
Demand for technical products like those in Information Technology is influenced not 
only by the state of the economy, but also by trends and cultural shifts that can be 
difficult to anticipate. Consumers are increasingly demanding, unique configurations, 
specially in computer hardware industry segment and thereby posing a challenge for 
procurement and production planners. Profit margins often start high, but quickly fall 
as competitors enter the market. Inventory management in the early phases of a new 
product is therefore very critical. Many key components are manufactured by a 
relatively limited number of known suppliers, who many have to deal with several 
companies engaged in active competition. Failure to manage forecast and maintain 
strategic alliances therefore may result in an advantage to its direct competitors. 
A very critical factor about the IT industry is that the technology iteslf is an enabler 
for globalization, with the converging technologies and the integration of 
technologies like video conferencing, emails, ERP, CRM etc into the business 
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transactions (Prasad and Prasad,2002) helping faster business transaction and 
collaboration across firms. 
Majority of fortune 500 firms outsource their software requirements to Indian 
software companies. In order to facilitate effective foreign investment in the sector, 
the government of India has introduced various incentives and investor friendly 
polocies, a few of them are outlined as follows: 
• Automatic approval for foreign equityup to 100% into the IT sector 
• 100% equity participation permitted for NRIs 
• A foreign collaborator who has a previous venture/tie up in India in the IT 
Sector does not require a no-objection certificate from the erstwhile Indian 
partner for establishing another partner ( unless the previous contract contains 
an exclusivity clause) 
• Automatic approvals for foreign technology / collaboration in all segments 
except sensitive and strategic sectors like defense 
• 100% FDI permitted in units set up exclusively for exports proposals 
• All hardware & software used in IT sector is exempt from customs duty 
• Tax holiday for Indian IT companies 
• Depreciaton on IT products to be allowed at the rate of 60% 
2.2.1 History of Indian IT Industry 
Indian IT industry has grown leaps and bounds in past few decades. A brief history 
of Indian IT Industry is as follows: 
• 1946-1950: The Indian Institute of Technology founded. With seven campuses, which 
admit 3,500 out of 150,000 applicants each year, it has become the intellectual core 
of the country's industry. Its professors sit on advisory boards, while alumni are 
behind successes such as Infosys. The five-year program is "grueling." said Ravi 
Pradhan, Via Technologies' manager for India. 
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• 1968: The Tata industrial conglomerate forms software services unit Tata Consultancy 
Services. "We had six employees," said Nagaraj Ijari, the delivery center head at 
TCS' Bangalore offices. "Now we have 40,000." 
• Mid-1970s: IBM exits India. Import duties of 150 percent or more mean that VCRs 
cost $3,000 and TVs cost $6,000. Wipro starts to create India's first homegrown PC. 
• 1985: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi makes speech imploring the country to move into 
tech. A transcript of the speech is passed out on paper to the audience, thanks to 
speech-to-text computing. 
• 1986: General Electric expands engineering presence and its Six Sigma methodologies 
here. Ex-GE employees become key leaders in several companies. 
• 1991: National financial crisis causes government to introduce major reforms. Finance 
Minister Manmohan Singh (now prime minister) emerges as hero. 
• 1993: A group of IT leaders determines plan for IT industry. 
• 1994: Telecom liberalized. 
• 1995: TCS determines that its CasePac tool developed for IBM can be used to scan 
software for Y2K problems. An industry is bom. 
• 1999: Y2K contracts pile into India. "The biggest boost of all was Y2K. In some ways, 
the U.S. created this monster," said Ash Lilani, head of sales and marketing at Silicon 
Valley Bank. 
• 2002: Indian companies expand hiring to handle incoming work resulting from massive 
layoffs after the dot-com bubble burst and the U.S. tech industry fell into a recession. 
• 2003: Led by service conglomerates such as Wipro and Infosys. India becomes a 
primary destination for offshore outsourcing as foreign companies seek to lower 
labor costs. The trend leads to political controversies around the world. 
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• 2004 till date: Singh becomes Prime Minister. High tech is fairiy ingrained in daily life 
for many in cities. Indian IT industry records phenomenal growth. The compounded 
annual growth rate of the Indian IT services industry has been over 50%. The 
software sector in India has grown at almost double the rate of the US software 
sector. The Indian software industry has grown from a mere US $ 150 million 
in 1991-92 to a staggering US $ 5.7 billion (including over $4 billion worth of 
software exports) in 1999-2000. No other Indian industry has performed so 
well against the global competition. 
The annual growth rate of India's software exports has been consistently over 50 
percent since 1991. Today, India exports software and services to nearly 95 countries 
around the world. The share of North America (U.S. & Canada) in India's software 
exports is about 61 per cent. More than a third of Fortune 500 companies outsourced 
their software requirements to India. 
2.2J2 Promotion of IT - governmental incentives 
With the formation of a new ministry for IT, Government of India (GOl) has taken a 
major step towards promoting the domestic industry and achieving the full potential 
of the Indian IT entrepreneurs. Constraints have been comprehensively identified and 
steps taken to overcome them and also to provide incentives. Thus for example, 
venture capital has been the main source of finance for software industry around the 
world. However, majority of the software units in India is in the small and medium 
enterprise sector and there is a critical shortage of venture capital kind of support. In 
order to alleviate this situation and to promote Indian IT industry, the Government of 
India has set up a National Task Force on IT and Software Development to examine 
the feasibility of strengthening the industry. The Task Force has already submitted its 
recommendations, which are under active consideration. Norms for the operations of 
venture capital funds have also been liberalized to boost the industry. The 
Government of India is also actively providing fiscal incentives and liberalizing 
norms for FDI and raising capital abroad. 
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Recently, an IT committee was set up by the Ministry of Information Technology, 
Government of India, comprising Non Resident Indian (NRl) professionals from the 
United States to seek expertise and advice and also to step up U.S. investments in 
India's IT sector. The committee is chaired by Minister of Information Technology, 
Government of India, and the members include Secretary, Ministry of Information 
Technology and a large number of important Indian American IT entrepreneurs. 
India's most prized resource in in today's knowledge economy is its readily available 
technical work force. India has the second largest English-speaking scientific 
professionals in the world, second only to the U.S. It is estimated that India has over 
4 million technical workers, over 1,832 educational institutions and polytechnics, 
which train more than 67,785 computer software professionals every 
year. Government of India is stepping up the number and quality of training facilities 
in the country to capitalize on this extraordinary human resource.. 
2.23 ChaUenges before Indian IT Industry 
At present there are a number of challenges that are facing the information technology 
industry of India. One of the major challenges for the Indian information technology 
industry was to keep maintaining its excellent performance standards. 
The experts are however of the opinion that there are certain things that need to be 
done in order to make sure that India can maintain its status as one of the leading 
information technology destinations of the world. The first step that needs to be taken 
is to create an environment for innovation that could be carried for a long time. 
The innovation needs to be done in three areas that are connected to the information 
technology industry of India such as business models, ecosystems and knowledge. 
The information technology sector of India also has to spread the range of its 
activities and also look at the opportunities in other countries. 
The improvement however, also needs to be qualitative rather than just being 
quantitative. The skill level of the information technology professionals is one area 
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that needs improvement and presents a considerable amount of challenge before the 
Indian information technology industry. 
The Indian information technology industry also needs to co-ordinate with the 
academic circles as well as other industries in India for better performance and 
improved productivity. The experts are of the opinion that the business process 
outsourcing service providers in India need to change their operations to a way that is 
more oriented to the knowledge process outsourcing. One of the most important crises 
facing the Indian information technology industry concerns the human resources 
aspect. The problems with outsourcing in countries like the United States of America 
are posing problems for the Indian information technology industry as well. 
2.2.4 Strat^c Alliances in Indian IT Industry 
The Indian IT cos like TCS, Infosys, Wipro have always faced touch competion from 
global IT cos like IBM,Accenture while fighting for global contracts. To bolster its 
image Indian IT companies have started hiring foreign nationals for consulting 
positions. To further boost up its image as a global company Indian IT companies 
have strategic alliances with global majors which in turn facilitates them to bag such 
huge contracts. 
In 2010, Infosys Technologies bagged a three-year, $600-million contract to manage 
the internal systems of Microsoft in partnership with US-based Unisys Corp. Rival 
HCL Technologies won a series of service contracts from Nokia, Xerox and 
Electrolux by partnering global tech companies such as SunGard, CompuCom, 
Infocare, Interxion and Sun ITS. India's largest software exporter, Tata Consultancy 
Services, has business solutions partners, including Tibco, Netezza, Informatica and 
Ingres, spanning global systems integration to consulting projects. Likewise, Wipro 
Technologies delivers services across the globe by allying with foreign companies 
such as Worldwide TechServices, Phoenix IT Services, CompuCom, Getronics, 
SunGard and CTC. 
Infosys, the country's second-largest IT company, has nearly 15 alliances with global 
technology providers like Unisys, BMC, VMware and Tibco. It has a similar number 
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of 'team agreements' with regional players such as Colt for hosting services like web 
hosting in Europe and KVH for infrastructure management services in Japan. These 
partners are critical for onsite desk-side support and multi-lingual services. 
Such tie-ups, which marry technology and logistics as well as negate the pervasive 
reach of an IT multinational, provide a glimpse into the fiiture of India's $60-billion 
outsourcing industry. Such tie-ups present the truly global face of IT industry. 
Thus India and Indian IT industry provides a great environment to do such a research. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter draws insights from earlier researches, which broadly deals with the 
issues set out as an agenda for this research 
To define strategic alliances, literature provides a range of terminology such as 
alliances, cooperation, joint venture, coalition, plus collaborative agreements such as 
joint manufacturing, technical assistance, joint marketing, cross-distribution, cross 
licensing, research pooling, and consortia. 
In simple words, a strategic alliance is sometimes just referred to as "partnering" that 
offers businesses a chance to join forces for a mutually beneficial opportunity and 
sustained competitive advantage. 
A key benefit in forming alliances is leveraging the abilities of a company's success 
into new customers and new markets (Gale, 1994; De la Sierra, 1995; Chen, 2003; 
Todeva & Knoke, 2005). 
To summarize, strategic alliances can be grouped into three broad categories, non-
equity alliances, equity alliances, and joint ventures (Barney, 1996). The various 
forms of a strategic aUiance can be based on the degree of interdependence 
Table 3-1 Forms of Strategic Alliances 
Merger & 
Acqusition 
Large 
Joint Ownership Joint Venture Formal 
Cooperative 
Venture 
Interdependence 
informal 
cooperative 
Venture 
Low 
Src : Forms of strategic alliance (Lorange & Roos, 1992) 
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To gain further understanding, a literature review of the definitions of strategic alliances 
is as follows: 
Tabic 3-2 Uefinitions of Strategic Alliances 
Douma, 
1997 
Dussauge 
& 
Garrette, 
1995 
Faulkner, 
1995 
Gulati, 
2004 
Phan, 
2000 
Porter, 
1990 
A strategic alliance is a contractual, temporary relationship between 
companies remaining independent, aimed at reducing the uncertainty 
around the realization of the partners' strategic objectives (for which the 
partners are mutually dependent) by means of coordinating or jointly 
executing one or several of the companies' activities. Each of the partners is 
able to exert considerable influence upon the management or policy of the 
alliance. The partners are financially involved, although by definition not 
through participation, and share the costs, profits and risks of the strategic 
alliance. 
An alliance is a cooperative agreement or association between two or more 
independent enterprises, which will manage one specific project, with a 
determined duration, for which they will be together in order to improve 
their competences. It is constituted to allow its partners to pool resources 
and coordinate efforts in order to achieve results that neither could obtain 
by acting alone. The key parameters surrounding alliances are opportunism, 
necessity and speed. 
A strategic alliance is a particular mode of inter-organizational relationship 
in which the partners make substantial investments in developing a long-
term collaborative effort, and common orientation. 
Strategic alliances are voluntary arrangements between firms involving 
exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or 
services. 
Alliances are long-term, trust-based relationships that entail highly 
relationship-specific investments in ventures that cannot be fully specified 
in advance of their execution. 
Strategic alliances are long-term agreements between firms that go beyond 
market transactions but fall short of merger. Forms include joint ventures, 
licenses, long-term agreements, and other kinds of inter-firm relationships. 
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Yoshino 
& 
Rangan, 
2005 
A strategic alliance is a partnership between two or more firms that unite to 
pursue a set of agreed upon goals but remain independent subsequent to the 
formation of the alliance to contribute and to share benefits on a continuing 
basis in one or more key strategic areas, e.g. technology, products. 
3.1 Types of Strategic Alliances 
Strategic alliances are classified on the basis of 3 different criteria. The first 
classification is based on resources, focused mainly upon the co-operations. The 
second classification relies upon the nature of the trading relationships. The third 
classification uses the characteristics of the firms participating in the alliance co-
operation. 
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3.1.1 Resource-based Approach 
Porter (1985) suggests the forms of business interrelationships should be classified by 
the major characteristics of resources/assets involved in the co-operations. These 
include tangible and intangible interrelationships. 
3.1.1.1 Tangible interrelationships 
Tangible interrelationships involve various activities in the value chain of businesses. 
This co-operation arises from sharing these activities among firms owing to their 
common buyers, distribution channels, technologies, and other factors (Porter, 1985). 
The forms of such interrelations are derived from the major components of the value 
chains, including shared infrastructure, shared technology development, shared 
procurement, shared marketing functions, and shared production fimctions. The 
various interrelationships within the value chain are utilised in order to sustain and 
create competitive advantages among the business units involved. The shared 
activities lead to competitive advantage in two ways, cost advantages and 
differentiation advantages. 
Regarding the cost advantages, sharing activities among business units is regarded as 
a tool for achieving considerable economies of scale. The activity sharing, 
particularly in the marketing function, increases volumes or scales of operation and 
enhances operational skills. The larger scale and better skills from shared experience 
can reduce the cost per unit of products and services. The partner firm can achieve the 
cost advantages according to two conditions (Porter, 1985). First, the operational 
activities shared with other firms should be major cost drivers or significant 
proportions of the firm's cost structures. Second, the cost 
advantage arises when the amount of costs reduced from the interrelationship is 
greater than the rising costs from the co-operation. The costs from co-operation 
involve the incremental expenditures occurred when the various business units build 
up a co-operation network. Moreover, such a partner firm is required to modify some 
of its behaviour. This is because the partner firm has to perform in the optimal way 
for all firms involved in the co-operation rather than only for its own benefit. This can 
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raise the cost that Porter calls "compromise cost". With reference to the 
differentiation advantage, the trading interrelationships enhance the degree of 
differentiation and uniqueness of firms' products/services due to more innovative 
ideas obtained from alliances. Moreover, the costs of advancing the firm's technology 
can be shared between the partners involved. In this respect, the interrelationships 
will be most favourable when the shared activities involve the key success factors as 
well as affecting the important cost drivers of the products and services 
3.1.1.2 Intangible interrelationships 
This relationship focuses upon co-operations of intangible assets/resources of 
business units and attempts to create competitive advantages through exchanging and 
transferring such assets/resources. Porter (1985) suggests that the intangible assets 
emphasise skills and competencies which are not in the activities of value chains. 
Reputations, brand names, images, and information are also regarded strategically as 
intangible assets. The major functions of the intangible relationship involve 
transferring and exchanging the intangible assets among the participating firms, 
which lead to a competitive advantage when the improvement in costs or 
differentiation of the firms exceeds the costs of learning and transferring 
competencies among business units (Porter, 1985). However, the intangible 
assets/resources are not easily transferred due to their particular characteristics which 
are invisible. Therefore, the success of this interrelationship depends upon not only 
acute understandings and co-operative techniques but also efficiency and 
effectiveness in the transferring and receiving processes of the firms involved. 
Importantly, the intangible interrelationships are recognised as major sources of 
synergy, one of the most desirable factors in a collaborative arrangement. The 
intriguing concept of synergy will be further discussed later. Yet, both tangible and 
intangible business relationships are not mutually exclusive. They can simultaneously 
happen in the business relationship and enhance the capability of the firms to create 
competitive advantage. 
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3.1J2 Relatioiiship characteristic approach 
The second classification of the strategic alliances relies upon the major activities 
encompassed by the trading relationships. 
3.1.2.1 Marketing co-operation 
The market-oriented co-operation involves an agreement of several marketing 
activities between the partner firms. This agreement is aimed at supporting and 
enhancing organisational effectiveness in terms of selling, distributing, and promoting 
the participating firms' products and services. Often, the marketing alliances are 
utilised to gain access to new potential markets, particularly when firms do not 
possess adequate resources to penetrate these markets alone (Lessem, 1989). Rao and 
Ruekert (1994) present another kind of marketing co-operation, the brand alliance. 
This means that two or more products from different firms are jointly branded. The 
brand alliance can help an individual product that hardly succeeds by its own 
brandname and image. The successful brand alliance between IBM and Intel Co., for 
example, can enhance the prestige and reputation of their brandname. Their products, 
then, achieve a great success in their target markets. Overall, the patterns of 
marketing alliances include the common brand name, cross-selling of products 
between the partners, bundled or packaged selling of the partners' products, shared 
sales forces, shared service/repair networks, shared distribution systems, shared buyer 
or distributor financing organisations, and shared marketing department (Porter, 
1985). 
3.1.2.2 Research and development co-operation 
The research and development (R&D) alliance primarily involves pooling, sharing, 
exchanging, and transferring existing technology necessary to survive and succeed in 
the competitive business environment (Dunning, 1993; Bidault and Cummings, 
1994). Sharing risks and improving the cost position of the alliance requires both 
partners to share their knowledge concerning the immediate products or 
manufacturing process under development (Lei and Slocum, 1992). This kind of co-
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operation normally originates from the common product and process technology of 
the participating firms (Porter, 1985). In addition, R&D agreements, which initiate 
from transferring and sharing technological assets, sometimes progressively expand 
their scope to the production or marketing alliances (Dunning, 1993). R&D alliances 
are also deployed as a device to transform the business from labourintensive to a 
technology-driven one (Marriott, 1995). Therefore, the firms, particularly in various 
developing countries in which the labour cost is a principal component of their cost 
structure, are eager to use alliances so as to reduce cost and promote cutting-edge 
technology. However, R&D alliances are concerned with the invisible configuration 
of technology which cannot be traded as a commodity. This is due to the difiiculties 
of evaluating the value of such knowledge, of monitoring of technology transfer, and 
of transferring expertise across organisations (Gulati, 1995). Further, McArthur and 
Schill (1995) suggest that many European managers spend considerable amounts of 
time detecting the problems in technology alliances rather than focusing upon such 
alliances' successes. This is also regarded as a major barrier to effective R&D co-
operations. 
3.1.2.3 Production and operation co-operation 
The production and operation alliances include shared inbound logistic systems, 
shared assembly facilities, shared component fabrication, shared manufacturing 
support systems, shared quality assurance/control systems, and shared factory 
infi^structure (Porter, 1985). The most important advantage from the production 
alliance is cost reduction, that is, economies of scale and scope. The major 
operational facilities including machinery, inbound logistic equipment, assembly line 
and other manufacturing infrastructure are shared between partners. Economies of 
scale and scope result from fixed cost allocation of the sharing of production 
facilities. Technology advancement also benefits from production alliances. 
Coutilisations of various production facilities always simultaneously promote the 
transference and assimilation of the partners' competencies. The operation costs are 
also reduced due to the technology transferability and improvement. Often, the 
42 
production and operational alliances are established in accordance with marketing co-
operations due to a close relation between these two functions. 
3.1.2.4 Strategic resource co-operation 
The strategic resources of an organisation consist of capital, managerial skills and 
expertise,human resources, and various competencies. The first type of this co-
operation is financing co-operation, including the joint fund-raising programme and 
shared capital utilisation programme. (Porter, 1985). The major advantages from the 
joint fund-raising programme are economies of scale as well as greater negotiating 
power from a large amount of capital required. The capital funded by this programme 
usually obtains a lower interest rate and transaction costs per unit, as well as more 
favourable terms of credit than those of individually raised funds. The exchange of 
human resources and the establishment of joint training programmes are also 
important strategic resource co-operations. This co-operation is a particular concern 
of advanced or professional service firms, which require highly qualified staff to 
serve the needs of their customers. Also, the transference and learning process of 
managerial skills, expertise, and other competencies between the partner firms also 
simultaneously exists with the human resources co-operation. The connections, 
relationships, and familiarities of any participating business units can also be shared 
to enhance the overall partner firms' capabilities in the operating businesses. The 
synthesis of connections and relationships among partners also establish world-wide 
superior linkages to globally pursue the businesses' prosperity. However, most of the 
strategic resources alliances do not directly involve reducing costs (Porter, 1985). 
Such alliances, then, will benefit the participating firms through supporting and 
promoting the firms' capability to efficiently compete with major competitors. 
3.1.2.5 Procurement co-operation 
Supplier alliances are created by two or more firms that need the same materials, 
equipment, and various resources for their operations (Porter, 1985). It is aimed at 
serving as an outsourcing or long-term supply agreement to reduce capital investment 
for R&D, new products as well as increase dividends to stockholders (Lei and 
Slocum, 1992). Such alliances pool the amount of purchases between the partners and 
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increase negotiating power with their major suppliers. Also, the supplier alliance 
helps the firms to obtain cheaper, better quality, and more timely supply. Another 
stimulus to build up this co-operation is the strong interdependence between suppliers 
and customers. This strong interdependence motivates both supplier and customer 
firms to collaborate with each other. From the supplier firm's viewpoint, it is 
necessary to build up relationships with its major customers in order to ensure the 
revenue sources as well as increase future orders from its customers. From the 
customer firm's perspectives, the dependence of supply sources forces the firm to 
strengthen its relationship with suppliers. This helps guarantee the flow of needed 
inputs in terms of quality, quantity, and timeliness. Many domestic firms believe that 
procurement alliances can be regarded as outsourcing or long-term supply agreements 
to promote their own performances (Lei and Slocum, 1992). Under the current 
environment in the world economy, the greater demand for higher quality supplies 
and materials encourage the firms to establish procurement agreements to receive the 
needed supplies efficiently and effectively. In the future, most major companies are 
likely to tend to concentrate on a few important suppliers instead of contacting a 
number of suppliers (Economist, 1994). This trend encourages a company to establish 
rapport with a smaller number of suppliers due to the benefits from transaction cost 
reduction and stronger outsourcing networks. 
3.13 Participant characteristic approach 
The participant characteristic approach identifies forms of strategic co-operation by 
considering the direction of relationships. In this respect, the strategic co-operations 
are divided into three major groups, vertical, horizontal, and external alliances. 
3. ] .3.1 Vertical alliances 
3.1.3.1.1 Upstream Co-operation 
The upstream co-operation is similar to the supplier alliance discussed earlier, which 
is the relationship between a firm and a supplier who provides various resources 
necessary for its operations. The supplier alliance is one of the major upstream 
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relationships. Such an alliance aims to ensure outbound logistic stability. Besides, the 
strong relationship with a supplier enhances outsourcing effectiveness of the firms in 
terms of quality, price and timeliness, which are currently considered the critical 
success factors for business. 
Figure 3-2 Vertical (Iipstream and Downstream), Horizontal, and External Alliances 
Dntinbniori and 
Intcmiwllarti* 
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3.1.3.1.2 Downstream Co-operation 
This alliance aims to increase downstream stability, which links a firm's distribution 
channels or target customers. The first is the establishment of the trading relationships 
with distributors or intermediaries in the industry which support flows of goods and 
services to their customers. The relationship with the intermediary is then recognised 
as a critical step of a manufacturing business wishing to create the necessary linkage 
between their business and customers. Such an intermediary also provides a firm with 
reliable and timely information on the attitude, preferences, and responses of 
customers. The alliance not only offers the firm an opportunity to better respond to 
market needs but also indirectly strengthens the relationship with its customers. This 
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enhances the downstream stability of all manufacturing firms. On the other hand, the 
purpose of customer alliances is to capture their target markets and to maintain 
pleasant relationships with their customers. The close and direct customer partnership 
helps develop new products, enter new markets, and build skills for creating customer 
value (Dull, Mohn, and Noren, 1995; Economist, 1996). This also reduces the firm's 
reliance on distributors and intermediaries via direct relationships with customers. 
3.1.3.2 Horizontal alliances 
The horizontal alliance is drawn up with organisations at the same level of the value 
chain. Usually, these relationships are developed with the firms operating in the same 
product or service market (Burton and Hanlon, 1994). To deal with broader and more 
complex customer needs, there is an effort to seek partners that complement a firm's 
products and services offering (Dull, Mohn, and Noren, 1995). Morris and Herget 
(1987) report that no less than 71 % of co-operations were between companies in the 
same market. The horizontal co-operations include the two major types of 
relationships, competitor and peer alliances. The competitor alliances are currently of 
the most interest. The overwhelming majority of the collaborations are between 
competitors (Dicken, 1992). The alliances are aimed at alleviating the intensity of 
competition (Lei, 1994). In addition, the transformation fi-om a competitor to become 
a partner benefits the participating firms in terms of a stable business environment 
and positive synergy. This eventually enhances the firm's competitive capability and 
helps gain more advantages from business activities in the industry. The peer alliance, 
another form of the horizontal co-operation, contains a similar process and concept to 
the competitor alliance. However, instead of an agreement with an existing and direct 
competitor, peer alliances refer to the alliances established with companies that have 
prior business relationships with the firms. The satisfactory progress, performance, 
and results from such co-operations stimulate the participants to strengthen their co-
operation. Thus, establishing a peer alliance agreement enhances the participants' 
competitive and bargaining power. 
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3.1.3.3 External alliances 
The external alliances are co-operations established with the potential entrants or with 
the producers of substitutes or complements in other industries (Burton and Hanlon, 
1994). Currently, this alliance is relatively less in number compared to other types of 
alliances. This may be because the potential partners of the external alliance do not 
directly contact the firms, unlike those of other alliance forms. However, there is 
some recent evidence indicating an increasing concern about external alliances. 
Substitute alliance, the first form of the external alliance, is a partnership with the 
producer of substitute or complementary products. This relationship aims to reduce 
threats from substitutions. These substitutes might be either entirely or partly 
substituted. 
This cooperative arrangement helps to reduce the substitution from products or 
services outside the industry and to identify the clear boundary of each partner's target 
market. As a result, the intensity of competition between substitute firms is alleviated. 
The substitute alliance also leads to a more extensive form of co-operation including a 
marketing, personnel, production, and R&D alliance. 
On the other hand, the growth of an alliance with a potential entrant currently 
represents a defensive approach of a business. This alliance attempts to eliminate a 
threat and instability emerging from an invasion by the potential entrants, particularly 
large-scale and multinational corporations. 
Instead of waiting for such a threat, the firm persuades these potential competitors to 
become its partners and attempts to mutually gain advantages from the collaboration. 
All types of strategic alliances are not mutually exclusive. There might be several 
forms of co-operation simultaneously occurring in one collaborative arrangement. 
This depends upon the conditions and goals of all firms participating in such a 
collaboration. 
Even though there are various definitions of strategic alliances, there are no 
differences in the basic meaning such as cooperation, a set of agreed goals, and 
shared resources and competences. 
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Range of strategic alliances is as follows 
Figure 3-3 Range of Strategic Alliances 
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There exists an abundance of literature in management that discusses strategic 
alliances in IT sector; however, there is limited research that covers strategic alliance 
in Indian IT industry. 
As companies increasingly move towards inter-firm co-operation, strategic alliances 
have become one of the most preferred tools for the companies to achieve sustained 
competitive advantage. (Porter and Fuller, 1986). 
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A visual representation of companies having strategic alliance is as follows. 
Figure 3-4 Network Map in Alliances 
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Each node in the network represents a company that competes in the Internet 
industry. Two companies are connected with a grey line if they have announced a 
joint venture, strategic alliance or other partnership. This map shows a subset of the 
total internet industry — 250 companies. These industry visualizations demonstrate 
the forces that organizations exhibit upon each other in complex, interconnected 
economic systems. The data is gathered from various public sources and includes 
only data on business partnerships such as strategic alliances and joint ventures. 
3.2 Reasons for alliance formations 
Alliance formation can be explained from various perspectives. According to 
Economic Geography ( Knigman, 1009; Scott, 1996; Rosenfiled, 1997; Baptista and 
Swann, 1998), firms form alliances in order to exploit the complementarities in 
resources and competencies. 
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The key idea of the resource-based perspective is that a firm's competitive advantage 
results from unique, firm-specific resources, and that this competitive advantage may 
be sustainable over time if'isolating mechanisms' are present that prevent other firms 
from imitation (Wemerfelt (1984) and Rumelt (1984). 
Theorists in the field of Organization Learning (Doz, 1996; Hamel, 1991 ; Inkpen, 
1998; Tsang, 1999) argued that alliances are formed to facilitate inter-partner 
learning. Alliances could also be used for "Pursuing Increasing Returns (Arthur, 
1989, 1996) with firms seeking to increase rents from knowledge intensive 
competencies. 
Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976: Arrow. 1971) also 
provides explanation for formation of alliances, wherein firms seek to share risks with 
their alliance partners. 
Market Power Theory was also used to explain the formation of alliances ( Porter, 
1980; Porter & Fuller, 1986), wherein it was proposed that partner firms tend to 
overcome the market uncertainties by collective power gained out of strategic 
alliances. 
Some researchers have proposed that alliances are a result of firms adapting "Game 
Theory " approach (Axelrod, 1984; Parkhe, 1993; McAfee and McMilan, 1996) for 
strategic decisions under uncertainty. 
Alliances are also used as part of information set that allows players to gauge the 
intention of other players. Give the variegated nature of the study of alliances, it is 
very important to incorporate these multidimensional elements (Osborne and 
Hagedoom. 1997; Yan and Zeng. 1999; Langley. 1999; Albrecht. Pagano and 
Phoocharoon, 1996) while undertaking a study to understand the reasons for alliance 
formation. 
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Pieffer and Salancik, (1978) have argued that firms may enter into strategic alliances 
in order to adapt or cope with a dynamic environment or try to effect change in the 
environment. 
In dynamic environments like those experienced in the IT industry, strategic alliances 
enable the participating firms to pool or exchange resources for mutual benefit, to 
diminish competitive attacks and collectively manage the environment (Astley 1984; 
Bresser and Harl, 1986; Gupta and Lad 1983, Harrigan 1985; Nielson 1988). In such 
dynamic environments, the notion of a firm as an autonomous vertically integrated 
profit maximiser waging a solitary struggle for survival within the limits of a hostile, 
deterministic environment is not valid. 
Vertical integration is mostly aimed to reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1991) 
and to make a choice either to make or to buy (Balakrishnann and Werenfelt, 1986; 
Harrigan, 1985; Walker and Weber, 1984). However, according to Linkage 
Uncertainty ( Williamson, 1975), unpredictability in volumes or uncertainty in the 
supply of inputs can lead to firms pursing alliances ( Heide and John, 1990). Studies 
by Contractor (1990) and Larson (1992) suggest that inter-firms cooperative 
arrangements may, under conditions of high environmental uncertainty be employed 
as viable substitutes for vertical integration. Since in uncertain environments, 
ownership of all resources by all the firms could be difficult, firms seek partners to 
share competencies and resources (Contractor & Lorange, 1998; Hagedoom, 1993; 
1995). Thus a high degree of resource dependence can lead to alliance formation ( 
Thompson, 1967; Forrest, 1992; Song II, 1995; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). 
Apart from resource dependency, alliances also are results of firms pursuing Strategic 
Behavior (Porter and Fuller, 1986; Kogut, 1988; Lewis, 1990; Larson, 1993; 
Hagedoom, 1993; Doz, 1988). Firms could seek to reduce the uncertainties of 
operating in a foreign country by learning up with a domestic firm or enter into 
partnerships for managing host country dynamics, gain market access, cope with 
governmental pressures, cultural distance etc. Firms could also use alliances to 
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efficiently organize their activities in uncertain environments; Alliances could also be 
technological partnerships, used to predict technical requirements (Heide and John, 
1990; Bala & Wemerfelt, 1986; Moxon, 1987). 
Since a market environment is a set of firms that are involved in exchange 
relationships with one another, uncertainty in their activities leads to interdependence 
and cooperative relationships. Alliances allow coordination of activities ( Mariti and 
Smiley, 1983). They help secure the trust and commitment (Richardson, 1972) of 
partners and thus in collectively vying for competitive advantage. Alliances can also 
be used to exchange proprietary, tacit or routine -embodies knowledge (Hamel. 
199)). 
This helps in gaining access to the knowledge of the partners, avoiding high 
investments individually and thus reducing the risks of total ownership of the same. 
The success of international business cooperation is influenced by both external and 
internal factors. In particular, there are a number of influential external factors. 
Turning to the internal factors, the success of strategic relationships is driven by both 
structural elements and social elements. 
Starting and successfully continuing an international alliance is more troublesome 
than many managers expect, and there are many principal causes of failure or 
difficulties in business partnerships (Rodrigues, 
1996; Griffin & Pustay, 1998; Van der Zee & Van Wijngaarden. 1999; Taylor. 2005). 
Davidow & Malone (1992) suggest that two key aspects of organizations, namely 
relationships and technology, must be successfully managed. 
This is in line with the observation that organizations that are linked together to 
cooperate should examine their policies, systems, structures, and culture to see if they 
support collaboration. 
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Table 3-3 \ arious perspectiie on strategic alliances 
Strategic 
Transaction 
Cost 
Learning 
Resource 
based view 
Definition 
Partnership between firms that work together to 
attain some strategic objectives or as part of the 
marl<eting of the product as a stream of value chain 
activities where alliances enable each value chain 
activity with help of alliance partner 
Collaboration between firms in which they agree to 
jointly carry out tasks that are difficult or costly to 
carry out alone 
Co-alignment between firms in which partners hope 
to learn and acquire from each other the 
technologies, products, skills and knowledge that are 
otherwise not available 
Voluntary cooperative inter firm agreement to 
achieve competitive advantage 
Author 
Porter and 
Fuller 
Contractor & 
Lo range 
Kogut 
Bleeke & 
Ernst 
Stafford 
Sanker et Al 
Das & Teng 
Hoffman & 
Schaper 
Kale et Al 
Vecianana J 
M 
Williamson 
Hennart 
Gray & Wood 
Faulkner 
Smith, 
Carroll & 
Ashford 
Gulati 
Kogut 
Doz et al 
Hammel 
Lie and 
Slocum 
Parkhe 
Lane 
Van de Ven 
Kogut 
Blodgett 
Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven 
Das & Teng 
year 
1986 
1988 
1992 
1998 
2002 
2006 
2008 
2009 
2008 
1985 
1985 
2006 
2008 
2009 
2008 
2008 
1998 
2005 
2006 
2006 
1999 
2007 
1976 
2000 
2002 
2006 
2007 
While alliances are useful to effectively operate in a dynamic environment, 
governance of alliances in such environments is a challenge. An alliance may be 
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successful for one firm, but may perform poorly for other partner due to asymmetric 
controls and behavioral uncertainties. 
Researchers have found that alliance governance leads to cost in sustaining alliance 
(Williamson, 1985,1991; Galbriath, 1973; Human and Provan, 1997; Gerunger and 
Herbert, 1989; Schann, 1983; Gulati, 1998). These costs could be a result oipartner 
opportunism ( Williamsonm 1991), trust building (Parkhe, 1998; Larson, 
1992;Arrow, 1974, Granovetter, 1985; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Geyskens, 
Steenkamp and Kumar, 1998; Bhattacharya, Divinney and Pillutla, 1998; Das and 
Teng, 1998), bureaucratic costs (Milgroom and Roberts, 1992; Jones and Hill, 1998), 
renegotiation between the partners (Pearce, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 
1998), Conflict resolution (Yukl, Falbe and Youn, 1993), management of diversity { 
Nairand Stafford, 1998; Parkhe, 1991),//asom/i^ (Schann, 1983; Killing, 1983) etc. 
Alliance performance is closely related to the initial objectives set forth at the time of 
alliance formation. These objectives differ based on the nature of alliances. Alliances 
could be for marketing (Doz and Hamel, 1998) where a firm markets the products of 
the partners or services or gives the partner a entry into new markets, apart from 
giving feedback on market demands and inputs on product or service upgrades. 
Alliances could also be for technology transfer (Chan and Heide, 1993), wherein a 
firm transfers technology to a partner or shares R&D activities in order to gain time to 
market advantages or sharing risks. 
Alliances can also be formed with an objective of learning (Hamsel. 1991), wherein a 
firm may seek to learn about the products/ technology/ operations of the partner by 
associating in an alliance relationship. In such relationships, the partner benefits from 
the time to market advantages resulting from working together on joint projects. 
These initial objectives would determine the importance firms attach to the partners 
and also the benefits derived from the alliance relationships (Geringer and Herbert, 
]991;Raghunath, 1998). 
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Based on the nature and purpose of the alliance, the benefits could be measured in 
terms of the business benefits line revenues, market share, new customers, 
technologies transfers, new competencies built, shareholder value creation etc ( 
Anderson 1990; Contractor and Lorange, ]988; Callahan and McKenzie 1999). 
Researchers have argued that the performance of alliances is higher if it is not eroded 
by the governance costs ( Hill and Snell, 1998; Phan and Hill, 1995). 
J. Hagedoom (1993) has studied a large number of publications on motives for 
entering strategic alliances. He found that these motives can be categorized into three 
major groups. The first group includes motives that are related to sharing and further 
advancement of research. Some motives in this group are related to the increased 
complexity and intersectoral nature of new technologies. For example, there is a 
growing number of relationships between the subfields of chemistry, physics and 
electronics, and the fields of computer science and process technology. 
Other motives stress the necessity for companies to monitor the evolution of 
technologies in order to assess technological synergies and relevant complementary 
skills and technologies. Another number of motives in this group are those dealing 
with reduction, minimizing and sharing of costs and uncertainty related to research 
and development. As the business world becomes more and more competitive, the 
costs of necessary R&D increase. Examples given in the literature are costs of 
research in high-tech industries and costs of advanced system design such as in 
telecom and aerospace 
The second group of motives is related to innovation projects in a joint activity. One 
motivation can be the possibility of secretly capturing some of the capabilities, 
knowledge or technologies of the other partner. In this case the joint activit>' is more a 
cover-up for quick absorption of innovative capabilities from others. At least one 
partner has a "hidden agenda" for his engagement in the alliance (opportunistic 
behavior). On the other hand, an agreed technology transfer from one part to another 
can also be a motive for entering cooperative relationships. Another motive is the 
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reduction of the total period of the product-life-cycle and reduction of the period 
between invention and market introduction. The third group of motives is associated 
with market access and the search for opportunities. One motive is the opportunity for 
market entry through joint monitoring of environmental changes. 
Internationalization, globalization and entry to foreign markets are also important 
motives for companies that lack the economic control, competence or experience to 
go this way alone. Another literature source that deals with strategic alliance driving 
factors is Brown and Pattinson(Brown, L. & Pattinson, H., (1995). "Information 
technology and telecommunications: impact on strategic alliance formation and 
management," Management Decision 33, no. 4 (1995).) 
They observe that the globalization of industries and organizations appears to move 
strategic mindsets towards considering strategic alliances. Some of the driving factors 
they found, which are not already mentioned, are pooling to gain operational 
economies of scale and diversification. 
Strategic alliances are often seen as a more effective diversification strategy than the 
traditional conglomerate approach. Probably the greatest stimulus to alliance 
formation has been the emergence of global competitors and those corporations 
wishing to become global (Devlin, G. & Bleackley, M., 1988). 
Globalization mandates alliances, makes them essential to strategy says Kenichi 
Ohmae (Ohmae K 1989). The simultaneous developments that go under the name of 
globalization make alliances necessary. Another driving factor, partly mentioned 
above, is the rapid pace of technological development and innovation, and the 
increasingly high costs of the associated research and development. Today's products 
rely on so many different technologies that most companies can no longer keep all the 
relevant technologies in-house. 
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Companies have to rely on a certain number of external vendors and suppliers. 
Vendors want to sell their products to as many customers as possible. As a 
consequence, they will try to sell them to as wide range of customers as possible. The 
inevitable result is the rapid dispersion of technology. That means that no one can 
keep all critical technologies out of the hands of competitors around the world. A 
company that develops a state of the art component for their own purpose can 
normally sell many times the volume to other companies. 
This generates cash flow, lowers unit costs, and builds up the experience needed to 
push the technology still further (Devlin, G. & Bleackley, M., 1988). The technology 
becomes generally available, making time even more critical. Nothing stays 
proprietary for long, and no company can master everything. Therefore, if a company 
is operating globally, within a big industry comprised of many competitors, it has to 
operate with partners. 
Globally competing companies have to be in all important markets simultaneously if 
they are going to keep competitors from establishing competing positions. Companies 
need partners and alliances to manage this (Ohmae, K., 1989). Another driving factor 
that should not be forgotten is the fashion and fear motives. 
As companies see their competitors forming alliances, they will follow suit. A good 
example is Mitsubishi Motors (Japan) and its alliance with Hyundai Motors (South 
Korea). One of the motives for Mitsubishi for forming this alliance was the pre-
emption of any potential alliance between Hyundai and one of Mitsubishi's Japanese 
competitors. As already mentioned, time is a critical factor. Alliances can provide 
shortcuts for companies racing to improve their production efficiency and quality 
control. 
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Table 3-4 Motives of Stralcgic Alliances 
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3.3 Gaps in contemporary literature 
The identified gaps in the literature are as follows: 
• Business strategy literature has plethora of research articles related to issues 
like strategic advantage, collaborative relationships, information sharing, trust 
can be found but a research gap exists from a practitioner perspective. 
" Existing literature on strategic alliances do provide an understanding of various 
reasons why companies in USA or Europe form alliances but there is very 
little work done on emerging economies like India which face various 
uncertainties due to evolution of institutional mechanisms and forces of 
globalization. There have been studies which delve in the factors of strategic 
alliances but there is no research which determines factors which drive 
domestic IT firms in India to enter into an international strategic alliance. 
• There is very little literature which explains the factors which influence 
governance costs of these alliances and the effect of governance costs on the 
performance of these alliances 
• Resource-based perspective has made an important contribution to the 
literature because it emphasizes the differences between firms and shows that 
the performance of firms is not determined by their industrial structure but by 
the resources that they possess and the way managers build and exploit them. 
Apart from its contributions, the resource based perspective has some fiaws 
which are as follows 
o Priem and Butler (2001) argue that the resource-based view was 
originally started as a dynamic perspective that emphasizes 
changes over time (cf Penrose, 1959. Wemerfelt, 1984). However, 
much of the subsequent literature has been static in concept. 
According to Priem and Butler, these static applications have 
several limitations with respect to strategic management research. 
One important limitation they point at is that these static 
approaches do not take into account the role of 'learning" (or 
exploration), while the ability to learn to develop effective 
resources is in itself a resource. 
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o Another important flaw of the resource based perspective is that it 
considers processes as a black box. In other words, the resource-
based view does not provide insight into how resources can lead to 
competitive advantages. According to Priem and Butler, the 
literature contains many references arguing that resources are 
useful, but they do not explain when, where and how they lead to 
competitive advantage. 
The identified gaps provide motivation for the present research. Issues related to strategic 
alliances in Indian IT industry have not been investigated to much extent. 
There is no work post liberalization on Indian IT firms and therefore there is a need for 
such a research. 
60 
4 CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Nature of study 
4.2 Research Questions 
43 Research Hypothesis 
4.4 Research Hypothesis & Questionnaire mapping 
4.5 Data Description 
4.6 Population 
4.7 Sample 
4.8 Survey Instrument 
4.9 Reliability and Validity of Data variables 
4.10 Research Design and Methodology 
4.11 Conceptual model of Research 
4.11 hypothesis and Variables mapping 
61 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter details with the methodology adopted for the conduct of the research. The 
research problem was studied in detail first. This enabled definition of research problem. 
Once the problem was identified, the method of data collection, the research instruments 
to be employed and various tests to be conducted. 
4.1 Nature of Study and Justification of Methodology 
Research related to alliances and inter-organizational network management encompasses 
a broad set of organizational and environmental variables. Issues like trust and other 
socio-cultural parameters need to be incorporated into the analysis. Researchers have 
suggested that a rigorous multidimensional research needs to be used in these settings. 
Uncertainties in the relationship between various intra and inter-organizational strategies, 
structures, processes and other traits result in difficulties in measuring the alliance 
performance and effectiveness (Glaister and Buckley, 1998) 
Such research is best done with qualitative research methods (Sofaer,1999), as a good 
qualitative research provides a rich description of complex phenomenon, track unique or 
unexpected events and draw insights from the experience and interpretation of events by 
actors. The above are typical environments in which Indian IT industry operates in. 
However these findings need to be tested for generalizability (Geringer, 1998). The 
generalizability of the findings derived from the case studies would be established 
through a survey using the variables obtained in stage two. 
Duncan (1979) notes that quantitative methods by themselves probably ignore the 
detailed processes pertinent to a particular research project. As a result, a real and deep 
understanding of the research may not be possible. Likewise, Hatten (1979) states that 
quantitative research methods have had little impact on business policy and strategy 
research. This is probably due to the nature of strategic management itself, that it is 
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concerned with divergent problems and anticipation of the future. Meanwhile, Smith 
(1991) argues that case studies are deserving of greater attention as a research method, 
particularly in the context of management research. However, various qualitative and 
inductive approaches appear less frequently in management journals (Bonoma, 1985). 
The quantitative methods remain popular and important to research in strategic 
management field. Currently, positivist concepts in management research are dominating, 
especially in the United States (Smith, 1991). Nevertheless, the positivist research 
orientations have long been criticized by social science scholars (Silverman. 1985). Being 
scientific and quantitative does not always result in acceptable research findings. 
Employing an entire process of the scientific method may not be considered appropriate 
for conducting management research. Many academics state that international 
management is still a field that lacks theoretical insights (Ricks, 1993: Miller, 1993: 
Black and Mendenhall. 1990: Adler. 1983). Besides, the nature of international business 
involves complicated and sensitive issues. As qualitative methods are considered the 
most robust way to develop a theory. Wright (1996) suggests using qualitative methods to 
work on international business research. In particular, qualitative methods allow the 
researcher to obtain more meaningful data and to increase opportunities to examine and 
explore the complex, interdependent issues that constitute international management 
(Wright. 1996). In greater detail, a qualitative approach focuses more on comprehensive, 
independent, holistic structures which are predictive and dynamic (Wright. 1996). These 
characteristics can help the researcher better understand complex phenomena in the 
international arena. Moreover, the benefits of qualitative methods in cross-cultural 
research are recognized even by scholars in the fields that favor experiments, testing, and 
statistical analysis. However, as argued by Boyacigiller and Alder (1991). the majority of 
research in North American social science is still dominated by rigorous quantitative 
methods. Survey research, a prominent kind of quantitative research, is probably one of 
the most commonly used techniques in international management research (Harpaz. 
1996). Nonetheless, the nature of research in international studies is more likely to 
depend upon rich context and explanation. In this respect, various quantitative methods 
may fail to elicit the complex phenomena which always exist in the international business 
arena. In conclusion, from the overall reasons mentioned above, it seems that qualitative 
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methods are more suitable for research in international management. This is because the 
subject is the nonlinear, interactive, interdependent, and involves complicated 
phenomena. Qualitative methods can solicit this type of data (Wright, 1996). 
Research methods in international strategic alliances 
Methodological orientations in international alliance research seem to favor and be biased 
towards quantitative methods (Bettis, 1991). Most of the international joint venture 
studies also overemphasize large-scale mail surveys and tend to use complicated 
statistical analyses. Consequently, the majority of research projects on international 
alliance topics published in various management journals are conducted using 
quantitative research methods. With reference to this phenomenon. Parkhe (1996) and 
Wright (1996) argue that "soft" concepts of international joint venture research, such as 
reciprocity, trust, opportunism, and linking mechanisms cannot be captured and 
discovered by "hard" data sources involving survey and other quantitative methods. 
Wright (1996) also indicates that some research topics including the formation of 
international joint ventures are not suitable for research by quantitative methods. These 
methods cannot gather all the necessary data and might provide misleading information 
that should be excluded from the analysis. Further, the current literature on international 
joint ventures (IJVs) shows that the recent empirical international joint venture research 
fails to address and contribute to the major concepts of joint venture relationships 
(Parkhe. 1993). Apparently, the suitable way to complete the literature on such IJV 
concepts is to deploy research methods which must be powerful and rigorous in 
generating valid and reliable data in order to thoroughly understand the concepts 
involved. As recommended by Parkhe (1996). one of the efficient ways to research IJV 
topics is case study analysis. He also gives a reason that a case study helps researchers to 
get closer to the actions of the various lifecycle stages of joint ventures. Besides, the 
systematic and rigorous analytical methods of case study analysis are well suited for 
clarifying and probing unclear research questions associated with the IJV management 
processes (Parkhe. 1996). The main data collection methods of case studies are 
considered effective. Such a major data collection method for case study development is 
open-ended interviews (Parkhe. 1996: Yin. 1984). In the interviews, respondents can be 
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asked about the facts of the joint ventures as well as opinions and insights about the 
cooperative events (Eisenhardt, 1989). The case study method, then, yields rich and 
subtle understandings and suggests sources of corroboratory evidence (Parkhe, 1996). 
Ghauri, Gronhaug, and Kristianslund (1995) also state that the main focus of the case 
study method is on seeking insights into the objects being investigated in order to obtain 
sufficient information to characterize and explain the unique features of each case study. 
Therefore, it is expected that the qualitative case study strategy can help the researcher to 
obtain sufficient important data, clarify an intriguing framework of international strategic 
alliances, and provide adequate explanations for behavioural aspects of international 
alliances Regarding all the previous discussion, the majority seems to support the 
deployment of qualitative research, particularly case studies. However, there are some 
criticisms of the effectiveness of the case study method. The qualitative method is 
believed to be inferior to the quantitative method, and that the former seems not to be 
scientific unless it clearly identifies a hypothesis which can be examined. Bonoma (1985) 
refers to a trade-off between "currency" and "data integrity". Currency means 
generalisability of the research findings. Data integrity refers to the characteristics of the 
research project that affect the error and bias of research results. As indicated previously, 
the research results ought to possess both attributes. However, it is apparent that any 
single method cannot simultaneously obtain data integrity and currency. Employing both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, which are complementary rather than contradictory 
(Duncan, 1979), offers a satisfactory level of currency and data integrity. 
Notwithstanding some unique strength of case studies, the case study approach is not 
adequate to simultaneously meet all the research quality criteria, comprising construct 
validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Parkhe. 1996). The 
triangulation of data collected and analysed from multiple research methods enhances 
accuracy and confidence in the research findings. Naumes (1979) suggests that the two 
major forms of research, consisting of quantitative and qualitative approaches, are a 
symbiotic relationship which can provide synergistic results. Moreover, in order to gamer 
more reliable research results, many researchers have advocated a use of both qualitative 
and quantitative methods (Triandis, 1976; Mcgrath. Martin, and Kulka. 1982; Brewer and 
Hunter. 1989). Smith (1991) also states that the problems associated with 
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representativeness might be irrelevant if quantitative and qualitative methods are 
combined to pursue the best of both approaches. In this way, the strengths of each 
research approach, including qualitative and quantitative methods, can reinforce each 
other and establish better research results. In conclusion, in order to improve validity and 
reliability, this research also employs quantitative research methods to collect specific 
and definite primary data. The study is made more scientific and generalisable through an 
intensive questionnaire survey. 
Rationale for the Case Studies 
In addition to the questionnaire survey, it was decided to conduct a small number of case 
studies. The case study method was used in order to investigate some aspects of the 
research in more detail and to discover any new and unexpected perspectives. The further 
investigation of sensitive issues with respect to the international alliance is of vital 
importance. For example, investigations concerning the strategic thoughts behind the 
companies' alliance formation, the firms' attitudes towards important issues influencing 
their cross-border co-operation, and the frameworks of major influencing factors in such 
a process are added to be more focused. Greater detail and insight into the real motives 
and underlying needs behind cross-border alliances, the process of seeking foreign 
partner, the strategic reasons for the use of selection criteria, and the logic behind alliance 
timing can be obtained. In particular, an attempt to explore the "black boxes" in the 
strategic thinking of executives regarding their alliances is imperative for investigating 
complicated patterns and rationales of their alliance development. All of these aspects 
cannot be efficiently elicited by survey methods alone. The use of case study research as 
additional research strategies clearly helps accomplish the mission of this study. 
4.2 Research Questions 
Emerging economies like India face various uncertainties due to evolution of institutional 
mechanisms and forces of globalization. Apart from this, owing to high degree of 
technical change, the level of uncertainties in industries like IT is very high. The focus of 
proposed study would be international strategic alliances between domestic and foreign 
firms in Indian IT Industry. Following questions would be answered as part of this 
research 
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• To study the factors that drive domestic IT firms in India to enter into an 
international strategic alliance 
• To study the factors that influence governance costs of these alliance 
Such a study on IT industry in India does not exist to date. This could be a value to both 
theorists and practitioners, as IT industry has emerged as a high growth industry for the 
Indian economy, which itself has been one of the emerging economies in the world. 
4.3 Research Hypothesis 
Following research hypothesis were created 
MOTIVATION: RESOURCE DEPENDENCY ARGUMENT 
Hypothesis I: Internal strategic alliances do not allow domestic IT firms to access 
spatially differentiated resources and are not entered into for gaining access to 
technology. 
Hypothesis 1.1 posits that spatially differentiated resources are not accessed by domestic 
IT firms from International Strategic Alliances. 
Hypothesis 1.2 posits that access to technology was not perceived to be a factor by 
domestic IT firms to gain from International Strategic Alliances. 
MOTIVATION: ENVIRONMENTAL DEPENDENCY ARGUMENT 
Hypothesis 2: Environmental factors and constraints will not initiate the use of 
international strategic alliances by domestic IT firms in an emerging economy and they 
are not used to overcome uncertainties related to vertically linked activities. 
Hypothesis 2.1 : International Strategic Alliances are not used by domestic firms in an 
emerging economy to overcome uncertainties related to vertically linked activities 
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Hypothesis 2.2: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not enter into 
international strategic alliances to overcome interregional differences associated with 
policy and culture. 
Hypothesis 2.3: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not use International 
Strategic Alliances to overcome competitive uncertainty. 
Hypothesis 2.4: Technical changes do not drive domestic IT firms to form international 
Strategic Alliance. 
MOTIVATION: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION ARGUMENT 
Hypothesis 3: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not enter into International 
Strategic Alliances to exploit competitive advantages and International Strategic 
Alliances do not distribute risks and do not help in gaining flexibility in the 
organizational activities for domestic IT firms. 
Hypothesis 3.1: Domestic JT firms in an emerging economy, will not enter into 
international strategic alliances to exploit competitive advantages related to vertical 
disaggregation and spatial separation of functions. 
Hypothesis 3.2 : International Strategic Alliances do not distribute risks and do not help 
in gaining flexibility in the organizational activities for domestic IT firms. 
COST DRIVER: 
Hypothesis 4: The behavioral uncertainty and partner asymmetry between alliance 
partners do not influence the governance costs in International Strategic Alliances. 
Partner reputation will not serve as a credible commitment and trust and cooperation 
between partners will not reduce the cost of International Strategic Alliances. 
Hypothesis 4.1 posits that partner reputation will not serve as a credible commitment in 
International Strategic Alliance relationships for domestic IT firms. 
Hypothesis 4.2 posits that trust and cooperation between participating firms will not 
reduce the cost of associated with an International Strategic Alliances for domestic IT 
firms in an emerging economy. 
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Hypothesis 4.3 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy, physical, 
cultural and organizational distance between partners will not contribute to governance 
costs of international strategic alliances. 
Hypothesis 4.4 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy, International 
Strategic Alliances cannot be cheaper for firms with experience at forming and maintain 
relationships. 
Hypothesis 5 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy the structure of an 
International Strategic Alliance wil I not influence its governance costs. 
Hypothesis 6 posts that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy the function of an 
International Strategic Alliance will not influence its governance costs 
4.4 Research Hypothesis and Questionnaire mapping 
Tabic 4-1 Reserach hypothesis and questionnaire mapping 
Hypothesis 
1.1 
1.2 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.4 
3.1 
3.2 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
5 
6 
Questions 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
13 
11,12 
14 
15 
9,10,17 
16 
4.5 Data Descr^tion 
The Indian Information technology (IT) industry was be taken up for research. In Indian 
IT industry the focus of research was on domestic IT firms and MNC's operating out of 
India would not be taken up for research. The industry consists of electronics, telecom, 
hardware, software and IT enables services. The industry has a high degree of technical 
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intensity and uncertainty. The product and project life cycle of this industry is less than a 
year. The percentage of technical manpower in these companies is very high. For the 
initial sample for the mail survey, the NASSCOM (National Association of Software 
and Services Companies) Directory would be used. A preliminary search would be done 
to identify firms in the NASSCOM directory having strategic alliances. The 
questionnaire would be mailed to the identified firms. 
Only the alliances between an Indian firm and foreign firms would be considered for the 
study. 
4.5.1 Primary Data 
To carry out the undertaken research work, the researcher has heavily relied on primary 
data by preparing the questionnaire to collect the information. Different set of questions 
were prepared to get the required information. The questionnaire was sent to companies 
4.5.2 Secondary data 
Apart from the first hand information through the questionnaire, lot of literature was also 
consulted like theses, NASSCOM directory, annual reports, projects, industrial journals, 
publications, books, magazines, articles, websites of different organization, text books, 
reports etc. to support the undertaken work in regard to conceptual part of human 
resource management, balance scorecard approach, theories, models, structures. 
The Research work was started by setting up of the objectives of the study. The 
hypotheses were framed to be tested. On the basis of the hypotheses, the data was 
collected and presented in the desired manner. The suitable statistical tools like t- test, 
chi-square test, Cronbach's alpha. Spearman Rank correlation Test were used as these 
tools were the most suitable in the given conditions. The interpretation was made to test 
the data. At the end of the chapter of analysis and interpretation, the accepted and 
rejected hypotheses are given in the form of table. 
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4.6 Pt^ulation 
The list of IT companies was picked from NASSCOM Database. NASSCOM® is the 
premier trade body and the chamber of commerce of the IT-BPO industries in India. 
NASSCOM is a global trade body with more than 1200 members, which include both 
Indian and multinational companies that have a presence in India. NASSCOM's member 
and associate member companies are broadly in the business of software development, 
software services, software products, consulting services, BPO services, e-commerce & 
web services, engineering services offshoring and animation and gaming. NASSCOM's 
membership base constitutes over 95% of the industry revenues in India and employs 
over 2.24 million professionals. The National Association of Software and Services 
Companies (NASSCOM), the Indian chamber of commerce is a consortium that serves as 
an interface to the Indian software industry and Indian BPO maintaining a state of the art 
information database of IT software and services related activities for use of both the 
software developers as well as interested companies overseas. 
4.7 Sanqiie 
As the number of companies in NASSCOM database is large hence a sample size was 
determined using the method suggested by Nargundkar (2008). For interval scaled 
variables the following formula given by Nargundkar (2008) has been used. 
N=( Z* S / E) 2 
Where N= Smaple size 
Z= Confidence level 
S= Population standard deviation for the variable which we are trting to study 
E= Tolerable error, expressed in the same units as the variables being measured 
I have taken following values 
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Z's value at 95% confidence level = 1.96 
S= Range of interval / no of Std Deviations = 4/6 
The survey had likert 5 point scale hence Range =5-1=4 
No of std deviations = 6 
E =0.09 from most of the studies around strategic alliances 
Substituting Z, S, E in above formula we get sample size to be 128 . Assuming a response 
rate of 30% the limit for number of firms that were selected for sending questionnaire 
was 350, to be on the safer side. Random Stratified sampling procedure was used in this 
study. 
4.8 Surv^ Instrument 
4.8.1 Exploratory Survey 
The objective during this stage of analysis was to choose representative firms whose 
alliances had a large spread in terms of motivational factors and also the business areas 
being addressed. Each alliance was mapped for the business area it addressed and also the 
benefits the Indian firm sought to gain. Totally 8 businesses area were considered both 
from the domestic and international perspective. The areas are listed below: 
Hardware development 
Software development 
Peripherals 
Networking 
Maintenance 
Training 
Hardware Marketing 
Software marketing 
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Overall, 13 motivational factors were considered at this stage. These factors are listed 
below. 
Experience building 
Assessing new technologies 
Rationalization of investment 
Spreading cost and risks of R & D 
Managerial experience building 
- Developing uniform industry wide product standards 
Complying with local governments 
Adapting to technology change 
Shortening of product development cycle. 
Monitoring environmental changes and market opportunities. 
Entry to foreign markets 
Access to recognized brand name. 
Long term supplier-buyer relationship 
The data from the questionnaire were analyzed. Data was available for 238 alliances. The 
number of alliances addressing each of business areas and also the various motivational 
factors are mapped. While doing the analysis it was found that quite a few alliances 
figured in multiple categories. 
While choosing the firms to be studied for the next stage, those firms which had alliances 
addressing the maximum number of motivations and also the maximum numbers of 
business areas were considered, in order to get a good spread of the observations on 
alliance strategies, during the case studies. The number of alliances the chosen firms had 
were also considered. Firms with more number of alliances were preferred for the case 
studies, in order to get a better perspective on the alliance strategy of the organization. 
Care was also taken to include alliance partners from various geographical regions. 
Outlier firms were also looked at while making choices for case studies, in order to avoid 
missing out strategy or alliance relationships which were unique. 
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Table 4.2 and 4.3 gives details of the business areas as well as the motivational factors 
addressed by alliances of Indian firms. These areas were indexed in descending order of 
the occurrence of alliances. 
It can be seen from the table 4.2 that the maximum number of alliances occur in the area 
of software development for international markets. Accessing of new technologies and 
entry of foreign markets stand out as the motivational factors which were addressed the 
most, followed by access to recognized brand name and expansion of product range. 
Table 4-2 Occurrence of Strategic Alliances- Busines* A.rca-wise 
Business Area 
Software development international 
Software development Domestic 
Maintenance- domestic 
Software marketing- international 
Hardware development- domestic 
Hardware marketing- domestic 
Software marketing- domestic 
Maintenance- international 
Hardware development- international 
Networking- domestic 
Hardware marketing- international 
Networking- international 
Peripherals- domestic 
Training- international 
Training- domestic 
Peripherals- international 
Number of Alliances 
128 
49 
33 
32 
30 
26 
25 
20 
19 
14 
11 
10 
7 
7 
6 
1 
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Table 4-3 Occurrences of Strategic Alliances- Motivation-vkise 
Motivational Factors 
Accessing new technologies 
Entry to foreign markets 
Access to recognized brand name 
Expansion of product range 
Supplier-buyer relationship 
Shortening of product development cycle 
Adapting to technology change 
Monitoring environmental changes 
Developing uniform product standards 
Managerial experience building 
Rationalization of investment 
Spreading cost and risks of R & D 
Complying with local governments 
Number of Alliances 
119 
102 
90 
83 
79 
69 
65 
51 
44 
38 
28 
28 
11 
The cases were selected in order to cover the most widely addressed business areas, as 
well as the most widely addressed motivational factors. As it was difllcult to find firms 
with a diversified focus on multiple business areas, the firm choices were made in such a 
way that the industry groups with high occurrence of alliances were covered from the 
cases selected, even if each case focused on just one or two business areas. Apart from 
this, care was taken to select alliances of the non equity and equity type. Preference was 
given to the firms having a large number of alliances. It was also taken care that different 
geographical areas were represented among the alliance partners, in order to understand 
the factors relating to cultural and inter regional differences. Table 4.4 gives a list of the 
cases selected. The following cases were selected for the analysis in stage 2 
- Bharti BT Ltd 
Wipro Technologies Ltd 
C MAC Centrum Electronics Ltd. 
D'gipro Design Automation and Marketing Pvt. Ltd. 
Sonata Software Ltd. 
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Forceftil variables are those where there was an emphasis through negatives or 
affirmatives or forceful language / adjectives on a theme or a key word. The variable was 
derived from the key words/themes mentioned in the conversation with the respondents. 
Inter- case Analysis 
The cases revealed that the alliances were of two types viz Non equity Alliances and 
Equity joint ventures (EJVs) 
The basic motivations for forming these alliances were as follows: 
Market Access (through direct support for marketing and market knowledge transfer) 
o Access to foreign markets, as in the case of C Maac Centum and Sonata 
o Access to domestic markets, as in the case of D'gipro, sonata and Bharti- BT 
Learning ( which is implicit without a contract, gaining knowledge about products/ 
technology) 
o Learning about operations as in the case of Bharti-BT. 
o Learning about products/ technology as in the case of Wipro and Sonata 
Technology transfer (explicit transfer of technology through a contract) 
o Transfer of product technology as in the case of C- Mac Centum 
o Transfer of operations technology as in the case of Bharti- BT 
The above groupings are captured in table 4.4. There were no cases of alliances in 5 firms 
chosen, wherein firms entered into non equity alliances with a motivation of having 
technology transferred. An understanding of the basic motivations for alliance formation 
is critical, for further analysis, as the behavior of the partners and the outcomes of the 
alliances may be affected based on the basic purpose for the alliances. 
tabic 4-5 Basic motivaiions for Alliance formation 
Equity Joint Ventures 
Non- Equity Alliances 
Learning 
Bharti- BT 
Wipro Sonata 
Market access 
C- Mac Cetum 
D' Cipro 
Sonata 
Bharti BT 
Technology Transfer 
C- Mac Centum 
Bharti BT 
Based on the fiequency of occurrences of the variables and also based on the uniqueness 
of a variable ( a variable which may have occurred less frequently, but may have been 
perceived as a unique factor by the interviewee), the following variables were generated 
from the cases studied. The variables have been classified into various categories based 
on the issues they address. The variables were used to develop a questionnaire intended 
to be sent to a large sample for testing the generalizability of variables. 
Bask reasons for entering into alliance 
o Learning about customer technology 
o Learning about supplier technology 
o Learning about products 
o Learning about operations 
o Entry to domestic markets 
o Entry to foreign markets 
o Access to product technology 
o Access to operations technology 
Resources Indian IT firms seeli to gain from alliances with foreign firms 
o Products of the partners 
o Knowledge of technology of the partner 
o Operational knowledge - Procedures, process and best practices 
o Manpower - Technical and managerial 
o Established infrastructure 
o Capital 
o Brand name 
o Partner network 
Alternative rontes for accessing resources 
o Formation of JV 
o Formation of SPV like Offshore Development Centers 
o Outright purchase of technology 
o Building technology for customers 
o Books / Manuals 
Resources why alliance route is preferred 
o Faster and richer access to technology through 
• Trainings 
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• Socialization of people 
• Access to senior people from partner side 
• Access to software /source code 
• Managerial conunitment from the partners 
o Preemption of a competitor to access the technology from the foreign company 
due to the formation of alliance 
EDvinmmentel foctors rdated to vertical activities sougiit to be dealt with aUiaBce 
o Overcoming effects of demand uncertainty 
• Reduction of inventories 
• Coping with the uncertainty in the future of the market / players in the 
maricet 
• Coping with uncertainty in customer behavior 
o Overcoming effects of supply uncertainty 
• Overcoming non availability of supplies locally 
• Leveraging on global procurement 
• Coping with need for continuous purchase and need of cost reduction 
o Overcoming effects of regulatory uncertainty 
• Hedging against changes in governmental policy on the sector 
• Coping with foreign exchange risks 
Interregional differences in pcdicy / cnltare songht to be dealt with alliance 
o Governmental policies 
• With regards to imports 
• Company governance 
• Subsidies and lax benefits 
o Cultural Barriers 
• National barrier 
• Business barrier 
• Language barrier 
o Gaining reputation in international markets by endorsement by partner 
Competitive uncertainties songht to be dealt with alliance 
o Overcoming investment risks 
o Overcoming dependence on a narrow range of 
• Products 
• Markets 
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• Customers 
o Overcoming risk of foreign company, partnering with other competitors due to 
wide availability of such partners 
o Overcoming lack of understanding of the markets 
How a]liaiice$ hdp cope np with technology change 
o Coping with technology change by 
• Access to forums/ material 
• Sharing R&D expenses 
• Establishing/Coping with standards 
o Monitoring technology change (by sharing beta versions, technology trends etc) 
o Evaluation of technology being used ( partner helping with evaluation of 
technology) 
How alliances help to organize production activities better 
o Alliance partner functioning as a 
• Marketing partner (marketing outputs if the firm) 
• Sourcing partner ( sourcing inputs for the firm) 
• Supplying partner ( supplying inputs for the firm at cheaper prices) 
o Sharing fixed costs 
o Overcoming regional differences in costs related to 
• Equipment failure 
• Attrition of manpower 
• Collection of receivables 
How alliances decrease flexilMlity of operations 
o Dependence on the partner for routine decisions 
o Exclusivity of the partnership for geographies / areas/ domains/ margins/ prices 
etc 
o Constraints on partnering with competitors of foreign partner 
o Stipulation on minimum levels for sales, promotions, products etc 
How alliances increase flexibility of operations 
o Partner subsiding operation costs like travel, advertizing 
o Autonomy given in fixing commissions , margins etc 
o Usage of assets 
Factors affecting trust and cooperation in alliances 
o Perception that the relationship is risks due to 
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• Ego 
" Lack of honesty 
• Perception that foreign partners will compete directly 
o Excess time spent for relations interactions compared to operational interaction 
o Failure to fulfill commitments/milestones 
o Disputes regarding 
• Setting objectives - payments, counter guarantees, milestones etc 
" Interim changes in alliance /project scope 
• Ownership of IP 
» Statulory contractxial c\avises ( arbitration, indemnity ett) 
• Operational contractual clauses ( reimbursement, ownership of material 
,cost sharing etc) 
• Call options - exercise price, number of shares, triggering events 
• Valuation / valuation methods 
• Convincing the partner to trust the company's knowledge of the local 
market 
Factors facilitating trust and cooperation in alliances 
o Creating an environment of openness and transparency 
o Building an organization based trust rather than a people / individual based trust 
o Providing unsolicited value addition to the partner (by sharing of knowledge , 
feedback for improvement, cost advantage, resources, access to markets, standing 
guarantees, 
o Unilateral dedication of assets 
o Acceptance of majority partner's dominant role in alliance 
o Facilitating a convenient interaction - in terms of meeting times, availability etc 
o Proactive change of the role in alliance 
o Avoiding bargaining by upfront acceptance of partner terms ( unwanted travel 
costs equity, stake, exclusivity) 
Factors relating to reputation of the partner looked at prior to catering into alliance 
o Company performance (sales, profits etc) 
o Market strengths ( market share, operations base, bargaining power with 
suppliers) 
o Future outlook of the partner ( Business plans, product / services roadmap etc) 
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o Technology strengths 
o Alliance management history - policies and past experience 
o Market reputation ( customer stories, endorsements by market research firms) 
Issnes rdating to physical / cnHnral / organization distance adding to cost of 
governing the alliance 
o Cost of adapting to the business / operational cultural distance ( equipment 
adaption, operational procedural adaption etc) 
o Costs of adapting to organizational cultural distance (decision making, sharing of 
vision, rules etc) 
o Costs of adapting to national cultural distance 
o Costs of adapting to differences in language 
o Costs of adapting to differences in work ethos 
o Costs of convincing on strategic issues - profitability, productivity . investments 
Benefits of alliance experience that helped managing alliances better 
o Better understanding of the expectations of partner 
o Upfront clarification of issues 
o Understanding hidden costs / factors for negotiation 
o Predictability of the behavior of alliance partner 
o Effective structuring of the alliance 
o Better understanding of the purpose of the alliance 
o Reduction in alliance management costs due to incremental improvements in the 
relationship 
Factors rdating to functional ( technology access / market access/ learning ) of the 
alliances resulting in higher alliance management costs 
o Efforts to adapt to the decision to break the alliance due to strategic reorientation 
of one of the partners 
o Change in scope of alliance 
o Inventory costs 
o Technology license fees 
o Logistics costs 
Factors relating to the structure of alliances that result in highn- alliance 
managements costs 
o Coping with discrepancies in incentives for workforce of Indian company with 
respect to foreign partners 
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o Sharing of teams 
o Preparation of reports and collecting of information and insistence on written 
communication 
o Training / Seminars 
o Manpower costs for alliance / project manager 
o Organizing coherent but decentralized conmiiinication with alliance partner 
o Board membership 
o Visits from partners 
o Top management time 
o Coping with changes in management structure of the partner 
o Coping with inexperienced alliance managers due to lack of resources 
o F*resence of foreign partner representatives in the Indian operational team 
o Foreign partners micromanagement of operations 
Factors relating to the stmctnre of alliance resniting in lower alliance management 
costs 
o Prescriptiveness of alliance operations 
o Autonomy of the staff 
o Presence of Indian representatives from partners side in Indian operational team 
o Partner's involvement in the Indian company's strategic planning, budgeting and 
management 
Factors normally considered when measuring the performance of alliances 
o Business benefits - topline, bottomline, market share 
o Success of partner's products / technology 
o Establishment of operations 
o Technology synergies with sister concerns 
o Organizational benefits - people, product, process 
o Lesser employee attrition 
o Shareholder value creation 
o Building upstream / downstream capabilities 
o Willingness to associate in future ventures 
o Access t unanticipated benefits 
o Non disclosure agreement 
o ROl 
o Partner support during times of need 
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o Fulfilling initial objectives 
o Performance compared to the other alliances of partner 
o Fulfilling of milestones 
o Fulfilling of investment commitments 
4.9 Reliability and Validity of data variables 
In this research a considerable amount of attention has been given to ensure reliability 
and validity of the results. Related earlier research have been used while developing 
constructs and measurement items. Relaible data source have been used and retesting is 
used to validate the primary data used. Statistical methods have been carefully selected 
and employed after ensuring fulfillment of assumptions. Finally results and conclusions 
have been carefully analyzed to ensure their feasibility. 
4.9.1 Reliability 
Reliability is consistency of measurement or the degree to which an instrument measures 
the same way each time it is used under the same condition with the same subjects. In 
short it is repeatability of measurement. Reliability was ensure by following steps 
As a single informant answered the survey, it was important that the respondent was 
knowledgeable to the operations / strategy of firms. In order to maximize the reliability of 
data of this study, the survey was administered to key executives as suggested by John 
and Reeve (1982). Survey was carefully designed with several rounds of revisions. 
Several interviews gave confidence that the respondents would not have problems in 
understanding the questions and that they would be knowledgeable about the issues 
covered in the questionnaire. Spector (1992) suggested this method to ensure reliability 
of data. Prior to analyzing a multi-item variable, the reliability and internal consistency 
were of vital concern. In this research, the researcher calculated Cronbach's alphas, 
namely coefficient alphas or reliability coefficient in order to ensure the reliability 
capabilities of all multi-item variables. Values of the reliability coefficients indicated 
correlation of various items in each variable. According to Nunnally (1967), a multi-item 
variable receiving a value 0.7 over is considered very reliable. Following factors were 
considered to be reliable. 
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b. The constructs and measurement items were developed on the basis of previous 
research as far as ]X)ssible. 
c. The questionnaire was developed and pretested to ensure that measures were in 
line with conmion understanding of concepts 
The draft questionnaire developed in stage 2 was tested in two phases 
a) Pilot surveys for 6 firms to eliminate redundant variables and also to reframe 
the question in a fashion that would be understood by the respondent. 
b) The revised questionnaire after the pilot surveys was administered to 3 
companies from the 5 cases chosen in stage 2 in order to check out whether 
the responses to the questionnaire were conforming to the patters in those 
cases. It was found that the questionnaire results matched with the patters in 
the respective case studies. 
A copy of the final questionnaire is attached at appendix . The questionnaire was mailed 
to a large sample of 367 firms. These were firms from which the questionnaire sent 
during stage I were not rejected back due to either lack of interest or address change. The 
responses to the questionnaire had data for 130 alliances in all. 
Where-ever needed, relationships were sought to be established further through 
correlation analysis( using spearman's correlation coefficient). The data for the large 
samples was subjected to a sign test in order to understand whether there was any 
significant change in the motivations of the alliances, from time of forming the same. 
4.10 Research Design and Methodology 
This section deals with the methodology adapted in this study to test for support for the 
hypothesis postulated. The various tools used and the preliminary results which helped 
in arriving at the final research findings are included here: 
Figure 4-1 Research Framework 
Setting of the objectives 
Framing of Hypotheses 
Final questionnaire 
Questionnaire survey 
Presentation of data 
Hypothesis testing (T-test, Chi-Square test) 
Interpretation of data 
Major findings and recommendations of study 
Direction for further Research 
A central focus of the research in strategic management has been to understand the 
relationships associated with the structure-strategy-performance paradigm. To examine 
these relationships, investigators have relied extensively on cross sectional methods the 
embody the implicit assumption that model parameters are stable across firms and over 
time. This is however not true with the uncertain environment under which domestic IT 
firme operate. The industry structure is highly unstable and uncertain in the technology 
intensive industries like those in the IT industry. Hence, the relationships may not emerge 
clearly from just cross -sectional studies. Many of the theoretical constructs used in 
strategic management have clear firm and time specific components and as a result 
alternative methods to cross-sectional analysis needs to be adapted. This can help for 
testing variation in model parameters across firms and over time (Bowen and Wiersema, 
1999). 
The concurrent study aimed at identifying the various factors related to the governance, 
motivation /reasons and performance of strategic alliances. The focus here was to explore 
factors related to various propostions postulated earlier, based on what factors the 
domestic IT forms have considerd as important. 
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Following sections give details of the three stages of research. 
Stage 1. Broad baaed QBertionBaire survey 
A preliminary survey was carried out to understand the nature of alliances domestic IT 
firms enter into. A questionnaire was sent to 367 firms by mail. These 367 firms were 
selected from the NASSCOM CNational Association of Software and Services 
Companies) liast, as it covered a wide variety of Indian IT firms. Only domestic firms 
would be chosen fi-om this list and the subsidiaries of MNCs would be left out. The 
responses from these firms was used to gain insights into the types of alliances and 
alliance strategies of domestic IT firms. Such a survey helped in stratifying the overall 
sample into clusters of firms, with similar types of alliances and similar alliances 
strategies. The objective of this survey wase to select few representative firms out of 
clusters formed to carry out an in-depth study. 
Stage 2. Case Studies 
Representative firms were chosen from the above clusters in order to understand the 
management of alliances better. Case studies were carried out on these firms. These 
studies were based on in-depth interviews and reports. Multiple interviews were done to 
take into account rival explanations (Patton, 1999; Yin, 1999). In order to gain richer data, 
apart from informant interviews, a content analysis of relevant documents was also be 
done (Yin, 1984; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest, 1972; Gummesson,1991). 
The objective of the case studies was to generate measureable variables that could be 
tested for generalizability. The cases was chosen in such a way that each case would 
represent a wider variety of reasons/ motivational factors and also a wider representative 
of industry presence. 
Stage 3. ValidatioB of variables 
The variables generated from the previous stage were used to design a questionnaire. The 
variables generated from stage two were subjected to statistical analysis in order to 
establish the generalizability of the variables. 
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Both the surveys in stage 1 and 3 were mail surveys and had telephone / email reminders 
and interaction as follow up action and thus followed Total Design Method (Salant and 
Dillman, 1994; Dillman, 1978). 
4,11 Concqttual model of Research 
This chapter outlines various hypothesis developed during this research. The hypothesis 
deal with the reasons for formation of alliances, costs of governing the relationships and 
the effect of these governance costs on alliance performance. 
Interfirm cooperation exists when two or more firma act in concert to pursue mutual gain 
(Borys and Jemison, 1989). These gains could be with respect to transactional advantage 
in the market place or with respect to gaining resources which are scarce and firm 
specific. This could be knowledge or technology. 
According to the resource based view of the firm, inter firm cooperation permits to share 
firm specific resources ( Barney, 1991) and thereby overcoming growth constraints due 
to lack of resources (Harmel, 1991). From organizational economics perspective, firms 
seek to cooperate for minimizing the costs of transactions and governance and also the 
costs for monitoring and controlling organizational activities ( Hersterly, Liebeskind, 
Zenger, 1990), whereas the resource based view focuses on the implications of resources 
for organizational action and performance and thus places resources at the center of 
competitive advantage, according to ( Wemerfelt, 1984), the central concern in 
organizational economics is to identify actions that minimize the costs of governance, 
which in turn maximize performance ( Williamson, 1994). 
Overall, Organizational economics offers a means to explain the way economic activity is 
organized. Any given arrangement can be viewed as an attempt to minimize the cost of 
economic exchange by aligning authority relationships and incentives to the unique 
conditions surrounding the exchange. Researchers have proposed that an effective way of 
understanding alliances would be to have a combination of both the schools of thoughts ( 
Madhok, 1996; Combs and ketchen Jr, 1999). 
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These exchange conditions which need to be taken into consideration can be either 
internal or external to the firm. In the current study, the motivations for alliance 
formation were looked at from a combination of Resource Dependence and 
Organizational Economics viewpoints taking into consideration the turbulent 
environmental factors the domestic IT firms are in and also the internal organizational 
perspective in order to study the motivations for alliance formation. Thus the three 
perspectives VIZ, resource dependence, environmental uncertainty and internal 
organization are looked at together. 
While transaction costs have also often been cited as reasons behind the formation of 
alliances, critics of this theory have however pointed that the theory is most appropriate 
to static efficiency and routine situations (Ghosal and Moran , 1995). Environments with 
a high degree of uncertainty, like the ones IT firms operate in, may not be the right 
context to use the transaction costs explanation alone. 
4.11.1 Use of Strategic Alliances to overcome resource dependency 
Kogut (1998) points out that two properties are particularly distinctive in order to 
distinguish an alliance from a normal contract, while analyzing from a transaction costs 
perspective. These are joint ownership and mutual commitment of resources. In a highly 
dynamic environment, ftill ownership, control and internalization of activities may not be 
easy, owing to high degree of risks and environmental uncertainties involved. Firms 
could then choose to jointly own or mutually share the firm specific resources, by way of 
participating in strategic alliances. 
Resources are the basis of profitability of firms and could be financial, physical, human, 
technological or reputational. Firms continuously seek opportunities to economize the 
resources and also to deploy the existing resources in more profitable areas. Demsetz ( 
1997) argued that the Neo-Classical theory conceptualizes an economy in which there is 
extreme dependency. He argues that though the neo-classical theory presumes full 
knowledge and therefore no risk, under conditions of imperfect information, risks 
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becomes relevant and cannot be discounted. This results in a situation of extreme 
dependency of firms. 
Transitional researchers have found that organization enter partnership when they 
perceive critical strategic interdependence with other organizations in their environment ( 
Levine and White, 1961; Aiken and Hage , 1968). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have 
proposed that more alliances relationships can be expected when resource flows are 
particularly problematic and environmental uncertainty is high. 
Hypothesis 1: Internal strategic alliances do not allow domestic IT firms to access 
spatially differentiated resources and are not entered into for gaining access to 
technology. 
Researchers in the field of economic geography have observed that resource dependence 
between the firms lead to formation of clusters (Porter, 1998), wherein firms form 
networks among themselves and reorganize as regional clusters to deal with resource 
dependencies. Susceptibility to form such clusters depends on the need for reduction of 
spatial transaction costs through such linkages and also the level of environmental 
externalities the firms are exposed to (Scott, 1996). 
Anand and Kogut (1997) have noted that while clusters help firms exploit the local 
linkages and complementarities of tangible assets for competitive advantage of the host 
country, two host country factors viz, resident technology and market attractiveness 
determine the benefits derived from the clusters. Cluster formation is also governed by 
various local market factors like R&D capacity, capital availability, knowledge, 
specialized services, social infrastructure etc ( Rosenfeld, 1997). 
It may be said here that while firms may form clusters with geographically proximate 
firms in order to overcome resource dependence ( Scott, 1998) , they may be forces to 
form networks with geographically distant forms , often times across the border firms , to 
gain access to resources which are not available locally. As the factors in the environment 
as well as the resource endowments of the firms determine the competitiveness of nations 
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(Porter, 1990), firms tend to overcome the resource limitations by exploiting the linkages 
across the borders. 
The formation of networks and alliances across the borders become imperative for firms 
needing speed of response, exploitation of knowledge resources and risk sharing across 
the borders (Ohame,1989). These advantages are critical for technology intensive 
industries like the IT industry. Knowledge is a key resource for the dynamic 
environments like those defined for this study (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Kogut 
and Zander 1996; Murinelli and Piscitello 1998) and drives extreme dependence between 
firms. The domestic partner could be looking at knowledge related to modem business 
practices and the foreign partner could be looking at knowledge related to local market 
environment ( Grifith, Zeybek and O'Brien, 2001: Bonfeld, 1995). Hence, firms adopting 
a collaboration strategy resort to increased alliance participation in order to gain access to 
spatially differentiated resources. This also helps them build the local infrastructure 
which is not available (Vonorats and Safioleas, 1997). 
Although emerging economies are growing at a faster pace than most developed 
economies, many of the business in emerging economies are young (Decastro and 
Uhlenbruk, 19997), and their resource endowments are unlikely to be strong within 
borders. These firms in emerging economies may use alliances as a means of acquiring 
tangible and intangible resources to develop their capability to compete domestic and 
global markets. Firms from developed countries tend to have richer resource 
endowments, but search for partners with specific to complement their own resource 
bases. In a study of alliances in Taiwan, Chen and Chen (2002) have found that 
Taiwanese firms tend to enter into asymmetric alliances with firms that are different from 
theirs and thus seek to gain resources that are not available locally. 
Alliances provide a framework for cooperation and facilitate exchange when market 
based trading is costly (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Williamson, 1991), as in case 
when the subject of exchange is specialized, intangible, inimitable, idiosyncratic or 
embodied in organizational routines. Market knowledge and technological challenges in 
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an industry with a higli degree of technological complexity fall into the above category. 
Alliances also help in reducing search costs and facilitate a better choice for gaining the 
requisite tacit and embedded knowledge either for the foreign or domestic firm. The 
training programs offered by the partners who own technology and the socialization 
between the partners enable and easier transfer and sharing of technology between the 
partners compared to other modes of accessing technology. Strategic Alliances help both 
in learning and leveraging technologies effectively (Doz and Hamel, 1994) 
4.11^ Strat^c Alliances to overcome environmental uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty varies across geographical regions. These interregional 
uncertainties can also be triggered by the governments in the different countries ( Dunnig, 
1997). The transaction costs of doing business in various countries and also the 
negotiation outcomes with the local government structures determine the ownership 
preferences and governance structures ( Gomes - Casseres, 1990). 
Strategic alliances can be an effective way of diffusing new technologies rapidly entering 
new markets, expeditiously bypassing governmental restrictions and also for learning 
quickly from the leading firms in a particular field (Lorange and Roos 1991). Alliances 
also enable firms to have a better bargaining power with the governments through the 
local partners (Kogut, 1998). This could be of critical importance in IT industry where 
the governmental regulations play a vital role for the growth of firms. This is enabled by 
firms leveraging on social capital (Ching, Singh and Lee, 2000), which is a result of the 
association with the local partners and enables the foreign firms to manage the economic, 
regulatory, cuhural and political factors specific to such markets. Such partnerships with 
local firms in foreign markets enable domestic IT firms to enter into those markets at a 
faster pace (Doz, 1998). The market presence of the partner firm is critical in such a 
relationship (Bleeke and Ernst, 1911). 
Hypothesis 2: Environmental factors and constraints will not initiate the use of 
international strategic alliances by domestic IT firms in an emerging economy and they 
are not used to overcome uncertainties related to vertically linked activities. 
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There has been a widespread use of strategic alliances in order to overcome interregional 
uncertainties (Dunning , 1998). For many multinational companies, strategic alliances 
have become increasingly important tools for ensuring the speed and flexibility needed to 
carry out muhinational strategies. Speed and flexibility are important for operating in 
technology intensive industries like the IT industry. 
Also the ownership advantages of a firm (Dunning, 1997), which embodies the firm's 
competitive advantage in a certain market, result in a need for greater dependence with 
the incumbent players. These ownership advantages vary geographically from country to 
country. In industries similar to the IT industry, which are technology intensive the 
institutional and interorganizational infirastructure are often poorly developed, likely to 
change frequently , and are particularly weak across national boundaries . Hence there 
appears to be a greater need for alliance for domestic IT firms in order to overcome the 
interregional uncertainty due to differences in policy and culture. 
Also the domestic firms would find it difficult to make an entry into foreign markets. 
Alliances with foreign firms help them to seek to leverage on the brand strengths of the 
partners and get a reputation endorsement, apart from the collaboration possible on core 
competencies (Coke and Ryan 2000). For smaller firms, alliances with partners owning 
technology and other critical technologies, help getting endorsements in the market place. 
These endorsements help the smaller firms get a visibility and acceptability of their skills, 
quality, services etc ( Stuart, 2000). 
Some of the industry level factors linked with alliance formation include the extent of 
competition, the stage of development of market, demand uncertainty and competitive 
uncertainty ( Harrigan, 1998; Shan, 1990; Burgers, Hill and Kim, 1993). Uncertainty in 
firms linkages, goal divergence, volume unpredictability and rivalry leads to competitive 
uncertainty. Strategic alliances are the best mode of governance for organizations 
operating in unstable external environments (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1997). Such 
organizational firms help firms to strike a balance between organizational adaption and 
action on account of the flexibility they provide. This would be quite helpfully in 
environments with a high degree of competitive uncertainty and also an intermediate 
industry concentration. Alliance act as defensive mechanism by which firms hedge 
100 
against strategic uncertainty, especially in industry of moderate concentration ( Vernon, 
1983). The presence of linkage uncertainty also leads to the formation of intermediary 
organizational forms like alliances (Williamsons, 1975). 
4.113 Strategic Alliances for better internal organization 
Hypothesis 3: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not enter into International 
Strategic Alliances to exploit competitive advantages and International Strategic 
Alliances do not distribute risks and do not help in gaining flexibility in the 
organizational activities for domestic IT firms. 
Resource owners seek to increase productivity through cooperative cospecialization ( 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Contractor and Lorange (1999) have also pointed out that in 
general, alliances may be used to exploit competitive advantages and to bring together 
complementary skills and talents that cover different aspects of the know-how. Thus 
alliances can be a form of quasi-integration with each partner contributing one or more 
different elements in the production and distribution chain and results in alliances 
creating competitive strengths through these vertical linkages (Harrigan, 1985). The need 
for vertically integrating production activities with other firms was emphasized by Doz 
(1998) in relation to technology partnerships. It was also observed that in effect the 
process of alliance formation involves vertical disaggregation (Miles and Snow, 1984) , 
internal redesign and then putting the alliance structure in place (Archol, 1991). TTius 
firms can attain competitive advantages related to vertical organization of the production 
fiinction by participating in alliances, more so if the fiinctions are separated 
geographically. In the IT industry, it was found that alliances were formed for integrating 
products and product related activities vertically (knoke, Yang and Grandos 2002). 
Strategic Alliances are used to organize the overall chain and to spread various activities 
among them. In IT industry it is possible to vertically disaggregate and spatially separate 
fiinctions across the value chain, with different modules of development occurring in 
different places in different firms. The different elements in the value chain like design, 
development, testing, implementation and maintenance can also be handled in various 
locations through a network of alliances. 
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While managing activity linkages, technological non seperability can be a key factoring 
supplanting the market by internal organization ( Alchain and Demsetz, 1972). This 
factor becomes more pronounced in technology intensive industries as the risks in 
developing a highly linked technology is very high. Thus under conditions of high risk, 
organizations may be impelled to assume joint risks and engage in recurrent business 
transactions (Ring and Van De Van 1992). 
Strategic Alliances are seen as an attractive mechanism for hedging risks because neither 
partner bears the fijlJ risks and costs of alliances activity (porter and Fuller, 1986). This 
view is also echoed by PfefFer and Salancik 1997, who argue that strategic alliances are 
best mode of governance for organizations operating in unstable external environments. 
Alliances also help in reducing risks, by spreading the assets dedicated to one kind of 
activity across a number of activities (Contractor, 1990) By participating in alliances 
firms adapt the key strategy of reducing dependence and gaining flexibility in order to 
function in uncertain environments. It was also pointed out that firms can enhance 
flexibility and reduce risks by staging commitments. Alliances help in enabling this to 
happen smoothly and mitigating risks by enabling a firm to partner with another which 
has complementary resources and which enable the firms to limit its resource 
commitments for a risky venture. The administrative costs would also be lower in the 
event of muhiple partners dealing with multiple activities on the value chain, brining their 
expertise in those areas. 
Hypothesis 4: The behavioral uncertainty and partner asymmetry between alliance 
partners do not influence the governance costs in International Strategic Alliances. 
Partner reputation will not serve as a credible commitment and trust and cooperation 
between partners will not reduce the cost of International Strategic Alliances. 
Hypothesis 5 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy the structure of 
an International Strategic Alliance will not influence its governance costs. 
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Hypothesis 6 posts that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy the function of an 
International Strategic Alliance will not influence its governance costs 
Figure 4-2 Conceptual model of Alliance Management 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
The findings are based on the questionnaire survey for a large sample. The methodology 
for the analysis was outlined in the last section of previous chapter. 
The results of the analysis carried out for the whole sample are presented below. The 
section below discusses the basic motivational factors for the formation of the alliances. 
This is followed by the section on the support of the hypothesis. These sections are 
followed by a section highlighting some general observations. A statistical analysis was 
done for the overall sample and complete group of non equity alliances and the non 
equity alliances for marketing and learning. For the other groups however, since the 
sample size was small o statistical analysis could be done. However only in the cases 
where an overwhelming trend was observed the findings were elaborated. 
5.1 Statistical Analysis 
While looking for support for the hypothesis, the analysis was carried out to identify 
factors falling into the following categories. 
• Significantly relevant factors 
• Significantly Important factors 
• Significantly non-relevant factors 
Significantly Relevant Factors: These were those factors which the respondents 
considered relevant for alliance management, these factors are considered relevant for 
alliance management in general and not specifically for those alliances currently being 
managed. As a result these factors could have been considered either important or 
unimportant for the alliances under consideration in this study. Statistically these factors 
were those wherein the proportion of respondents answering the question was 
significantly higher than the upper confidence limit of the sample proportion in the case 
of overall sample of 130 alliances, the upper confidence limit was 0.58. The upper 
confidence limit was calculated for a null hypothesis that 50% of the alliances would fall 
into the trend of having a factor relevant. 
112 
Significantly important factors were those relevant factors which apart from being 
relevant were also considered highly important for the alliances being managed by these 
respondents. Statistically these factors were those wherein the responses for a question 
the proportion of respondents giving a weight age of 4 or 5 for a question which was 
answered was significantly higher than the upper confidence limit of the sample 
proportion (the sample size here was taken as the number of relevant responses). The 
upper confidence limit was calculated for a null hypothesis that 50% of the alliances 
which indicated that the factor was relevant would also indicate that the factor was 
important. 
Significantly Non relevant factors are those which the respondents have not considered 
relevant at all for the alliance management for their firms. Statistically these factors were 
those wherein the proportion of respondents answering the question was significantly 
lower than the lower confidence limit of the sample proportion (in the case of the overall 
sample of 130 alliances, the lower confidence limit was 0.42). The upper confidence limit 
was calculated for a null hypothesis that 50% of the alliances would fall into the trend 
having the factor as non relevant. The limits for the confidence intervals for the various 
samples are shown in table below. 
Table 5-1 I pper 
Sample 
Overall 
Sample 
Non equity 
alliances 
and Lower conTidcnce limits for !>tati!.tital anal*»is 
Sample 
Size 
130 
118 
UCL 
(Sig 
level 
5%) 
0.58 
0.59 
UCL 
(Sig 
level 
5%) 
0.42 
0.41 
UCL for test 
of importance 
The new samp 
LCL for test of 
importance 
e size is the number of 
respondents indicating the factor to be 
relevant. The limits would vary based 
on the sample size. 
TTie new sample size is the number of 
respondents indicating the factor to be 
relevant. The limits would vary based 
on the sample size. 
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EJV 
Non equity 
alliances for 
marketing 
Non equity 
alliances for 
Learning 
Non equity 
alliances for 
technology 
12 
78 
77 
8 
Sample too small for statistical analysis 
0.61 
0.61 
0.39 
0.39 
The new sample size is the number of 
respondents indicating the factor to be 
relevant. The limits would vary based 
on the sample size. 
The new sample size is the number of 
respondents indicating the factor to be 
relevant. The limits would vary based 
on the sample size. 
Sample too small for meaningfiil analysis 
5.2 Basic motivations for forming alliances 
Prior to testing for support for the hypothesis an attempt was attempt was made to 
understand the basic motivations for the alliances. It emerged from the case studies that 
Indian IT firms entered into strategic alliances for market access, learning and technology 
transfer. A finer analysis of the basic motivational factors reveals that market access 
could be for foreign markets or domestic markets. Leaning which happens in an implicit 
manner could be related to supplier technology, customer technology, new products pr 
new operations. Technology transfer which is done through an explicit contract could be 
related to either product pr operations technology. An understanding of this would help in 
having a clearer picture on the alliance governance keeping in mind the basic purpose for 
which the alliances in a specific group were formed. A marketing alliance is a 
relationship wherein a form markets the partner's products or gives the partner an entry 
into new markets, apart from giving feedback on market demand and inputs on product 
upgrades. A technology alliance is a relationship wherein firm transfers technology to a 
partner shares R&D activities in order to gain time to market advantages or sharing the 
risks of R&D. A learning alliance is a relationship wherein a firms seeks to learn about 
the partner's products / technology / operations by associating in a relationship where the 
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partner benefits from the time to market advantages resulting from working together on 
joint projects. 
Table 5-2 Basic motivational factors for alliance formation 
Motivation 
Access to 
foreign markets 
Exposure to 
supplier 
technology 
Exposure to new 
products 
Exposure to 
customer 
technology 
Access to 
domestic 
markets 
Transfer of 
product 
technology 
Transfer of 
operations 
technology 
Exposure to new 
operations 
No of 
alliances 
(factor 
relevant) 
130 
130 
130 
130 
130 
130 
130 
130 
Proportion 
of alliances 
(important 
to some 
extent) 
0.69 
0.70 
0.70 
0.41 
0.39 
0.18 
0.16 
0.00 
Proportion of 
alliances (highly 
important or 
extremely 
important) 
0.59 ( 4 or 5) 
0.43 ( 4 or 5) 
0.52 ( 4 or 5) 
0.74 ( 1 or 2) 
0.61 ( l o r 2) 
0.91 ( l o r 2) 
0.94 ( l o r 2) 
UCL 
0.58 
0.58 
0.58 
0.58 
0.58 
0.58 
0.58 
0.58 
LCL 
0.42 
0.42 
0.42 
0.42 
0.42 
0.42 
0.42 
0.42 
Level of 
importance 
Significantly 
Important 
Significantly 
relevant 
Significantly 
relevant 
Significantly 
not relevant 
Significantly 
not relevant 
Significantly 
not relevant 
Significantly 
not relevant 
Significantly 
not relevant 
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The respondent firms considered the following as relevant motivational factors while 
forming strategic alliances 
• Exposure to supplier technology 
o N=130; proportion indicating factor as relevant= 0.7; upper conf limit of 
proportion =0.58) 
• Exposure to new products 
o N=130; proportion indicating factor as relevant= 0.7; upper conf limit of 
proportion =0.58) 
• Exposure to foreign markets 
o N=130; proportion indicating factor as relevant= 0.69; upper conf limit of 
proportion =0.58) 
Among the above only access to foreign markets was considered significantly important 
for the alliances being studied ( n=130; proportion indicating factor as relevant= 0.69; 
proportion indicating factor as very important= 0.59; upper conf limit of proportion 
=0.58) 
The respondent firms did not attach any relevance at all for the following factors while 
forming alliances 
• Exposure to customer technology 
o (n=130, proportion indicating factor as relevant= 0.41; lower conf limit of 
proportion =0.42) 
• Access to domestic markets 
o (n=130, proportion indicating factor as relevant= 0.39; lower conf limit of 
proportion =0.42) 
• Transfer of product technology 
o (n=130, proportion indicating factor as relevant= 0.18; lower conf limit of 
proportion =0.42) 
• Transfer of operational technology 
o (n=]30, proportion indicating factor as relevant= 0.16; lower conf limit of 
proportion =0.42) 
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Also for the above factors, for the alliances which indicated that the factors were relevant, 
the level of importance attached to them was low ( 1 or 2). This reinforces the findings 
that these factors were not relevant for the alliances in the sample being considered here. 
Table 5-3 Correlation Coefficient for basic motivational factors 
Spearman's 
Motivation 
exposure 
supplier 
technology 
Motivation 
rho 
for 
to 
for 
exposure to new 
products 
Motivation 
exposure 
foreign 
technology 
for 
to 
Corr CoefT 
Sig (2 tailed 
N 
Corr CoeflF 
Sig (2 tailed 
N 
Corr CoefT 
Sig (2 tailed 
N 
Motivation for 
exposure to 
supplier 
technology 
1.000 
130 
.280*** 
.001 
130 
-.223*** 
.009 
130 
Motivation for 
exposure to new 
products 
280*** 
.001 
130 
1.000 
130 
-.192*** 
.026 
130 
Motivation for 
exposure to 
foreign 
technology 
-.223*** 
.009 
130 
-.192*** 
.026 
130 
1.000 
130 
* * Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2 tailed) 
The data shows that the respondent firms predominantly looked at access to foreign 
markets while entering into alliances. While exposure to supplier technology and new 
products were considered relevant they were not considered important for the current 
alliances. A correlation analysis (table 5.3), showed a negative correlation between the 
motivation for exposure to supplier technology and the motivation to access foreign 
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markets. All this shows that foreign market access is the most predominant compared to 
products and technology transfer. 
While foreign market access emerged as the predominant motivational factor ( n=130; 
proportion indicating the factor to be relevant=0.70; proportion indicating the factor to be 
very important =0.59, Upper confidence limits of the proportion =0.58). These firms 
were however not seeking the foreign market access by depending on the technology or 
products of the partners. Though majority of the sample had suppliers of technology or 
products as partners (56% of them; n=130) they do not appear to be using the partner 
directly for gaining an entry into foreign markets. The technology and product knowledge 
gained from these partners was used for enhancing the competence of the domestic IT 
firms. 
5,3 Research Hypothesis 
MOTIVATION: RESOURCE DEPENDENCY ARGUMENT 
Hypothesis 1: Internal strategic alliances do not allow domestic IT firms to access 
spatially differentiated resources and are not entered into for gaining access to 
technology. 
Hypothesis 1.1 posits that spatially differentiated resources are not accessed by domestic 
IT firms fi-om International Strategic Alliances. 
Hypothesis 1.2 posits that access to technology was not perceived to be a factor by 
domestic IT firms to gain from International Strategic Alliances. 
MOTIVATION: ENVIRONMENTAL DEPENDENCY ARGUMENT 
Hypothesis 2: Environmental factors and constraints will not initiate the use of 
international strategic alliances by domestic IT firms in an emerging economy and they 
are not used to overcome uncertainties related to vertically linked activities. 
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Hypothesis 2.1 : International Strategic Alliances are not used by domestic firms in an 
emerging economy to overcome uncertainties related to vertically linked activities 
Hypothesis 2.2 : Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not enter into 
international strategic alliances to overcome interregional differences associated with 
policy and culture. 
Hypothesis 2.3 : Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not use International 
Strategic Alliances to overcome competitive uncertainty. 
Hypothesis 2.4 : Technical changes do not drive domestic IT firms to form international 
Strategic Alliance. 
MOTIVATION: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION ARGUMENT 
Hypothesis 3: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not enter into International 
Strategic Alliances to exploit competitive advantages and International Strategic 
Alliances do not distribute risks and do not help in gaining flexibility in the 
organizational activities for domestic IT firms. 
Hypothesis 3.1: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy, will not enter into 
international strategic alliances to exploit competitive advantages related to vertical 
disaggregation and spatial separation offiinctions. 
Hypothesis 3.2 : International Strategic Alliances do not distribute risks and do not help 
in gaining flexibility in the organizational activities fi)r domestic IT firms. 
COST DRIVER: 
Hypothesis 4: The behavioral uncertainty and partner asymmetry between alliance 
partners do not influence the governance costs in International Strategic Alliances. 
Partner reputation will not serve as a credible commitment and trust and cooperation 
between partners will not reduce the cost of International Strategic Alliances. 
Hypothesis 4.1 posits that partner reputation will not serve as a credible commitment in 
International Strategic Alliance relationships fi)r domestic IT firms. 
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Hypothesis 4.2 posits that trust and cooperation between participating firms will not 
reduce the cost of associated with an International Strategic Alliances for domestic IT 
firms in an emerging economy. 
Hypothesis 4.3 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy, physical, 
cultural and organizational distance between partners will not contribute to governance 
costs of international strategic alliances. 
Hypothesis 4.4 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy. International 
Strategic Alliances cannot be cheaper for firms with experience at forming and maintain 
relationships. 
Hypothesis 5 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy the structure of an 
International Strategic Alliance will not influence its governance costs. 
Hypothesis 6 posts that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy the function of an 
International Strategic Alliance will not influence its governance costs 
5,4 Resource Dependency Argument 
Hypothesis 1: Internal strategic alliances do not allow domestic IT firms to access 
spatially differentiated resources and are not entered into for gaining access to 
technology. 
Two sub hypothesis, one dealing with spatially differentiated resources and the other 
dealing with technology were tested. 
Attiances for Accessing Spatially Differentiated Resources 
Hypothesis 1.1 posits that spatially differentiated resources are not accessed by domestic 
IT firms from International Strategic Alliances. 
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ne respondent firms considered the foUowing resources to be relevant while 
cofoidering the resources to be accessed from alliance partners 
• Products of partners 
o N=130;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.73, upper conf limit of 
proportion=0.58 
• Knowledge of the technology of the partner including know how standards etc 
o N=130;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.76, upper conf limit of 
proportion=0.58 
• Operational knowledge- procedures, processes and best practices 
o N=130;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.64, upper conf limit of 
proportion=0.58 
• Reputed brand name 
o N=130;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.73, upper conf limit of 
proportion=0.58 
However among the above only "products of the partners' and "knowledge of the 
technology of the partner, including know-how, standards etc" stood out as important. 
• Products of partners 
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The following resources were not considered relevant at all 
• Manpower of partner 
o N=130;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.42 ;lower conf limit of 
proportion=0.42 
• Established operational infrastructure 
o N=130;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.23 ;lower conf limit of 
proportion=0.42 
• Capital 
o N=130;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.16 ;lower conf limit of 
proportion=0.42 
• Partner networks / forums 
o N=130;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.41 ;Iower conf limit of 
proportion=0.42 
The data shows that domestic IT firms sought to gain the products of the partners 
(N=130; proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.73, ;proportion indicating factor as 
important=0.60; upper conf limit of proportion=0.58). The products and the knowledge 
of the technology in terms of using the products were the important resources sought to 
be gained by these firms (N= 130;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.76 
;proportion indicating factor as important=0.63; upper conf limit of proportion=0.58). 
These resources are not available locally, as the product makers are situated outside the 
country. These products from the technology suppliers / owners are used for rendering 
services to the clients of the Indian firms. The operational knowledge and association 
with a reputed brand name were considered as relevant resources as they could help in 
further market access. It was indicated earlier that exposure to product technology was 
found to be a relevant motivational factor. These products are not on the customer side, 
but on the supplier side. By gaining access to these products, the domestic IT firms act as 
value added partners for the product makers. The expectation from the partner networks 
and forums was not a relevant factor for these alliances (N=130; proportion indicating 
factor as relevant=0.41; lower conf limit of proportion=0.42). It was not expected that the 
firms would leverage on the partner networks. However foreign market access was 
sought to be gained by the strengths developed by understanding the technology of the 
products gained from the partners, in order to be able to provide effective solutions 
around them. 
The case studies (Wipro and D'gipro) revealed that domestic IT firms showcase their 
infrastructure for implementing solutions around the products of the partners. Hence, they 
bring in the skilled manpower, operational infrastructure and also the capital required for 
the same. These are positioned as complementary resources to the products of the 
partners, in order to deliver solutions to the end users. While the former are available 
locally, the latter are to be accessed from the foreign partners from across the border and 
hence are spatially differentiated. 
In order to get a finer distinction on these factors, a further analysis was done at two 
levels. In the first level, the factors for EJV and non equity alliances were compared. In 
the second level, a comparison was made between the three groups within the non equity 
alliances viz., marketing alliances, learning alliances and technology alliances. The 
results of the findings are presented in the appendices. 
It can be seen from table 2 in appendix 2 that the products of the partners and the 
knowledge of the technology were looked at as important resources for non equity 
alliances. Operational knowledge and brand name were relevant resources, though not 
important for the current relationships. Established operational infrastructure was not 
considered relevant at all. There were no important resources for EJVs. Brand name was 
considered as a relevant resource. Capital was not even a relevant resource. Even the case 
studies ( Bharti BT and C -Mac Centum ) showed that more than capital, the other 
benefits like foreign market access and operational infrastructure were considered 
important for EJVs. 
Relating the findings from this proposition to those in the earlier section on the 
motivational factors, it appears as though the Indian firms overall looked at gaining 
foreign market access by riding on these relationships. The firms entering into non equity 
relationships to achieve the above by gaining access to the products of the partners 
(n=118,RELPRO=0.67;lMPPRO=0.63;UCL=0.59) and also then knowledge about the 
same in terms of knowhow and standards 
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(n=118,RELPRO=0.70;IMPPRO=0.64;UCL=0.59). Possessing the knowledge about the 
products helps these firms to perform better in the foreign markets. This was also 
indicated by the respondents in the case studies (Wipro and Sonata etc), wherin it was 
indicated that access to application product interface (API) , partner certification etc, 
would enable them to have an access to foreign markets better. 
For the firms entering into the EJVv however, the association with the brand name of the 
partner was important in facilitating them to gain a foreign market access. In both these 
groups an overwhelming majority of the respondents indicated that these resources were 
not available locally. 
To get fiirther clarity on the resources gained, a further analysis was done to look at 
nonequity alliances formed with a marketing, learning or technology transfer objective 
Alliances with a Marketing Objective 
The products of the partners were considered as an important resource, apart from the 
knowledge of the technology. Capital was not found to be relevant. 
The Indian firms did not seek to gain any established operation infrastructure from these 
relationships. 
The data shows that domestic IT firms entered into marketing alliances of the non equity 
type to gain an access to foreign markets by working around the products of the gaining 
newer competencies and showcasing these competencies. 
Alliances with a Learning Objective 
Like for earlier group the products of the partners were considered as an important 
resource, along with the knowledge of technology. Capital was found to be irrelevant. . 
The Indian firms did not seek to gain any established operation infrastructure from these 
relationships. 
It appears that the domestic IT firms entered into learning alliances of the non equity type 
to gain competencies by working on the products of the partners ( n=77, RELPRO=0.71; 
IMP PRO=0.71;UCL=0.61) and also gaining knowledge on the technology (n=77. 
RELPRO=0.82; IMP PRO=0.78;UCL=0.61). 
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Table 5-5 Hypothesis l . l 
Hypothesis 1.1 
posits that spatially 
differentiated 
resources are not 
accessed by 
domestic IT firms 
from International 
Strategic Alliances. 
testing 
N 
130 
Std deviation 
3.2 
t 
3.1 
Significance 
value 
0.001 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1.2 posits that access to technology was not perceived to be a factor by 
domestic IT firms to gain fi-om International Strategic Alliances. 
The alternative option considered by the respondents for gaining access to technology are 
as indicated in following table. 
Tabic 5-6 Alternate option* available for tcchnolog} aiccs* 
Alternative options available for 
technology access 
Building technology for customers 
SPV like offshore development centers 
Outright purchase of technology 
Books / manuals 
Internet 
Mean Rank 
1.93 
2.30 
2.33 
2.72 
3.50 
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Ideally firms would have sought to gain technology by building technology for customers 
or setting up SPVs for customers or by outright purchase of technology. However on 
account of varying advantages alliances provide it was found that the domestic IT firms 
sought to take the alliances route over other options for gaining a speedy access to 
technology. 
The factors which facilitated a speedy access to technology through the alliance route are 
captured below. 
• Richer and faster access of technology through training programs 
o N=91;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.67 ;upper conf limit of 
proportion=0.60 
• Richer and faster access of technology through socialization of people 
o N=87;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.64 ;upper conf limit of 
proportion=0.61 
• Richer and faster access of technology through access to senior people from the partner 
side 
o N=83;proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.61 ;upper conf limit of 
proportion=0.61 
Among these "Richer and faster access of technology through training programs" stood 
out as a motivational factor with a high degree of importance (N=91;proportion 
indicating factor as relevant=0.67 ; proportion indicating factor as important=0.73 ;upper 
conf limit of proportion=0.60). 
Apart from the above, 11 firms indicated that the alliance option provides a cheaper mode 
of technology access, as the other options would involve investments of a high order and 
may not be viable, considering the risks of technology change involved. 
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suppliers of technology and products, lead them to a richer and faster access to the 
technology compared to the other alternative considered for gaining technology. Indian 
firms sought to gain access to technology, while the ownership still lies with the partner. 
In order to get a finer distinction on these factors, a further analysis was done at two 
levels. In the first level, the factors for EJV and non equity alliances were compared. In 
the second level a comparison was made between three groups of non equity alliances 
vis., marketing alliances, learning alliances and technology alliances. The results of the 
findings are presented in Tables 3,4 & 5 of appendix 2. The alternate options that 
considered for technology access by domestic IT firms which entered into non equity 
alliances were building technology for customers and SPVs like offshore development 
centers. The alternate routes considered for technology access by Indian firms which 
entered into EJVs were SPVs like Offshore development centers and outright purchase of 
technology. 
With respect to the alternate options available for technology access the firms entering 
into non equity alliances considered the benefits derived from the training programs as 
important for a richer and faster access to technology. The firms entering into EJVs 
mentioned that the only benefit the alliance route offers would be the cost advantages 
compared to the option of purchasing the technology outright. 
It appears that the domestic IT firms entering into non equity alliances value the training 
programs of the partners. As the partners themselves are the owners of products and 
technologies. These trainings programs which form part of alliance enable the domestic 
IT firms to gain access to the technology in a richer and faster way. For firms entering 
into EJVs however these firms sought to have ov^ership of the technology without 
purchasing the same, but by having an equity partnership with the technology owners. 
To get fiirther clarity on the advantages alliances offer for technology access, a further 
analysis was done to look at the alliances formed with a marketing, learning, or 
technology access objective for non equity alliances. Table 4 and 5 of Appendix 2 give 
details of this analysis. 
Allumces with a Marketing Objective 
The options that firms entering into non equity alliances could have considered were 
outright purchase of technology and books /manuals. However, in this case none of the 
alliances advantages were considered. 
This could be so because these alliances were essentially formed as marketing 
relationships and technology access was not a key motivational factor. Also the important 
motivational factors here as seen in one of the preceding sections was foreign market 
access and an exposure to the new products. As indicated in that section the focus was to 
showcase the competencies of the India firm and while doing so, there were no 
technology benefits sought to be gained from the foreign partners. What was sought to be 
showcased were the competencies of the Indian firms built over a period of time. 
Alliances with a Learning Objective 
The options considered by firms entering into no equity alliances were building 
technology for customers and outright purchase of technology. The training programs of 
the partners were considered as important factors for a faster and richer access to 
technology. 
This could be so because the technology already exists and rather than rebuilding an 
existing technology for the customers and in a way competing with the suppliers of 
technology, it would be beneficial to work closely with these technology providers by 
getting trained by them (n=64;RELPRO=0.83; IMPPRO=0.67;UCL=0.62) and getting 
access to the technology and in the process still address the customers needs. 
Alliances with technolt^ transfer objective 
The options firms entering into non equity alliances could have considered were SPVs 
like ODCs and building technology for customers. The socialization process that happens 
through alliances, the access to senior people from the partner side and the training were 
considered factors relevant while entering into alliances. However none of these factors 
were found to be important. 
As these relationships are essentially for technology transfer and loosely coupled they are 
driven more by the personal contacts and socialization process. The same benefits may 
131 
not be accruing for firms with relationships where the socialization and access to senior 
people from the partner side would be low. 
Overall Significance test 
Tabic S-8 Hypothesis 1.2 testing 
Hypothesis 1.2 posits that access 
to technology was not perceived 
to be a factor by domestic IT 
firms to gain from International 
Strategic Alliances. 
N 
86 
Std 
deviation 
3.9 
t 
4.2 
S^nffkance 
value (p) 
0.008 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
5.5 Envtronmental Dependency Argwnent 
Hypothesis 2: Environmental factors and constraints will not initiate the use of 
international strategic alliances by domestic IT firms in an emerging economy and they 
are not used to overcome uncertainties related to vertically linked activities. 
The following factors were considered as part of this hypothesis: 
• Uncertainties related to vertically linked activities (demand, supply and capacity) 
• Inter-regionaJ differences in policy and culture 
• Competitive uncertainties (with regard to markets, products and customer) 
• Technology change 
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Alliances for oyercoming uncertainty in vertically linked activities 
Hypothesis 2.1 : International Strategic Alliances are not used by domestic firms in an 
emerging economy to overcome uncertainties related to vertically linked activities 
The variables which were considered as not relevant at all are the following : 
• Demand uncertainties 
o Uncertainties in the fixture of the meirket /players in the market 
• (n=36;proportion indicating factor as relevant =0.27;lower conf limit of 
proportion=0.34) 
o Uncertainties in customer behavior 
• (n=30;proportion indicating factor as relevant =0.22;lower conf limit of 
proportion=0.32) 
• Supply uncertainties 
o Benefits of global procurement 
• (n=31 ;proportion indicating factor as relevant =0.23;lower conf limit of 
proportion=0.32) 
o Benefits of continuous purchase from the partner, resulting in cost reduction 
• (n=23;proportion indicating factor as relevant =0.17:lower conf limit of 
proportion=0.30) 
• Regulatory uncertainties 
o Hedging against changes in governmental policies for the sector 
• (n=12;proportion indicating factor as relevant =0.09;Iower conf limit of 
proportion=0.22) 
o Coping with foreign exchange risk 
• (n=3];proportion indicating factor as relevant =0.23;lower conf limit of 
proportion=0.32) 
• Capacity uncertainties 
o Coping with capacity fluctuations 
• (n=19;proportion indicating factor as relevant =0.14;lower conf limit of 
proportion=0.28) 
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deriving cost benefits from continuous or global procurement were not found to be 
relevant. Through these case studies, it evolved that the changes in industry capacity due 
to changes in governmental policies on the sector play a vital role in the Indian firms 
seeking alliances entered in the years prior to economic liberalization viz.,CMac- Centum 
( before the telecom sector was opened) and alliances of Sonata (formed prior to 1991) 
some of these factors were found to be relevant. 
Through these case studies, it evolved that the changes in industry capacity due to 
changes in governmental policies on the sector play a vital role in the Indian firms 
seeking alliances entered in the years prior to economic liberalization viz.,CMac- Centum 
( before the telecom sector was opened) and alliances of Sonata (formed prior to 1991) 
some of these factors were found to be relevant. The data for the individual groups viz.. 
non equity alliances, EJVs and the sub groups for marketing, learning and technology 
access in non equity alliances also revealed that these factors were not relevant for these 
groups. Table 5 and Table 6 in Appendix 2 summarize the findings. 
Tabic 5-10 Hypothesis 2.1 tesiting 
Hypothesis 2.1 : International 
Strategic Alliances are not used 
by domestic firms in an 
emerging economy to 
overcome uncertainties related 
to vertically linked activities 
N 
30 
Std 
deviation 
1.96 
t 
-12.10 
Sigr^ficance 
value (p) 
0.007 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2.2: Domestic IT firms do not enter into international strategic alliances to 
overcome interregional differences associated with policy and culture. 
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Regional Differences 
• Related to national culture 
o (n=8; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.06;LCL=0.15) 
• Related to business culture and work ethos 
o (n=8; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.06;LCL=0.15) 
• Related to language 
o (n=7; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.05;LCL=0.13) 
The data shows that forms did not face any major issues relating to difference in policy or 
culture across the geographies they operate in. They however seek to leverage on the 
association they have with the partner, by seeking their endorsements for their 
capabilities partners (n=84; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.62; proportion of respondents indicating the factors to be important=0.61; UCL=0.61). 
These endorsements became critical as in the event of the partner ( who in majority of the 
cases was a technology /product supplier) endorsing the capabilities of the domestic IT 
firm. It would be easier to get a faster access to new customers in foreign markets. 
In order to get a finer distinction on these factors, a fiirther analysis was done at two 
levels. In the first level, the factors for EJVs and non equity alliances were compared. In 
the second level a comparison was made between three groups within the non equity 
alliances viz., marketing alliances, learning alliances and technology alliances. It can be 
seen fi-om the table 6 in appendix 5 that there are no relevant factors relating to the inter 
regional differences in terms of policy and culture which were sought to be overcome 
through the alliances. 
The data shows that government policies on imports, corporate governance, subsidies, 
national culture, business culture and language have not driven the formation of alliances. 
This is unlike in the past wherein such issues played a vital role. Through the case 
studies, it emerged that these factors lost their relevance in the recent times as the Indian 
firms have set up operations in various geographies. Also the governmental regulation 
with regard to imports, subsidies, corporate governance etc. are no longer as overbearing 
as they were earlier. 
For non equity alliances for learning an important factors for the formation of these 
alliances was to seek an endorsement from the foreign partners for the capabilities of the 
Indian firms. This is critical as these alliances do not look for technology transfer or using 
the partner as a marketing partner, but gaining competencies by learning fi-om working on 
the products of the partners. These endorsements enabled the domestic IT firms penetrate 
into the foreign markets. 
Table 5-12 Hypothesis 2.2 testing 
Hypothesis 2.2: Domestic IT 
firms do not enter into 
international strategic alliances 
to overcome interregional 
differences associated with 
policy and culture. 
N 
28 
deviation 
5.4 
t 
3.915 
Sigrdficance 
value (p) 
0.002 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Alliances for Overcoming Competitive Uncertainties 
Hypothesis 2.3 : Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not use International 
Strategic Alliances to overcome competitive uncertainty. 
This hypothesis was considered significantly relevant and important only the for the 
factor of Indian firms seeking to reduce dependence on a narrow range of customers 
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The factors not considered relevant at all are the following: 
• Overcoming investment risk by better returns on investment, factor utility etc 
o (n=13; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.10; 
LCL=0.23) 
• Overcoming risk of foreign company partnering with other players 
o (n=30; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.22; 
LCL=0.32) 
It appears that the expectation was to gain more customers by leveraging on the endorsement the 
foreign partners give for the capabilities of the domestic IT firms. The capabilities were enhanced 
by access to the products and technology of the partners. In order to get a finer distinction on 
these factors, a fiirther analysis was done at two levels. In the first level, the factors for EJVs and 
non equity alliances were compared. In the second level a comparison was made among three 
groups in the non equity type viz., marketing alliances, learning alliances and technology 
alliances. The results are presented in Table 7 of Appendix 2 . No significant competitive 
uncertainties were sought to be overcome either through non equity alliances or through EJVs. 
From Table 8 of Appendix 2 it can be seen that non equity alliances for mari^eting sought to 
reduce their dependence on a narrow range of customers by partnering with the foreign firms. 
Being marketing alliances it is critical for them to expect more customers through these 
relationships. 
It was earlier observed that the firms entering into non equity alliances do not seek to have a 
foreign markets access due to any direct efforts of the partners. The association with the foreign 
partners enables them to get endorsements from these partners and thus get an access to more 
customers. 
Table S I4 Ihpothesis 2J testing 
Hypothesis 2.3 : Domestic IT firms in 
an emerging economy do not use 
International Strategic Alliances to 
overcome competitive uncertainty. 
N 
82 
Std 
deviation 
1.96 
t 
-4.40 
Signfffcance 
vaiue(p} 
0.0002 
Reject 
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This hypothesis was considered significantly relevant and important only on the factor of 
Indian firms seeking to cope up with technology change by accessing forums / material of 
the partners (n=86; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.64; 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be important =0.73;UCL=0.61) Table 
10.7 gives the details of the related factors. 
The following factors were not considered relevant at all: 
• Coping with technology change by sharing R&D expenses 
o (n=23; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.17; 
LCL=0.30) 
• Coping with technology change by establishing / coping with standards 
o (n=25; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.19; 
LCL=0.30) 
Since the domestic IT firms were more of technology users rather than developers, the 
expectation from the partners for sharing R&D expenses and helping in establishing / 
coping with standards was low. However, the Indian firms had a high expectation for the 
partners to give access to their forums and material, in order to stay abreast with new 
developments to be able to provide solutions to customers in a better way. Sharing of beta 
versions, technology trends etc by the foreign partners were also found to be a relevant 
motivational factor, though not important. The importance of this factor has however 
decreased over the time (only 56% of the respondents said that it was important for them 
currently whereas others mentioned it was important at the time of formation of alliances 
) . It emerged that foreign companies are no longer willing to share beta versions with 
geographically distant firms and thus beta versions are currently being tested with 
partners geographically closer. 
In order to get a finer distinction on these factors, a further analysis was done at two 
levels. In the first level, the factors for EJVs and non equity alliances were compared. In 
the second level a comparison was made between three groups in non equity type viz.. 
marketing alliances, learning alliances and technology alliances. The results of the 
findings are presented in table 8 of appendix 2. The data shows that for both non equity 
alliances and EJVs this factor was not found to be relevant. In order to get further clarity 
on this, a further level of analysis was done to look at alliances formed with a marketing 
or learning or technology transfer objective for non equity type of alliances. Table 9 of 
appendix 2 gives details of this analysis. 
For alliances formed with a marketing objective, technology change was not an important 
factor. For non equity alliances for learning, alliances were sought to help in monitoring 
technology change by sharing beta versions, technology trends etc. This could be 
important because domestic IT firms seek to work on the products of foreign partners and 
gain competencies which could be used for delivering solutions for their clients. 
I able 5-16 Hypothesis 2.4 teiting 
Hypothesis 2.4 : Technical changes 
do not drive domestic IT firms to 
form international Strategic 
Alliance. 
N 
32 
Std 
deviation 
3.89 
t 
34.216915 
Significance 
valueip) 
0.009 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
5,6 Internal Organization Dependency 
Hypothesis 3: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy do not enter into International 
Strategic Alliances to exploit competitive advantages and International Strategic 
Alliances do not distribute risks and do not help in gaining flexibility in the 
organizational activities for domestic IT firms. 
Hypothesis 3 1: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy, will not enter into 
international strategic alliances to exploit competitive advantages related to vertical 
disaggregation and spatial separation of functions 
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The findings for this hypothesis are in line with earlier findings that domestic IT firms 
seek products of the partners as key resources. The data shows that domestic IT firms 
perceive themselves as extended arms of the foreign partners with the foreign partner 
taking care of the supply side. 
In order to get a finer distinction on these factors a further analysis was done at two 
levels. In the first level, the factors for EJVs and non equity alliances were compared. In 
the second level a comparison was made between three groups in the non equity alliances 
viz., marketing alliances, learning alliances and technology alliances. The results are 
presented in Table 9 and 10 of Appendix 2. 
From the table 9 of appendix 2 it emerges that Indian firms entering into non equity 
alliances sought to use the alliances partners as supplying partners, gaining access to 
cheaper inputs. The products gained from the partners though the alliance relationship are 
very critical for the operations of the domestic IT firms. A cost advantage at this stage 
would be beneficial for them as they could pass on cost benefits to the end users. 
Table 10 of appendix 2 gives details of the analysis done to look at the non equity 
alliances formed with a marketing or learning or technology transfer objective. This 
factor is relevant only for non equity alliances for marketing wherein the motivation of 
using the partner as a supplying partner was important. This could give cost benefits to 
the domestic IT firms. 
1 able 5-lS U%pt)theM<> 3.1 tcitinj; 
Hypothesis 3.1: Domestic IT will not 
enter into strategic alliances to exploit 
competitive advantages related to 
vertical disaggregation and spatial 
separation of functions. 
N 
74 
Std 
deviation 
2.3 
t 
-4.1 
Slgnifkance 
value (p) 
0.001 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
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having direct interaction with the customers (n=82; proportion of respondents indicating 
the factor to be relevant =0.61; UCL=0.61). Each of the partners are involved in different 
areas of the product cycle and by outsourced activities in the value chain gain 
administrative and operational flexibility. This factor was not relevant for EJVs. Being 
closely coupled through administrative linkages with the partners, administrative and 
operational flexibility is not relevant for EJVs. For non equity alliances however as both 
partners are loosely coupled there appears to be lot more scope for flexibility. Table 11 
in Appendix 2 gives details of the analysis for the subgroups in non equity alliances. For 
the non equity alliances for marketing, this factor was found to be relevant. The domestic 
IT firms sought to gain advantages of operational and administrative flexibility by each 
partner directly interacting with customers and being spread along the value chain. This 
factor was however not found relevant for any other groups. 
Table 5-21 Hypothesis 3.2 leMing 
Hypothesis 3.2 International 
Strategic Alliances do not distribute 
risks and do not help in gaining 
flexibility in the organizational 
activities for domestic IT firms. 
N 
23 
Std 
deviation 
6.55 
t 
3.553 
Significance 
value(p) 
0.03 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
5.7 Cost Driver 
Effect of partner behavior on Alliance Governance costs 
Hypothesis 4: The behavioral uncertainty and partner asymmetry between alliance 
partners do not influence the governance costs in International Strategic Alliances. 
Partner reputation will not serve as a credible commitment and trust and cooperation 
between partners will not reduce the cost of International Strategic Alliances. 
Effect of partner reputation on Alliance Governance costs 
Hypothesis 4.1 posits that partner reputation will not serve as a credible commitment in 
International Strategic Alliance relationships for domestic IT firms. 
The factors relating to reputation of the partner were found to be relevant and most of 
them were found to be important we well. The data ( table 5.14) showed that an 
understanding of the reputation resulted in a good relationship and in reducing 
governance costs. 
Following factors were considered relevant. 
• Performance of partner sales / profits 
o (n=104; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.77; 
UCL=0.60) 
• Operational strength of the partner 
o (n=97; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.72; 
UCL=0.60) 
• Alliance management history of the partner 
o (n=112; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.83; 
LCL=0.59) 
The following factors have been found to be important while considering the reputation 
of the partner at the time of firming the alliance 
• Market strengths of the partner ( market share, operations base etc) 
o (n=123; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.91; 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be important =0.77;UCL=0.59) 
• Future outlook of the of the partner ( business plans, product /service roadmaps) 
o (n=117; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.87; 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be important =0.75;UCL=0.59) 
• Technology strength of partner (association with technology with a good potential) 
o (n=125; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.93; 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be important =0.84;UCL=0.41) 
• Market reputation of the partner (customer stories, endorsement by market research. VC 
firms etc) 
o (n=97; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.72; 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be important =0.74;l]CL=0.60) 
152 
It can be inferred from the data that reputation of the partner was considered as a 
critical variable while selecting a partner. The domestic IT firms considered the 
various factors mentioned above as relevant factors while understanding reputation. 
Among those the factors mentioned above as relevant factors while understanding 
reputation. 
Among those the factors related to market strengths future outlook, technology 
strengths and market reputation were considered important for an effective 
relationship. Issues relating to how the market feels about the partner and also about 
what the partner feels about the market and the partner's technology strength appear 
to be considered. 
On the issue of alliance management history of partners it was observed that while 
Indian firms considered it as a relevant factor they did not consider it as an important 
factor. The scores for this variable with regard to the level of importance were lower 
than the lower confidence level of 0.41. This could be so because domestic IT firms 
may not be aware of the alliance management history of foreign partners as indicated 
by firms. 
Though the motivation for understanding alliance management history was high there 
was a lack of information regarding the same. 
Overall the respondents have indicated that an understanding of the reputation of the 
partner has helped them to manage the alliances better and also to reduce the 
governance costs 
153 
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Effect of pArtner reputation on reduction of aUiance costs 
1 able 5-23 Effect of partner repuration 
Effect of partner 
reputation on 
reduction of alliance 
costs 
No of alliances for 
which the factor was 
relevant 
124 
Alliances indicating that partner 
reputation resulted in lower alliances costs 
# 
% 
119 
0.98 
For a finer distinction on these factors a further analysis was done at two levels. In the 
first level the factors for EJVs and non equity alliances were compared. In the second 
level a comparison was made between three groups viz marketing alliances, learning 
alliances and technology alliances. The results are presented in tables 11 and 12 of 
appendices 2. 
For non equity alliances ( Table 11 of appendix 2) , market strengths, the future outlook 
of the partner ( with respect to the product / services roadmap, business plans etc). , 
technology strengths mad marker reputation of the partner were considered important 
while assessing the reputation of the partner. For EJVs the marker strengths of the partner 
were considered relevant. For non equity alliances, alliance management history of the 
partners was not considered relevant.. For non equity alliances, assessment of the partner 
reputation helped in reducing the governance costs and enabling a better alliance 
relationship. 
It appears that as though the technology strengths and future outlook of the partners are 
critical for the non equity alliances as these are loosely coupled relationships and an 
understanding of the strengths of the partners in those areas is critical so that even in the 
absence of a tightly couple relationship an association with the partner can still generate 
significant benefits. It was indicated during the administration of the questionnaire that 
the alliance management history of the partners, though may be an important issue, the 
domestic IT firms were not able to get details on the same and hence was not considered 
relevant during any partner evaluation. An understanding of the partner reputation has 
resulted in good relationship for non equity alliances. 
Table 12 of Appendix 2 gives details of the analysis done to look at the alliances formed 
with a marketing or learning or technology transfer objective. 
Table 5-24 Hypothesis 4.1 testing 
Hypothesis 4.1 posits that partner 
reputation will not serve as a 
credible commitment in 
International Strategic Alliance 
relationships for domestic IT firms. 
N 
124 
Std 
dariation 
1.96 
t 
-12.1 
SIgnlflcance 
value(p) 
0.021 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Effect of trust and cooperation on Alliance Governance costs 
Hypothesis 4.2 posits that trust and cooperation between participating firms will not 
reduce the cost of associated with an International Strategic Alliances for domestic IT 
firms in an emerging economy. 
This hypothesis was supported by the data as majority of the alliances were relationships 
with a high level of trust. The respondents indicated that the efforts put by their firms to 
build trust with the partner increased trust in the alliance. The important factors are 
outlined below. 
• Building an environment of openness and trust 
o (n=123; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.93; 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be important =0.62;UCL=0.59) 
• Building an organization based trust rather than a people / individual based trust 
o (n=108; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.80; 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be important =0.66;UCL=0.59) 
Table 5.16 gives the details of the factors not relevant. The following is a gist of the 
same. These factors include those impending and those facilitating trust. 
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Lack of honesty 
o (n==40; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.30;LCL=0.35) 
Indications that the partner will compete directly with the firm 
o (n=35; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.26;LCL=0.33) 
Partner not trusting capabilities 
o (n=38; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.28;LCL=0.34) 
Disputes related to interim changes in alliance / project scope 
o (n=42; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.31;LCL=0.35) 
Disputes related to ownership of IP 
o (n=20; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.15;LCL=0.28) 
Disputes related to statutory contractual clauses ( arbitration, indemnity etc) 
o (n=17; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.]3;LCL=0.26) 
Disputes related to operational contractual clauses ( reimbursements of expenses, 
ownership of material, cost sharing etc) 
o (n=27; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.20;LCL=0.31) 
Disputes related to control 
o (n=5; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.04;LCL=0.06) 
Disputes related to valuation / valuation methods 
o (n=6; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.04;LCL=0.10) 
Trust building through unilateral dedication of asses prior to the relationship 
o (n=45; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.33;LCL=0.35) 
Trust building through acceptance of the majority partner's dominant role in the alliance 
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o (n=17; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.13;LCL=0.26) 
• Trust building through proactive change of the role in the alliance by the partners based 
on the changes in the function of the alliances 
o (n=29; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.21;LCL=0.32) 
• Trust building through avoiding bargaining by upfront acceptance of partner terms 
o (n=29; proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant 
=0.21;LCL=0.32) 
Majority of the respondents felt that the efforts put in by their companies to build trust between 
them and their partners have not added to the governance cost of the alliances (n=l 18; proportion 
of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.87; proportion of respondents indicating 
that the efforts for trust building have not added to the governance cost=0.70; UCL=0.50). 
Overall the firms indicated that the alliance relationships have been highly trustworthy (n= 127; 
proportion of respondents indicating the factor to be relevant =0.94; proportion of respondents 
indicating that the efforts for trust building have not added to the governance cost=0.82; 
UCL=0.41). Trust was facilitated by putting efforts to build an environment of transparency / 
ojjenness and also by building an organizational based trust rather than person based trust. 
However it c£m also be seen from the table below that the perception that the relationship is risky 
due to ego, disputes relating to setting of objectives ( payments, counter guarantee, milestones 
etc) had a large effect in decreasing trust. Unsolicitated value addition to the partner had a large 
effect in increasing trust. These findings were supported in more than 50% of the alliances. The 
finding with regard to this hypothesis were based on the perceptions of the respondents on 
whether the relationships were trustworthy or not and also on whether the efforts put to build trust 
were worth the benefits received from the alliances. 
Overall 83% of the respondents indicated that the alliances were trustworthy. 92% of the 
respondents indicating that the alliances were trust worthy also indicated that they were cheaper 
to govern. In 87% of the alliances, Indian firms were smaller that their foreign partners. Hence it 
was critical for them to put efforts to build trust. Moreover the respondents felt that these efforts 
to build trust did not add to the overall governance costs. 
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Effect of factors whidi were not foimd to be SSgnUicuitly NOD relevant oo tmst 
I able 5-26 Trust Related Factors Affecting Governance Costs in Alliances ( Contd...) 
Perception that the relationship is 
risky due to ego 
Failure to fulfill commitments / 
milestones 
Disputes relating to settings of 
objectives - payments, counter 
guarantees, milestones etc 
Disputes relating to call options -
exercise price, number of shares, 
triggering event etc 
Increasing trust through unsolicited 
value addition to the partner 
No of alliances for 
which the factor 
was relevant 
64 
40 
51 
2 
79 
Alliances indicating that 
partner reputation resulted 
in lower alliances costs 
# 
% 
# 
% 
# 
% 
# 
% 
# 
% 
32 
0.50 
19 
0.47 
41 
0.80 
0 
0 
72 
0.91 
In order to get a finer distinction on these factors a further analysis was done at two 
levels. IN the first level, the factors for EJVs and non equity alliances were compared. In 
the second level a comparison was made between three groups of non equity type viz.. 
marketing alliances, learning alliances and technology alliances. The resuhs of the 
findings are presented in table 12, table 13 and table 14 of appendix 2. 
The data showed that for non equity alliances as well as EJVs, the factors normally 
expected to impeded trust were not found to be relevant for the alliances studied. 
However the efforts put by firms to build an environment of openness and trust and also 
the efforts put to build an organization based trust rather than a people based trust were 
considered important. Overall the alliances experienced a high degree of trust and the 
costs incurred to be highly trust worthy ( n=112, RELPR0=0.83; proportion of 
respondents mentioning that level of trust was high = 0.84 ; UCL=0.59) whereas no 
significant interpretations could be arrived from the data on EJVs on the degrees of trust 
(RELPRO-0.94; Number of respondents indicating that the level of trust in the alliances 
was high =0.63 at 20% significance level,. UCL =0.69). For both the domestic firms as 
well as foreign parmers it appears as though there were conscious efforts to build trust 
and also to avoid opportunistic behavior. In the case of EJVs it was surprising to note that 
disputes relating to call options and valuations were not found relevant at all. This could 
be due to the fact that capital was not considered as relevant resource for EJVs and as a 
result disputes related to capital were not considered at all. 
Table 13 of Appendix 2 gives details of this analysis done to look at the alliances formed 
with a marketing or learning or technology transfer objective, An observation of the 
groups reveals that while overall the factors impeding trust were not found to be 
important for any of the groups, some of the factors enabling trusts were found to be 
relevant. 
Alliances with marketing Objective 
None of the factors were considered important. However the respondents considered trust 
building efforts in terms of building an environment of openness and transparency and 
also in terms of building an organization based trust rather than a people based trust as 
relevant factors. 
Alliances with a Learning Objective 
For non equity alliances creating an environment of openness and transparency ( n=69. 
RELPR0=0.90;IMPPRO=0.65;LCL=0.62) and building an organization based trust rather 
than a people based trust (n=56, RELPR0=0.73;IMPPRO=0.77;LCL=0.37) were 
important factors 
Alliances with a technolf^ transfer objective 
No relevant factors were found for this group 
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A Spearman Rank correlation Test was done to understand the relationships between trust 
related factors. 
Table 5-27 Spearman Rank correlation results for factors relating to trust 
Spearman's rho 
Overall trust 
Trust building by 
unsolicited value 
addition 
Corr Coeff 
Sign (2 tailed) 
N 
Corr Coeff 
Sign (2 tailed) 
N 
Performance based 
on Metrics Chosen 
0.347 ** 
0.000 
127 
0.647 ** 
0.000 
81 
Performance based 
on fulfillment of 
initial objectives 
0.224** 
0.011 
127 
0.658 ** 
0.000 
81 
** Correlation is significance at 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
Spearman Rank correlation results for factors relating to trust (overall Sample) 
As can be seen from the above table the efforts put by firms to build trust have a positive 
correlation with the overall performance of the alliances. This validates the respondent's 
perception that efforts to build trust have improved the alliance performance rather than 
increasing alliance governance costs. 
It can thus be inferred that the findings that the efforts put to build trust actually result in 
better alliance performance and do not erode the benefits by adding to the governance 
costs. Since in the various alliances looked in the sample the impediments to trust were 
not found to be important and in some cases not relevant the governance costs were low. 
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Table 5-28 Hypothesis 4.2 testing 
Hypothesis 4.2 posits that trust and 
cooperation between participating 
firms will not reduce the cost of 
associated with an International 
Strategic Alliances for domestic IT 
firms in an emerging economy. 
N 
93 
Std 
devbttion 
3.38 
t 
3.4 
SlgiUflcance 
value(p) 
0.001 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Effect of physical, cultural and organizational distance on alliance governance costs. 
Hypothesis 4.3 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy, physical, 
cultural and organizational distance between partners will not contribute to governance 
costs of international strategic alliances. 
This hypothesis was not supported by the sample as none of the factors relating to this 
were found to be significantly relevant. Language was not perceived to be relevant at all. 
These factors are captured in table 9.14 and also below: 
• Costs of dealing with difference in language 
o (n=48; proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.36; lower conf limit of 
proportion =0.36) 
• Administrative, travel and communication costs resulting from distance between 
firms 
o (n=49; proportion indicating factor as relevant=0.36; lower conf limit of 
proportion =0.36) 
The data showed that the administrative, travel and communication costs 
resulting form the distance between the firms whether physical, cultural or 
organizational had added to the alliance governance costs. This was 
triggered by the differences in business and operational culture and also 
due to the differences in work ethos. The costs due to differences in 
language were not found to be relevant. 
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Table S-29 Distance related factors affecting governance costs in alliances 
Factor 
Costs of 
adapting to 
language 
difTerences 
No of 
alliances 
(factor 
was 
relevant) 
48 
Proportion 
of 
alliances ( 
factor to 
be 
relevant) 
0.36 
Proportion 
of 
alliances ( 
factor to 
be 
important) 
0.77 (1 or 
2) 
UCL of 
the 
population 
proportion 
0.64 
LCLof 
the 
population 
proportion 
0.36 
Level of 
Importance 
Significantly 
not relevant 
Effect of the factors that were Bot fonnd to be significantly not relevant on alliance costs 
lablt 5-30 Distance related factors affecting go*trnanct COMS in alliHnccs (cuntd) 
Extent to which costs of adapting to 
differences in business operations added 
to alliance costs 
Extent to which costs of adapting to 
differences in organizational culture 
added to alliance costs 
Extent to which costs of adapting to 
differences in work ethos added to 
alliance costs 
Administrative, travel and • 
communication costs due to 
organizational differences 
No of alliances 
for which the 
factor was 
relevant 
54 
65 
46 
46 
Alliances indicating that 
partner reputation 
resulted in lower 
alliances costs 
# 
% 
# 
% 
# 
% 
# 
% 
54 
1.00 
50 
0.77 
23 
0.50 
38 
0.83 
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Through the case studies and also on closer observation of the data, it was found that for 
alliances which have been formed before 1991, cultural and organizational distances have 
been causes for increase in governance costs. This was more important at a time when the 
domestic IT firms did not setup their own operations in various geographies. Such an 
evidence emerged from the case studies of companies which had alliances dating back 
earlier than 1991. Domestic IT firms with older alliances prior to 1995 experienced 
reduction in communication costs over a period of time particularly after the emergence 
of internet technology. 
For a finer distinction on these factors a fiirther analysis was done at two levels. In the 
first level, the factors for EJVs and non equity alliances were compared. In the second 
level a comparison was made between three groups viz., marketing alliances, learning 
alliances and technology alliances. The results are presented in table 13 and 15 of 
Appendices 2. 
Table 15 of appendix 2 gives details of the analysis done to look at the alliances formed 
with a marketing or learning or technology transfer objective in the non equity type of 
alliances. It can be observed that these factors were not relevant for non equity alliances 
for marketing and learning. 
The alliance costs due to the distance between the partnering firms appears to be more in 
cases where interaction is high and administrative linkages are high, it is also observed 
that for alliances related to technology transfer, the distance between the two 
organizations appears to be critical variable. From the cases studies it evolved that these 
costs have gone down over a period of time with technological advances. However 
overall only 13% of the sample perceived that technological advances have reduced the 
alliances governance costs (n=130)> there was no evidence to indicate that technical 
language helps in overcoming the differences in regional languages. This was a factor 
mentioned in the case study. Overall only 4% of the respondents (n=130) have perceived 
that technical language has enabled in significantly reducing the governance costs. 
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Table 5-31 Hypothesis 4J testing 
Hypothesis 4.3 posits that for domestic IT 
firms in an emerging economy, physical. 
cultural and organizational distance 
between partners will not contribute to 
governance costs of international 
strategic alliances. 
N 
47 
Std 
deviation 
4.04 
t 
5.4 
Significance 
value(p) 
0.006 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Effect of Alliance Experience on Alliance Governance Costs 
Hypothesis 4.4 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy, International 
Strategic Alliances cannot be cheaper for firms with experience at forming and maintain 
relationships. 
The respondents were asked to rank the learnings picked up over a period of time from 
the various alliances. The results are summarized in following tables 
Firms with more than 5 alliances (7 firms) 
I able 5-32 Learning form the Allianres (more than 5 alliances) 
Learning form the Alliances 
Better understanding of the purpose of the alliances 
Better understanding of the expectations and behavior of partners 
Alnlity to choose a good partner 
Effective structuring of the alliance 
Understanding hidden costs /factors of negotiation 
Extent to which the firms experiences costs reduction due to above 
learnings ( one a scale of 1-5) 
Mean Rank 
2.00 
2.57 
2.86 
333 
4.00 
3.14 
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Firms with 3- 5 alliances (15 firms) 
Table 5-33 Learning form the Alliances (3- 5 alliances) 
Learning form the Alliances 
Better understanding of die purpose of the alliances 
Better understanding of the expectations and behavior of 
partners 
Ability to choose a good partner 
Effective structuring of the alliance 
Understanding hidden costs /factors of negotiation 
Extoit to which the firms experiences costs reduction due 
to above learnings 
Mean Rank 
2.47 
2.55 
2.70 
2.89 
3.88 
2.75 
Firms with 2 alliances (16 firms) 
I able 5-34 I earning form the Alliances (2 alliances) 
Learning form the Alliances 
Better understanding of the purpose of the alliances 
Better understanding of tiie expectations and behavior of 
partners 
AMlity to choose a good partner 
Effective structuring of the alliance 
Understanding hidden costs /factors of negotiation 
Extent to which the firms experiences costs reduction due 
to above learnings 
Mean Rank 
2.10 
238 
2.40 
3.50 
3.80 
1.50 
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Summary 
Firms with 3- 5 alliances (15 firms) 
Table 5-35 Learnings from Alliance Experience 
Learning form the Alliances 
Better understanding of the purpose of the alliances 
Better understanding of the expectations of partners 
Ability to choose a good partner 
Effective structuring of the alliance 
Understanding hidden costs /factors of negotiation 
Extrat to which the firms experiences costs reduction due to 
above learnings 
Mean 
Rank 
54-all 
2.00 
2.57 
2.86 
333 
4.00 
3.14 
3-5 
aU 
2.47 
2.55 
2.70 
2.89 
3.88 
2.75 
2aU 
2.10 
238 
2.40 
3.50 
3.80 
1.50 
As can be seen from the above table, the learnings have been different for the different 
groups. Effect of cost reduction on account of these learnings increased as the number of 
alliances increased. For firms with just two alliances the most important learnings were 
the ability to choose a good partner and effective structuring of the alliance. 
For firms with 3-5 alliances, the most important learnings were better understanding of 
expectations and behavior of partners and effective structuring of the alliance. For firms 
with more than 5 alliances, the most important learnings were a better understanding of 
the purpose of the alliance and a better understanding of the expectations and behavior of 
the partners. 
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Fable 5-36 Hypothesis 4.4 testing 
Hypothesis 4.4 posits that for 
domestic IT firms in an emerging 
economy. International Strategic 
Alliances cannot be cheaper for 
firms with experience at forming and 
maintain relationships. 
N 
16 
Std 
deviation 
3.3 
t 
2.6 
Slgirifkance 
value(p) 
0.015 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Effect of Alliance Structure on Alliance Governance Costs 
Hypothesis 5 posits that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy the structure of an 
International Strategic Alliance will not influence its governance costs. 
This research found evidence supporting this hypothesis. Though respondents indicated 
that most of the factors relating to the structure of alliances were not relevant for the costs 
of governing their alliances, a second level of analysis was done for only the variables 
where respondents indicated that the factors were not significantly not relevant for their 
alliances. In those cases it was found that the factors decreasing the flexibility in the 
alliance structure added to the governance costs and the factors increasing the flexibility 
reduced the governance costs. It can thus be concluded that the way the alliance structure 
would have an impact on the governance costs. 
However, at a broad level 96% of the respondents indicated that the alliances were highly 
flexible. The gist of findings is given below 
• Costs of coping with discrepancies in pay / incentives for workforce 
• Costs of training/seminars (direct costs and time involved) 
• Cost reduction due to partner involvement in operations 
• Reduction in operational facilities due to dependence on the partner for routine decisions 
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Factors increasing flexibility and thus decreasing costs 
Table 5-39 Factors relating to structure of the alliance affecting governance costs 
Costs reduction due to 
prescriptiveness of the 
alliance operations 
Costs reduction due to 
autonomy of the partners/staff 
58 
46 
# 
% 
# 
% 
50 
.86 
41 
.89 
As can seen in the table the costs due to a decrease in the flexibility due to constraints on 
partnering with competitors of the foreign partner, costs due to decrease in the flexibility 
due to stipulations on minimum level of sales, promotion, production etc. costs of 
preparing reports and collecting information, costs resulting from manpower costs for 
dedicated alliance/project mangers, team, management etc,costs due to decentralized 
interaction with the partner have an effect on increasing alliance governance costs. The 
alliance governance costs are reduced due to the prescriptiveness of the alliance 
operations and the autonomy of the partners/staff. 
table 5-40 Ilyptithcsis 5 testing 
Hypothesis 5 posits that for 
domestic IT firms in an emerging 
economy the structure of an 
International Strategic Alliance will 
not influence its governance costs. 
N 
38 
Std 
deviation 
3.18 
t 
19.386 
Slgrriflcance 
value(p) 
0.005 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Effect of Alliaiice Function on Alliance Governance Costs 
Hypothesis 6 posts that for domestic IT firms in an emerging economy the function of an 
International Strategic Alliance will not influence its governance costs. 
The variables relating to the function of the alliance were not found to be relevant for 
alliance governance costs in the sample considered. The findings are summarized below 
and also table 5-25 
• Efforts to adapt to the strategic orientation of the partner firm 
• Efforts to adapt to the strategic orientation of the Indian firm 
• Efforts to adapt to the decision to the change the scope of the alliance 
• Convincing partner on the strategic issues (profitability, productivity etc) 
• Inventory costs 
• Technology license fees 
• Logistics costs 
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A small number of respondents responded to this factor. It could be so as very few 
companies have different alliances with multiple functions. Though sample size is small 
an analysis was nevertheless carried out for understanding the impact of the alliance 
function on the governance costs. It was found that an overwhelming majority of the 
respondents who indicated that the factors were relevant also indicated that these factors 
added to the governance costs. The costs of adapting to the strategic reorientation of the 
partner firm strategic reorientation of the Indian firm and also the change in the 
alliance/project scope added to the governance costs. It may also be noted here that the 
alliances were found to be extremely flexible. This could also have led to the finding that 
the alliance function did not have a significant impact on the alliance governance costs. 
It may also be interesting to look at the sub groups within the sample to understand if the 
trend could be different for any of the sub groups. In the first level, the factors of EJVs 
and non equity alliances were compared. In the second level a comparison was made 
between 6 groups viz.,marketing alliances (EJV and non equity type), learning alliances 
(EJV and non equity type) and technology alliances. 
However at a macro level it was found that in the case of 4 firms, marketing alliances 
were found to be costlier than technology alliances. In 2 firms technology alliances were 
found to be costlier than learning alliances and in 4 firms marketing alliances were found 
to be costlier than learning alliances. Overall it appears as though marketing alliances are 
more costly compared to technology alliances which are in turn more costly than learning 
alliances. 
I able 5-42 Coinpari^ion of tht governHncc co*ts of various t>pcs of alliances 
No: of firms were marketing alliances are costlier than technology 
alliances 
No: of finns were technoJogy alliances are costlier than learning alliances 
No: of firms were marketing alliances are costlier than learning alliances 
4 
2 
4 
From the case studies, it evolved that the freedom for decision making was high with the 
Indian firms and the power for decision making rested mostly with the Indian firms. 
Table 5-43 Hypothesis 6 testing 
Hypothesis 6 posts that for domestic 
IT firms in an emerging economy the 
function of an International 
Strategic Alliance will not influence 
its governance costs. 
N 
41 
5td 
deviation 
4.04 
t 
5.46 
Slgi^flcanee 
value(p) 
0.001 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
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6 CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Sumamry of Findings and Conclusions 
6.2 Implications for theory and further research 
6.3 Implications for Managers and Practitioners 
6.4 Limitations of the study 
178 
The following section summarizes the findings and also captures the conclusions that can 
be drawn from the findings elaborated in the previous chapter. Section 6.1 provides the 
summary of the findings. Section 6.2 outlines the overall group that emerged from the 
study and the nature of alliances in those individual groups. Section 6.3 outlines the 
support for the hypothesis in this study. Section 6.4 outlines the behavior of alliances in 
each of the subgroups that emerged in the study. In the sections below the terms 
'relevant' and 'important' have been used for various factors. As mentioned in an earlier 
section, 'relevant' factors are those, which a statistically significant proportion of the 
respondents in this research have considered as relevant for the alliances they were 
involved in. 'Important' factors are those 'relevant' factors for which a statistically 
significant proportion of respondents attached a high degree of importance. 
6.1 Summary of findings 
Sumamry of the findings of this research is as follows 
Table 6-1 Summary findings 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1.1 
Hypothesis 1.2 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2.1 
Hypothesis 2.2 
Hypothesis 2.3 
Hypothesis 2.4 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3.1 
Hypothesis 3.2 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4.1 
Hypothesis 4.2 
Hypothesis 4.3 
Hypothesis 4.4 
Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 6 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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Detailed results of this research are as follows: 
Table 6-2 Detailed results 
Hypothesis 1: Internal strategic alliances do not allow 
domestic IT firms to access spatially differentiated 
resources and are not entered into for gaining access to 
technology. 
Hypothesis 1.1 posits that spatially differentiated 
resources are not accessed by domestic IT firms from 
International Strategic Alliances. 
Products of the partners 
Knowledge of the technology of the partner ( including 
knowhow, standards etc) 
Operationsl knowledge -Process, procedures etc 
Reputed brand name 
Manpower -technical and managerial 
Established operational infrastructure 
Capital 
Partner network / forums 
Hypothesis 1.2 posits that access to technology was not 
perceived to be a factor by domestic IT firms to gain from 
International Strategic Alliances. 
Rejected Hypothesis 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Significantly important 
Significantly important 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly non relevant 
Significantly non relevant 
Significantly non relevant 
Significantly non relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Richo" and faster access of technology through 
Training programs 
Socialization of people 
Access to senior people from the partner side 
Hypothesis 2: Environmental factors and constraints will 
not initiate the use of international strategic alliances by 
domestic IT firms in an emerging economy and they are 
Significantly considered as a key 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
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not used to overcome uncertainties related to vertically 
linked activities. 
Hypothesis 2.1 : International Strategic Alliances are not 
used by domestic firms in an emerging economy to 
overcome uncertainties related to vertically linked 
activities 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Overcoming demand uncertainty by overcoming uncertainty in 
Future of the market / players in the market 
Customer behavior 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Overcoming supply uncertainty through 
Benefits of global procurement 
Benefits of continuous purchase from the partner and 
resulting cost reduction 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Overcoming regulatory uncertainty by 
Hedging against changes in governmental policies for the 
sector 
Coping with foreign exchange risks 
Coping with capacity fluctuations 
Hypothesis 2.2 : Domestic IT firms in an emerging 
economy do not enter into international strategic alliances 
to overcome interregional differences associated with 
policy and culture. 
Overcoming regional policy / culture differences by 
gaining reputation in international markets by 
endorsements by partner 
Overcoming regional policy / culture differences with 
regards to imports 
Overcoming regional policy / culture differences with 
regards \a corporate governance 
Overcoming regional policy / culture differences with 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Significantly important 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
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regards to national culture 
Overcoming regional policy / culture differences with 
regards to business culture and work ethos 
Overcoming regional policy / culture differences with 
regards to language 
Hypothesis 2.3 : Domestic FT firms in an emerging 
economy do not use International Strategic Alliances to 
overcome competitive uncertainty. 
Overcoming dependence on a narrow range of customers 
Overcoming investment risk ( by better returns on 
investment, resource utility) 
Overcoming risk of foreign company partnering with 
other players 
Hypothesis 2.4 : Technical changes do not drive domestic 
IT firms to form international Strategic Alliance. 
Coping with technology change by access to forums and 
materials 
Monitoring technology change ( by sharing beta versions, 
tech trends, partner helping with evaluation of technology 
etc) 
Coping with technical changes by sharing R&D expenses 
Coping with technology change by establishing / coping 
with standards 
Hypothesis 3: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy 
do not enter into International Strategic Alliances to 
exploit competitive advantages and International Strategic 
Alliances do not distribute risks and do not help in 
gaining flexibility in the organizational activities for 
domestic IT firms. 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Significantly important 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Significantly important 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
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Hypothesis 3.1: Domestic IT firms in an emerging 
economy, will not enter into international strategic 
alliances to exploit competitive advantages related to 
vertical disaggregation and spatial separation of 
fiinctions. 
Using alliance partner as a supplying partner ( supplying 
inputs at cheaper prices) 
Using alliance partner as a marketing partner ( marketing 
outputs of the firms) 
Using alliance partner as a sourcing partner ( sourcing 
inputs of the firms) 
Hypothesis 3.2 : International Strategic Alliances do not 
distribute risks and do not help in gaining flexibility in 
the organizational activities fiyr domestic IT firms. 
Hypothesis rejected 
Significantly important 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Overcoming operational risks with respect to 
Attrition of manpower 
Collection of receivables 
Factor 
Doing away with the rigid administrative mechanisms 
within a vertically integrated firms by each partner 
directly interacting with the customers and delivering 
effective and speedier outputs. 
Better organization of operations by sharing fixed costs 
like administration , distribution, plant equipment 
Hypothesis 4: The behavioral uncertainty and partner 
asymmetry between alliance partners do not influence the 
governance costs in International Strategic Alliances. 
Partner reputation will not serve as a credible commitment 
and trust and cooperation between partners will not reduce 
the cost of International Strategic Alliances. 
Not relevant 
Not relevant 
Level of Importance 
Significantly important 
Significantly Not relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
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Hypothesis 4.1 posits that partner reputation will not 
serve as a credible commitment in International Strategic 
Alliance relationships for domestic IT firms. 
Market strengths of the partner (market share , operations 
base) 
Future outlook of the partner ( business plans, product 
services roadmap etc) 
Technology strength of the partner ( association with a 
technology with good potentia)) 
Market reputation of the partner ( customer stories, 
endorsement by market research , VC firms) 
Performance of the partner ( sales , profits etc) 
Operations strengths of the partner ( cost, quality, size, 
experience etc) 
Alliance management history of the partner (policies and 
past experience) 
Hypothesis 4.2 posits that trust and cooperation between 
participating firms will not reduce the cost of associated 
with an International Strategic Alliances for domestic IT 
firms in an emerging economy. 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Hypothesis rejected 
Increasing trust and cooperation by 
Creating an environment of openness and transparency 
Building an organization based trust rather than a people/ 
individual based trust 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Decrease in trust and cooperation due to the perception that the relationship is risky due to.... 
Lack of honesty 
Indications that the partner will compete directly with the 
firm 
Partner not trusting capabilities 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Decrease in trust and cooperation on account of disputes relating to.... 
Interim changes in alliance / project scope Significantly not relevant 
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Ownership of IP 
Statutory contractual clauses 
Operational contractual clauses 
Control 
Valuation / valuation methods 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Decrease in trust and cooperation due to 
Unilateral dedication of assets prior to relationship 
Acceptance of the majority partner's dominant role 
Proactive change of the role by the partners 
Avoiding bargaining by upfront acceptance of partner 
terms 
Hypothesis 4.3 posits that for domestic IT firms in an 
emerging economy, physical, cultural and organizational 
distance between partners will not contribute to 
governance costs of international strategic alliances. 
Costs of adapting to language differences between 
partnering firms 
Hypothesis 5 posits that for domestic IT firms in an 
emerging economy the structure of an International 
Strategic Alliance will not influence its governance costs. 
Costs of coping with discrepancies in pay/incentives for 
workforce 
Costs of training /seminars 
Cost reduction due to partner involvement in operations 
Reduction in operational flexibility due to dependence on 
the partner for routine decisions 
Reduction in operational flexibility due to exclusivity of 
the partnership 
Reduction in operational flexibility due to stipulations on 
minimum level for sales,promotion,production etc 
Increase in operational flexibility due to partner 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Significantly not relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
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subsidizing operational costs like travel advertising etc 
Increase in operational flexibility due to autonomy given 
to fix commissions,margins,pricing etc 
Increase in operational flexibility due to usage of assets 
for multiple activities 
Hypothesis 6 posts that for domestic IT firms in an 
emerging economy the function of an International 
Strategic Alliance will not influence its governance costs. 
Costs due to efforts to adapt to the strategic orientation of 
the partner firm 
Costs due to efforts to adapt to strategic orientation of the 
Indian firm 
Costs due to efforts to adapt to the decision to change the 
scope of the alliance 
Costs of convincing partner on strategic issues 
Inventory costs 
Technology license fees 
Logistics costs 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Hypothesis Rejected 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
Significantly not relevant 
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6,2 ImpUcationsfor theory and further research 
A suggestion for further research is to conduct a 'real' longitudinal study in which the 
responses of are traced in 'real time' over a longer period of time. 
Earlier research on strategic alliances looked at the motivations for alliance formation and 
also the governance costs drivers and its relationship to the alliance performance. The 
current work helps in understanding the variations with respect to the above across 
various types of alliances viz., marketing, learning and technology alliances as well as 
non equity and EJV type of alliances. 
Earlier research have also found that IT firms tend to form alliances with firms on the 
supply side in large numbers ( Bonefiled, 1995). This was found to be true in current 
research also. It was also found by researchers ( Hagedoom, 2002) that R&D alliances 
were concentrated mostly in developed nations. This research in its attempt to understand 
the alliances in an emerging has found further support to Hagedoom's finding 
specifically in the context of IT firms as majority of the alliances were not R&D alliances 
but alliances meant for commercialization of the products of the innovators. 
Knowledge being a critical resource in the IT industry it is difficult for innovators to 
protect the knowledge. Strategic Alliances and social networks (Deroian, 2002) help 
them to diffuse this knowledge for commercial gains (Rosenbaum, 1993). This learning 
helps Indian firms in delivering effective solutions to their own clients. Institutional 
theorists (Scott and Meyer, 1994) have also argued that firms tend to increase their 
legitimacy in a field through interorganizational relationships. This could be true with the 
foreign firms trying to have a larger customer base through their partnerships with the 
Indian firms. 
The findings of the research are also in line with recent work (Supphellen, Haugland and 
JjKomeliussen, 2002) who have found that in International strategic alliances, the 
closeness of the partner to the strategic core of the firm, the degree of dissimilarity among 
potential partners, degree of expected opportunism and prior expericen with cooperation 
are critical for the success of the alliance. 
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A clear distinction emerges between marketing and learning alliances. These distinctions 
and observations help us to arrive at the following hypothesis, which need to be tested in 
a larger sample and in different types of industries. 
Hypothesis A: For domestic IT firms in an emerging economy, spatially separated 
resources can be leveraged on spatially disaggregating functions and entering into 
alliance relationships outside the clusters. 
Hypothesis B: Domestic IT firms in an emerging economy entering into learning 
alliances with foreign firms do not have motivations of overcoming uncertainties relating 
to internal organization of activities by participating in such an alliance relationships. 
Hypothesis C: IT firms in an emerging economy entering into learning alliances with 
foreign funds do not have motivations of overcoming uncertainties relating to internal 
organization of activities by participating in such an alliance relationship. 
Table 6-3 Summary of the findiDgi 
Overall ME EJV NE-
M 
NE-
L 
NE-
T 
Motivations 
Gaining of resources 
Access to technology 
Overcoming competitive uncertainty 
Overcoming Technical uncertainty 
Gaining Operation advantages 
Distributing operational risks and gaining flexibility 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Costs drivers 
Reduction in costs due to reputed partner 
Trust building efforts 
Reduction in costs due to alliance experience 
Physical / cultural / organizational distances 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
Effect of governance costs on performance 
Governance costs eroded alliance benefits X X X 
NE = non equity, EJV : Equity JV, NE-M= Non equity for marketing, NE-L= Non equity 
for learning, NE-T= Non equity for technology 
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6,3 Implications for Managers and Practitioners 
The findings of this research have shown that Indian firms have used the International 
Strategic Alliances extensively to gain a footprint in the customized software and systems 
management segments of the IT industry and have been fairly successful. These are in 
line with the recommendations of korwar (1991). Korwar's work which was written prior 
to liberalization and much more earlier compared to the formation of many of the 
alliances considered here, proposed that the strengths of the Indian IT firms viz., 
technical manpower and the weakness of foreign firms viz., shortage of trained 
manpower are complementary. Similarly the strengths of the foreign partners viz., 
credibility \, experience etc and the weakness of the Indian partners viz., lack of 
knowledge , credibility in solving business problems etc are complementary. It was put 
forth a good leveraging on these synergies would lead to effective international strategic 
alliances for Indian IT firms. This trend appears to have happened over the years and the 
Indian IT firms have indeed exploited the synergies well. 
The findings are also supportive of some of the propositions put forward by Dargo (1997) 
for strategic alliances in the IT industry. It was proposed by him that alliances are most 
sought after in highly innovative industries with firms which produce component parts of 
a larger technological system, in situations where it is important to set industry standard 
and firms entering into new markets. 
While many of the variables dealt with for the various hypothesis in this study were not 
found to be relevant for the firms in the sample these can be used for developing metrics 
for devising and measuring the deliberate strategies of firms. 
The study suggests the following for practitioners for effectively managing alliances: 
• The governance costs of managing alliances are lower for alliances with a high level of 
trust. EfTorts put in for building trust can reduce governance costs and result in an 
effective relationship. 
• Governance costs can be lower if the firm has past experience in managing alliances. 
Firms which do not have high experience in managing alliances need to look for hiring 
managers with priori experience in managing alliances for reducing governance costs 
• The partner asymmetry leads to higher governance costs. Firms need to put in efforts to 
understand the organizational, national and societal culture of their partners. 
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• Firms need to put in efforts to select partners with good reputation. Having a reputed 
partner can result in an alliance with lower governance costs. 
• Firms need to flexibly structure their alliance relationship for being able to adapt to the 
changes in the environment. This leads to lower governance costs. 
6.4 Limitations of the study 
The study was primarily done for companies that had registered with NASSCOM. 
Though there should not be many exclusions (specially the important ones), still that is a 
limitation of this study and might require a wider coverage of companies that have not 
been registered with NASSCOM. 
This study has shown that strategic alliances are non static and more dynamic than 
assumed in current work across the world. Therefore, more research is required that 
assumed strategic alliances as dynamic. Such approaches also involve requirements with 
respect to the methodology. According to Langley (1999), research on dynamic 
phenomena has been approached in two ways. Some researchers have used coarse-
grained research approaches in order to test a-priori formulated theories, while others 
have used fine-grained qualitative research approaches in an attempt to build theory. 
However, a great deal of literature calls for more in-depth process research, which helps 
understand organizational phenomena over time on more levels than just the superficial 
one. 
The sample for EJVs and also for non equity alliances for technology was small to 
generate rich comparative findings. Due to time and logistic constraints further attempts 
to expand the sample were not made. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
Dear Sir / Madam, 
As part of my Ph.D. program at AMU, I am investigating the usage of cooperative 
strategy by Indian IT firms. In this context, I am studying the issues related to the 
formation and management of strategic alliances between Indian and foreign firms and 
your responses would help me in testing my hypothesis. 
1 would be thankful if you could take some time to respond to the questionnaire. It would 
take about 20 minutes to complete. 
The name of the alliance partner need not be mentioned in the responses if you feel so. 
If there are any clarifications, I can be reached at Anurag_ojha@yahoo.com 
Thank you, 
Anurag Ojha 
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Strategic Alliances could be with or without equity participation and are far more 
intrinsic than contractual agreements. 
For the purpose of my research, a strategic alliance is considered as a relationship 
between independent companies working closely together to manage the flow of goods or 
services along the value chain. The relationship involves joint decision making the 
partnering terms. The forms appreciate that they have a stake in partner's success and 
realize that they share common goals. They provide information to each other and 
therefore operate through a system of close coordination for the benefit of alliance. The 
inputs gained from the partners are considered strategic by the firms. 
Strategic Alliances could be any of the following types: 
Marketimi Alliances: A relationship wherein a firm markets the partner's products or 
gives the partner an entry into new markets apart from providing help with market 
demand and inputs on product upgrades. 
Technoloev Alliances: A relationship wherein a firm transfers technology to a partner or 
shares R&D activities in order to gain "time to market" or sharing the risks of R&D. 
Leamine Alliances: A relationship wherein a firm seeks to learn about the partner's 
products / technology / operations by associating in a relationship where the partner 
benefits by working together on joint projects. 
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1. Name of your firm: 
2. Does your firm have any strategic alliances (Y/N): 
3. Business area of your firm (Please tick the relevant boxes): 
Domestic 
Internation 
Hardware 
Developme 
nt 
Dl 
Hardware 
Developme 
nt 
11 
Software 
Developme 
nt 
D2 
Software 
Developme 
nt 
12 
Peripheral 
s 
D3 
Peripheral 
13 
Network in 
g 
D4 
Networkin 
e 
14 
Maintenanc 
e 
D5 
MaintenarK: 
e 
15 
Trainin 
8 
D6 
Trainin 
i 
16 
HAv 
Marketin 
g 
D7 
Marketin 
g 
17 
S/W 
Marketin 
g 
D8 
S/W 
Marketin 
g 
18 
4. Nature of the alliances your firm has : 
Note: Alliances can be single contractual agreements /equity joint ventures /non-equity joint 
ventures. 
1 
Alliance 
Nnnbcr 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
Name of 
Partner 
3 
Conntiy 
of origin 
4 
Country 
where the 
partner is 
head 
qnartered 
5 
% stake 
of the 
foreign 
partner 
in the 
JV 
6 
Headquarters 
of the Jirfnt 
Venture 
/AlUancc 
7 
Which of 
the 
business 
areas 
mentioned 
above docs 
the 
alliances 
deal with 
8 
Whra 
was the 
alliance 
formed 
(mm/yy) 
5. Reasons for entering into the alliance (please tick the relevant box): 
No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Reasons 
Accessing new technologies 
Rationalization of investment 
Spreading costs and risks of R&D 
Managerial experience building 
AlliaDcc Number 
1 2 3 4 
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5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Developing uniform industry wide product standard 
Complying with local government policy requirement 
Adapting to technology change 
Shortening of product development cycle 
Monitoring environmental changes and market 
opportunities 
Entry to foreign markets 
Expansion of product range 
Access to recognized brand names 
Supplier -Buyer relationship 
6. Location of Development / Research Centers of your firm in India : (please tick) 
Bangalore / Mumbai / Delhi / Chennai / Kolkata / Pune / Hyderabad / Others 
7. Location of Development/ Research Centers of your firm worldwide: (please tick) 
USA / Europe / SouthAsia / Japan / MiddleEast / Others 
8. Geographic locations where your firm has international subsidiaries 
USA / Europe / SouthAsia / Japan / MiddleEast / Others 
9. Number of people working in Development / Research Centers of your firm in India 
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10. Average turnover in Rupees (Millions) 
11. Average Profit in Rupees (Millions) 
12. Number of years in business 
a. In India: 
b. Outside India: 
13. Whether an MNC? (Y/N) 
14. Whether promoters are NRl : (Y/N) 
15. Location of Indian head quarters : (please tick) 
Bangalore I Mumbai / Delhi I Chennai I Kolkata I Pvne / Hyderabad / Others 
16. Location of Indian head quarters: 
Filled up 1^ 
Name: _Designation:_ 
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• PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ON A SCALE OF 1 to 5 
• PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING BASED ON HOW THE SITUATION 
WAS WHEN YOU ENTERED THE ALLIANCE (LEFT HAND SIDE-
FORMATION SIDE) AND HOW THE SITUATION IS NOW (RIGHT HAND 
SIDE -CURRENT SIDE) 
• SINCE EACH ALLIANCE WOULD BE DIFFERENT IN NATURE, PLEASE 
INDICATE YOUR CHOICES WITHOUT ANY IMPLICIT COMPARISONS 
BUT ON AN ABSOLUTE SCALE OF 1 to 5 INDEPENDENTLY FOR EACH 
ALLIANCE 
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING 
Formation 
st^e 
1 2 3 4 
17.. What does your firm expect to ^ tn ' 
from this alliance? 
l{N<tt1mp) 2 3 4 3 (Highly Imj^ 
Exposure to customer technology 
Exposure to supplier technology 
Exposure to new products 
Exposure to new operations 
Access to foreign markets 
Access to domestic markets 
Transfer of product technology 
Transfer of operations technology 
Others (please specify) 
Cum»itStag^ 
1 2 3 4 
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How important is the alliance for your firm 
1( Not Imp) 2 3 4 5 (Highly Imp) 
§:M' : 
\'4i 
IS. Re^uroessou^tto begainedtltrmjpb 
'•' WmWatks'? 
tW'^ 
Current Stage 
la-- 1{ Mot lrtpJ^™2.......3™.^4^.-...5 {Highly hnp) 
Products of the partner 
Technologyof the partner (know-how, 
standards) 
Operational Knowledge- Procedures, processes 
Manpower-technical and management 
Established operational infrastructure 
Capital 
Brand Name of the partner 
Partner networks 
Others (please specify). 
Are the resources sought to be gained through 
the alliance available locally 
1( easily available locally)...2.3...4....5 (Difficult 
to get locally) 
Formation 
stage 
1 2 3 4 
19. issues relating to the business climate 
sought to be dealt with through this 
alliance 
Current Stage 
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s 
Formation 
stage 
1( Not Imp) 2 3 4 5 (Highly Imp) 
OVERCOMING EFFEaS OF DEMAND 
UNCERTAINITY 
-By reduction of inventories 
-by overcoming uncertainty of the market 
players in the market 
-By overcoming uncertainty in customer 
behavior 
OVERCOMING EFFEaS OF SUPPLY 
UNCERTAINITY 
-Overcoming uncertainty of supplies locally 
-availing benefits of global procurement 
-availing benefits of continuous purchase from 
the partner and resulting in cost reduction 
OVERCOMING EFFECTS OF REGULATORY 
UNCERTAINITY 
-hedging against changes in regulatory policies 
for the sector 
-coping with exchange rate risks 
COPING WITH CAPACITY FLUaUATIONS 
Others ( please specify) 
20. Issues relating to regional policy 
/culture differences sought to be dealt 
1 
1 
I 
Current Stage 
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1 2 3 4 
Formation 
stage 
1 2 3 4 
vtfitlit through this aitiance 
1( Not lmp):.;;,.2..,—3 4 5 (Highly Imp) 
GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES 
-with regards to imports 
- with regards to corporate governance 
- with regards to subsidies and tax benefits 
CULTURAL BARRIERS 
-National culture 
-Business culture and work ethos 
-Language barriers 
GAINING REPUTATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
MARKETS BY PARTNER ENDORSEMENT 
Others ( olease soecifv) 
21. issues relating to competition sought 
to be dealt with through this alliance 
1( Not Imp). 2 3 4 5 (Highly Imp) 
OVERCOMING DEPENDENCE ON A NARROW 
RANGE OF 
-Products 
- Markets 
- Customers 
OVERCOMINGINVESTMENT RISK ( by better 
1 2 3 4 
1 
1 
Current Stage 
1 2 3 4 
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Fonnation 
stage 
1 2 1 3 4 
Formation 
stage 
1 2 3 4 
ROI, resource utilization etc) 
OVERCOMING RISK OF FOREIGN COMPANY 
PARTNERING WITH OTHER LOCAL PLAYERS 
Others ( please specify) 
22. Issues relating to technology sought to 
be dealt with through this alliance 
1( Not Imp) 2.„ 3.......4 5 {Highly Imp) 
COPING WITH TECHNOLOGY 
-Access to forums / material 
-Sharing R&D expenses 
- Establishing / coping with standards 
MONITORING OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ( 
by sharing beta versions, technology trends, 
evaluation of technologies) 
Others ( please specify) s 
23. Issues relating to organization of your 
operations sought to be dealt with 
through this alliance 
1( Not lmp)......2 3 4 5 (Highly Imp) 
ALLIANCE PARTNER FUNCTIONING AS A 
-marketing partner (marketing outputs of your 
firm) 
Current Stage 
1 2 3 4 
Current Stage 
1 2 3 4 
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-Sourcing partner {sourcing inputs for your 
firm) 
- Supplying partner (supplying inputs for your 
f irm at cheaper prices) 
OVERCOMING OPERATIONAL RISKS WITH 
RESPEa TO 
- Equipment / product failure 
- Attrition of manpower 
- Collection of receivables 
EACH PARTNER DIRECTLY INTERACTING WITH 
THE CUSTOMERS AND DELIVERING EFFECTIVE 
AND SPEEDIER OUTPUTS 
SHARING FIXED COSTS (Administration, 
distribution, p lant /equipment etc) 
Others (please specify) 
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PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING BASED ON THE SITUATION AT 
THE TIME OF ENTERING INTO THE ALLIANCE 
24./^»rt from 
fforaratfon of 
an s^Bat^, 
wtiat were 
the otiier 
op^ms 
avallaUe to 
you for 
acttssinig 
tedincriogy? 
Mease rank the 
following, best 
dioice gets rank 
1, you can rank all 
tiie alliances 
(mentioned in 
columns with 
heaiflngs text 
1 A M ) 
Outright purchase 
of technology 
Technical 
manuals/ journals 
/books 
Building 
technology for 
customers 
SPV like offshore 
development 
Rank , Alliance 
1 
AtK9ii{% 
2 
JMHance 
% 
Alliance 
4 
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centers 
Resources on 
Internet 
XS. WhicE of the fi^iiMng fac^m dM 
you f ^ were the tey benefits thte 
alHancK would offer you vte4-vis 
the <ttl«et better options mention«i 
above for accessii^ technoli^. 
INot am^dered tey benefit»2»3. A.5 . 
Comddered as a key benefit 
FASTER AND RICHER ACEESS TO 
TECHNOLOGY THROUGH 
Training programs 
Socializing of people 
Access to senior people from the 
partner side 
Managerial commitment from the 
partner due to equity participation 
PRE-EMPTION OF A COMPETITOR TO 
ACCESS THE TECHNOLOGY FROM THE 
FOREIGN COMPANY AFTER FORMATION 
OF AN ALLIANCE WITH YOUR FIRM 
26. How have the following decreased 
the flenMity in your (Mrganizatlon? 
1 No 
cl7CC*«*«« ••••^••••••••^••••••••••4aM»M •• • B^B l a i ^ G 
Effect 
Dependence on the partner for routine 
NX^KM 
1 
.•-:'::. i S 4 
Alliance 
1 
fiMmim 
2 
AlHance 
2 
Mt tma 
3 
Alliance 
3 
MK^mx 
4 
m 
AMance 
4 
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decisions 
Exclusivity of the partnership (for 
geographies / areas/ domains/ margins/ 
prices) 
Constraints on partnering with 
competitors of the foreign partner 
Stipulation on minimum levels for sales, 
promotion, production etc 
Others 
(Specify) 
27. How have the foikMvit% increased 
the flexibility in ytnir organization? 
1 No 
Effect 
Partner subsiding operational costs like 
travel, advertising etc 
Autonomy given to you in fixing 
commissions, margins, pricings etc 
Usage of assets for multiple activities 
Others 
(Specify) 
28. How have the foHowing n^ativeiy 
affected trust and cooperation in 
youraUianras? 
1 No 
effect.......w2......~3»~..~.4...~.....5.large 
Effect 
PERCEPTION THAT THE RELATIONSHIP IS 
RISKY DUE TO 
Ego 
AMiance 
1 
Mliance 
1 
AMance 
2 
Alliance 
2 
Alliance 
3 
Alliance 
3 
Alliance 
4 
AMance 
4 
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Lack of honesty 1 
Indications that the partners will 
compete with your firm 
Your partner not trusting your 
capabilities 
FAILURE TO FULFILL COMMITMENT / 
MILESTONES 
DISPUTES RELATING TO 
Setting objectives- payments, counter 
guarantee, milestones etc 
Interim changes in alliances / project 
scope 
Ownership of IP 
Statutory contractual clauses 
(arbitration, indemnity etc) 
Operational contractual clauses 
(reimbursement of expenses, ownership 
of material, cost sharing etc) 
Control (% equity sake) 
Call options - exercise price, number of 
shares, triggering event etc 
Valuation / valuation methods 
Others (Specify) 
29. HoMT have tfie folloMring increased 
trust and cooperation In your 
alliances? 
1 No 
effect.M.>.~2.......3.~~..~.4...M....J>.large 
Effect 
Creating an environment of openness 
and transparency 
Alliance 
1 
Alliance 
2 
Alliance 
3 
\ 
AlHance 
4 
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Building an organization - based trust 
rather than a people / individual trust 
Providing unsolicited value addition to 
the partner (sharing of knowledge, 
feedback for improvement, standing 
guarantee) 
Unilateral dedication of assets prior to 
relationship 
Acceptance of the majority partner's 
dominant role in the alliance 
Facilitating a convenient interaction - in 
terms of meeting times, availability etc 
Proactive change of the role in the 
alliance by the partners, based on the 
change in function of the alliance 
Avoiding bargaining by upfront 
acceptance partner terms (unwanted 
travel costs, equity stake, exclusivity etc) 
Others 
(Specify) 
Have the above efforts added to the 
costs of managing the alliances. 
l .No increase ....2....3 4 5 very 
high increase 
Overall how do you rate your alliance 
relationship in terms of trust 
1.lacking trust....2....3 4 5 Highly 
trustworthy 
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30. what did you JoiA fmr whHe 
eviriuating the reputetion of your 
pauriikar, betonloketbHSJnUo an 
alilaiice relationship 
1 Not con^dered.~*2n.3u.4~..>5 
Condd^d serkN^ 
Company performance (sales, profits 
etc) 
Market strengths of partner (Market 
share, operations base, bargaining 
power) 
Future outlook of the partner (business 
plans, product, services roadmap etc) 
Operational strength (cost, quality, size, 
experience etc) 
Technology strength (association with a 
technology with good potential for the 
future and good market prospects 
Alliance management history - policies 
and past experiences 
Proactive change of the role in the 
alliance by the partners, based on the 
change in function of the alliance 
Market reputation (customer stories, 
endorsement by market research firms, 
VC firms etc) 
Others 
(Specifv) 
Has an understanding of the above 
resulted in a good alliance relationship 
l .Not very useful ....2....3 4 5 
Alliance 
1 
J^ince 
I 
/Wlance 
3 
MBance 
4 
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Extremely useful 
31. While deaflng with physical / 
culturai / imi^izational 
differences, wMch of the following 
added to tiie alPance costs 
1 Not rdevant->JZ.>.~3»....4 5 
iaige effect 
COST OF ADAPTING TO DIFFERENCES IN 
BUSINESS OPERATIONS (equipment 
adaption, operational procedure 
adaption etc) 
COST OF ADAPTING TO DIFFERENCES IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE (Decision 
making, sharing of vision, rules etc) 
COST OF ADAPTING TO DIFFERENCES IN 
NATIONAL CULTURE 
Dealing with differences in languages 
Dealing with differences in work culture 
/ ethos 
Others (Specify) 
Have the costs of interaction with the 
partner reduced over a period of time 
due to technology advances 
l.Nochange 2 3 4 SHigh 
Reduction 
>'^;32^Rfease lank the fbHcmdng (the best 
Better understanding of the 
expectations and behavior of partners 
Better understanding of the purpose of 
the alliance 
Alliance 
1 
Alliance 
AlHance 
2 
, AlOaote 
Alliance 
3 
AMwoe 
3 
Alliance 
4 
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Understanding hidden costs /factors for 
negotiation 
Ability to choose a good partner 
Effective structuring of the alliance 
What effect did the above benefits have 
on reducing the costs of managing the 
alliances 
l.Noeffect 2 3 4 SHigh 
Reduction 
33. Which of the following increased 
the alliance cost 
l.Noeffect 2 3 4 5 increased 
alliance cost 
Efforts to adapt to the strategic 
reorientation of the partner firm 
Efforts to adapt to the strategic 
reorientation of your firm 
Efforts to adapt to the decision to 
change the scope of the alliance due to 
changes in joint objectives 
Costs of convincing on strategic issues 
(profitability, productivity, investments 
etc) 
Inventory costs 
Technology license fees 
Logistics fees 
Coping with discrepancies in incentives 
for w/orkforce 
Preparation of reports and collecting 
information (direct cost and time 
involved) 
Alliance 
1 
Alliance 
2 
Alliance 
3 
AlHance 
4 
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Manpower costs for the dedicated 
Alliance / Project manager, teams, 
Managementldi\rect cost and time 
involved) 
Decentralized interaction with the 
partner (multiple people within your 
firm interacting with multiple people 
from the partner firm 
Others 
(Soecifv) 
Has your dependency on your partner 
reduced overtime 
l.Noeffect 2 3 4....5 reduced to a 
large extent 
34. How have follo^Ming helped in 
lowering alliance management 
costs 
l.Noeffect 2 3 4 5 reduced 
alliance cost 
Prescriptiveness of the alliance 
operations 
Autonomy of partners / staff 
Partner involvement in operations 
Others 
(specify) 
35. On what parameters would you 
choose to measure the success of 
the alliance. Please rank the 
following, (best choice gets rank 1) 
Business benefits (Topline / Bottom Line 
/ROI) 
Alliance 
1 
Alliance 
1 
Alliam^ 
2 
Alliance 
2 
MHance 
3 
Alliance 
3 
MK»nce 
4 
Ailfance 
4 
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Market benefits (market share / new 
customers) 
Stakeholder value creation (including 
shareholders, employees, customers) 
Fulfillment of the initial objectives of 
alliance 
Performance compared to that of other 
alliance partners of the partner 
Unanticipated benefits from the alliance 
Other (Soecifv) 
Rate the success of the alliance based on 
the above measure you have chosen as 
most important 
1.Highly unsuccessful..2..3..4..5 Highly 
successful 
Rate the success of the alliance based on 
the fulfillment of the initial objectives 
that were looked at 
1.Highly unsuccessful....2....3....4....5 
Highly successful 
Do you feel that the alliance costs 
incurred were worth the benefits 
derived 
l .Not at all 2 3 4 5 To a 
large extent 
Do you feel that the alliance costs have 
eroded the benefits that you derived 
from the alliance 
l .Not at all 2 3 4 5 To a 
large extent 
What is your partner's level of 
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dependence on the alliance 
l.Verylow level ....2 3 4 5 Very 
high level 
In your perception, who is the dominant 
partner in this relationship 
1. Your firm is more dominant 
2. Both share equal partner 
3. The partner firm is dominant 
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APPENDIX 2: Analysis ofEJVs v/s Non equity Alliances 
FACTOR 
Basic 
Motivational 
factors 
Importance of tiie 
alliance partner 
Non equity Alliances (118 Alliances 
UCL and LCL at 5% confidence 
level) 
SIGNIFCANTLY RELEVANT 
Exposure to new products 
(n=118; RELPRO=«.65;UCL=0.59) 
Exposure to supplier technology 
(n=118; RELPRO=0.61;UCL=0.59) 
Access to foreign markets 
(n=118; RELPRO=0.65;UCL=0.59) 
SIGNIFCANTLY NOT RELEVANT 
Exposure to customer technology 
(n=118; RELFRO=<).36;UCL=0.41) 
Transfer of product 
technology (n=l 18; 
RELPRO=«.13;UCL=0.41) 
Transfer of operations 
technology(n=118; 
RELPRO=0.13;UCL=0.41) 
There was no significant level of 
importance for the alliance partner, 
(n=118;RELPRO=0.87;UCL=0.59) 
EJV (12 alliances) 
RELEVANT 
Access to foreign markets 
9 of the 12 alliances have 
indicated that this factor was 
relevant 
Important 
All the 12 alliances indicated 
that alliance partner was 
important 
Table 1 Basic Motivational Factors for Alliance Formation 
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FACTOR Non equity Alliances (118 Alliances UCL 
and LCL at 5% confidence level) 
EJV (12 alliances) 
Resources SIGNIFCANTLY IMPORTANT 
Knowledge of the technology of the 
partner including know how standards etc 
(n=118; 
RELPRO=0.70;IMPPRO=0.64;UCL=0.59) 
Exposure to supplier technology 
Products of the partner 
(n=118; RELPRO=0.67; 
IMPPRO=0.63;UCL=0.59) 
SIGNIFCANTLY RELEVANT 
Reputed brand name 
(n=118; RELPRO=«.61;UCL=<).59) 
Operational knowledge- procedures, 
process and best practices 
(n=118; RELPRO=«.59;LCL=0.41) 
SIGNIFCANTLY NOT RELEVANT 
Manpower - technical and managerial 
(n=118; RELPRO=<).36;LCL=<).41) 
Established operational infrastructure 
(n=118; RELPRO=0.19;LCmJ.41) 
Capital 
RELPRO=0.12;LCL=<).41) 
(n=118; 
RELEVANT 
Reputed brand name 
11 of the 12 alliances have 
indicated that this factor 
was relevant 
Not RELEVANT 
Capital 
2 of the 12 alliances have 
indicated that this factor 
was not relevant 
Availability of 
resources locally 
Not Available 
(n=118;RELPRO=0.87;UCL=0.59) 
Not Available 
11 out of 12 alliances 
indicated that the 
resources were not 
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available locally 
Table 2 Resources Sought to be gained from Alliance partners 
FACTOR Non equity Alliances (118 
Alliances UCL and LCL at 5% 
confidence level) 
EJV (12 aUiances) 
Alternative options 
for technology access 
Bnilding technology for 
castomers 
(n=62; Mean rank =1.89) 
s p y like offshore development 
centers 
(n=36; Mean rank =2.39) 
Outright purchase of 
technology 
(n=48; Mean rank ^.40) 
Books Manual 
(n=61; Mean rank =2.69) 
Internet 
(n=61; Mean rank =3.46) 
s p y like offshore development 
centers 
(n=4,mean rank-1.5) 
Outright purchase of technology 
(n=7, mean ranks =1.86) 
Building technology for customers 
(n=3;mean rank =3.33) 
Internet 
(n=3;mean rank =4.33) 
Table 3 Alternate Modes of Technology Access 
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FACTOR 
Alliaoce advantage 
for access to 
technology 
Non equity Alliances (118 
Alliances UCL and LCL at 5% 
confidence level) 
SIGNFICANTLY IMPORTANT 
Richer and faster access of 
technoloev throoeb trainine 
proerams 
rn=84:R£LPRO=0.62:UCL=O.61) 
EJV (12 alliances) 
Reasons mentioned: 
Costly hypothesis to purchase 
the technology hence Alliance 
route 
Not relevant 
Preempting a competitor to 
access the technology from the 
foreign firms after formation of 
alliance 
Only 1 of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the factor was 
relevant 
Table 4 Benefits of Alliance over other methods for technology access 
FACTOR 
Control over 
vertically related 
activities 
Non equity Afliances (118 
Alliances UCL and LCL at 5% 
confidence level) 
SIGNFICANTLY IMPORTANT 
Overcoming demand uncertainty 
in the future of the market 
/players in the market 
(n=33;RELPRO=0.24;UCL=0.33) 
By overcoming uncertainty in 
customer behavior 
(n=28;RELPRO=0.19; 
EJV (12 alUances) 
NOT RELEVANT 
Overcoming demand 
uncertainty Overcoming 
uncertainty in customer 
behavior 
Only 1 of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the factor was 
relevant 
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LCL=0.31) 
By overcoming supply 
uncertainty through benefits of 
global procurement 
(n=25;RELPRO=0.19;LCL=«.30) 
Continuous purchase from the 
partner and resulting cost 
reduction 
(n=26;RELPRO=<).14;LCL=«.28) 
Overcoming regulatory 
uncertainty by coping with 
foreign exchange risks 
(n=26;RELPRO=0.19;LCL=<).31) 
By hedging against changes in 
governmental policies for the 
sector 
(n=9;RELPRO=0.07;LCL=0.17) 
Coping with capacity fluctuations 
(n=15;RELPRO=0.11;LCL=0.25) 
Overcoming uncertainty in the 
future of the market players in 
the market 
Only 2 of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the factor was 
relevant 
Co[Hng with capacity 
fluctuations 
Only 2 of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the factor was 
relevant 
Table 5 environmental uncertainties related to vertical activities sought to be overcome 
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FACTOR 
Regional differences 
in polky 
sought to 
with 
/ cnltnre 
be dealt 
Non equity Alliances (118 
Alliances UCL and LCL at 5% 
confidence level) 
SIGNFICANTLY NOT 
RELEVANT 
Overcoming regional policy 
/culture differences with regard 
to imports 
rn=18:RELPRO=«.13:UCL=0.27> 
EJV (12 alUances) 
NOT RELEVANT 
Overcoming regional policies 
/culture differences with regard 
to governmental policies on 
subsidies 
Onlyl of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the factor was 
relevant 
Overcoming regional policy 
/culture differences with regard 
to corporate governance 
Only 2 of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the factor was 
relevant 
Table 6 Interregional differences sought to be overcome through alliances 
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FACTOR 
Overcoming 
nncertauity relating 
to competition 
Non equity Alliances (118 
Alliances UCL and LCL at 5% 
confidence level) 
SIGNFICANTLY NOT 
RELEVANT 
Overcoming risk of foreign 
company partnering with other 
players 
rn=118:R£LPRO=0.20:UCL=0.30) 
EJV (12 alliances) 
NOT RELEVANT 
Overcoming investment risks 
by better returns on 
investment, resource utility etc 
Overcoming risk of foreign 
company partnering with other 
players 
Only 2 of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the factor was 
relevant 
Table 7 Competitiveness uncertainties sought to be overcome through alliances 
FACTOR 
Overcoming 
technical change 
Non equity Alliances (118 
Alliances UCL and LCL at 5% 
confidence level) 
SIGNFICANTLY NOT 
RELEVANT 
Coping with technology change 
by establishing /coping with 
standards 
(n=22:RELPRO=0.16:UCL=0.29) 
Coping with technology change 
by sharing R&D expenses 
EJV (12 alliances) 
NOT RELEVANT 
Coping with technology changes 
by establishing /coping with 
standards 
Coping with tech change by 
sharing R&D expenses 
Only 2 of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the factor was 
relevant 
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fn=20;RELPRO=0.15;UCL=0.28) 
Table 8 Issues relating to technology change addressed through alliances 
FACTOR 
Better 
organizatioii of 
operations by 
spatial 
separation of 
functions 
Non equity Alliances (118 Alliances UCL and 
LCL at 5% confidence level) 
SIGNWCANTLY RELEVANT 
Using alliance partner as a supplying partner ( 
Supplying inputs at cheaper prices) 
fn=92:RELPRO=«.68:IMPRO=0.62:UCL=0.60> 
SIGNFICANTLY NOT RELEVANT 
Using alliance partner as a sonrcing partner ( 
soorcing inputs for the firm) 
rn=38:RELPRO=0.28: LCL=034) 
Using alliance partner as a marketing partner ( 
marketing outputs for the firm) 
(n=28:RELPRO=«.21: LCL=«31> 
EJV (12 alliances) 
NOT RELEVANT 
Using alliance partner 
as a sonrcing partner ( 
sonrcing inputs for 
the firm) 
Only 2 of the 12 
alliances indicated 
that the factor was 
relevant 
Table 9 Factors enabling vertical control of activities sought from alliances by Spatial 
separation of functions. 
254 
FACTOR 
Operational 
risks sought to 
be overcome 
tlirongii 
alliances 
Non equity Alliances (118 Alliances UCL and 
LCL at 5% confidence level) 
SIGNFICANTLY IMPORTANT 
Doing away with the rigid administrative 
mechanism within a vertically integrated firm 
by each partner directly interacting with the 
customers and delivering effective and speedier 
outputs 
(n=82:RELPRO=0.61:lMPRO=0.96:UCL=0.611 
SIGNFICANTLY NOT RELEVANT 
Overcoming operational risks with respect to 
Equipment /product failure 
rn=47:RELPRO=0.35: LCL=«.36) 
Attrition of manpower 
(n=40:RELPRO=0.3:LCL*=«.35) 
Collection of receivables 
(n=5:RELPRO=<).04:LCL=0.06) 
Better organization of operations by sharing 
fixed costs like administration, distribution, 
plant /equipment etc 
rn=lS:RELPRO=0.11: LCL=<).25) 
EJV (12 alliances) 
NOT RELEVANT 
Overcoming 
operational risks with 
respect to collection of 
receivables 
Only 1 of the 12 
alliances indicated that 
the factor was relevant 
Better organization of 
operations by sharing 
fixed costs like 
administration. 
distribution, plant 
Equipments etc 
Only 2 of 12 alliances 
indicated that the 
factor was relevant 
Table 10 Operational risks and flexibility issues dealt with alliances 
FACTOR Non equity Alliances (118 Alliances UCL and LCL EJV (12 alliances) 
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at 5% confidence level) 
Reputation 
building 
Assessment 
SIGNFICANTLY RELEVANT 
Technology strength of the partner (association 
with a technology with a good potential) 
fn=116;RELPRO=0.86;IMPRO=0.8S;UCL=0.59^ 
Market strengths of the partner ( market share, 
operations base etc) 
fa=112;RELPRO=0.83;IMPPRO=0.77;UCL=0.59) 
Future ouflook of the partner (business plan, 
products services roadmapsetc) 
(n=108;RELPRO=0.8;IMPPRO=«.77;UCL=0.59) 
Market reputation of the partner (customer 
stories, endorsement by market research VC firms 
etc( 
n=90;RELPRO=0.67;IMPPRO=0.74;UCL=0.6) 
RELEVANT 
Market strength of 
the partner (market 
share, operations 
base etc) 
10 of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the 
factor was 
considered 
important 
SIGNFICANTLY NOT RELEVANT 
Alliances management history of the partner 
(poUcies and past experience) 
(n=106;RELPRO=0.79; UCL=0.60) 
Performance management history of the partner 
(policies & past experience) 
rn=96;RELPRO=«.71; LCL=0.60) 
Operations strength of the partner (cost, quality, 
size, experience etc) 
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Table 11. Reputation related factors affecting governance costs in Alliances 
FACTOR 
Trust and 
cooperatioD 
Non equity Alliances (118 Alliances UCL and 
LCL at 5% confidence level) 
SIGNFICANTLY IMPORTANT 
Increasing trust and cooperation by... 
Building an organization based trust rather 
than a person based trust 
fn=96:RELPRO=0.71:IMPRO=«.68:UCL=0.60> 
Creating an environment of openness and 
transparency 
(n=lll;RELPRO=0.82;IMPPRO=0.62; 
UCL=0.59) 
SIGNFICANTLY NOT RELEVANT 
Decrease in trust due to partner failure to fulfiU 
commitment/ milestones 
rn^7:RELPRO=<).35: LCL=0.3(rt 
EJV (12 alliances) 
SIGNIFICANTLY 
RELEVANT 
Increasing trust and 
cooperation by creating 
an environment of 
opened & transparency 
11 of the 12 alliances 
indicated that the above 
factor was relevant 
SIGNIFICANTLY 
NOT RELEVANT 
Proactive change in the 
role in the alliance with 
changes in alliance 
scope 
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Increase in trust by 
Facilitating convenient times for interaction 
rn=47;RELPRO=O.35;LCL=0.36) 
Unilateral dedication of assets prior to 
relationship 
fa=37;RELPRO=0.27;LCL=0.34) 
Proactive change of role in the alliance partner 
based on the change in function of alliance 
fn=27;RELPRO=0.20;LCL=0.31) 
Avoiding bargaining by upfront acceptance of 
partner terms 
(n=2S;RELPRO=0.19: LCL=0.30) 
Accepting of majority partner's dominant role 
in the alliance 
(n=12;RELPRO=0.09;LCL-0.22) 
Decrease in trust and cooperation due to the 
percqttion that the relationshqt is risky due to 
Disputes relating to interim changes in alliance 
project scope 
(n=35;RELPRO==0.26; LCL=0.33) 
Lack of honesty 
Only 1 of the 12 
alliances indicated that 
the factor was relevant 
Decrease in trust due to 
disputes related to..„. 
Statutory clauses 
CaU options 
Valuation methods 
Increase in trust by.. 
Avoiding bargaining by 
upfront acceptance of 
partner 
Only 2 of the 12 
alliances indicated that 
the above factors were 
relevant 
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(n=32;RELPRO=0.24;LCL=0.33) 
Indications that the partner will compete 
directly with the firm 
(n=32;RELPRO=0.23;LCL-0J2) 
Partner not trusting capabilities 
(n=31;RELPRO=0.23;LCL=0J2) 
Decrease in trust due to disputes related to.. 
Operational clauses 
(n=20;RELPRO=9.15;LCL=0.28) 
Ownership of IP 
(n=16;RELPRO=0.12;LCL=<).26) 
Statutory clauses 
(n=14;RELPRO=0.1;LCL-0J4) 
Table 12. Trust related factors affecting governance costs in alliances 
FACTOR 
Physical, cultural 
and organizational 
distance factors 
Non equity Alliances (118 
Alliances UCL and LCL at 5% 
confidence level) 
SIGNFICANTLY RELEVANT 
Costs of adapting to differences 
in business operations 
rn=48:RELPRO=0.36:LCL=0J(n 
Costs of adapting to language 
differences between the 
partnering firms 
rn=38:RELPRO=0.28: 
EJV (12 alliances) 
NO statistically sienificant 
results 
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LCLrm.34^ 
Table 13 Distance related factors affecting governance costs in Alliances 
FACTOR 
Alliance function 
related factors 
Non equity Alliances (118 
Alliances UCL and LCL at 5% 
confidence level) 
SIGNFICANTLY NOT 
RELEVANT 
Costs due to efforts to adapt to 
the strategic reorientation of the 
partner firm 
rn=38:RELPRO=0.28:LCL=0.34) 
Costs due to efforts to adapt to 
the decision to change the scope 
of alliance/ 
fn=38:RELPRO=0.28: 
LCL=0.33) 
EJV (12 alliances) 
SIGNIFICANTLY NOT 
RELEVANT 
Technology ficense fee 
Only 1 of the 12 alliance 
indicated the above factor as 
relevant 
Logistics costs 
Only 2 of the 12 alliances 
indicated the above factor as 
relevant 
Table 14 Governance costs due to function of alliance 
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FACTOR 
Preferred 
performance 
measure 
Non equity Alliances (118 
Alliances UCL and LCL at 5% 
confidence leveQ 
Business Benefits 
( n=118;Mean rank =2.19) 
Market benefits 
(n=101;Mean rank =2.62) 
Stakeholder value creation 
(n=88,Mena rank =2.95) 
Fulfillment of initial objectives 
oftheaOiance 
(n=69;mean rank =3.76) 
Performance compared to that 
of other alliance partner 
(n=73;Mena rank=4.01) 
Unanticipated benefits from the 
alliance 
(n=47, mean rank=4.81) 
EJV (12 alliances) 
Stakeholder value creation 
( n=15;Me8n rank =2.27) 
Business benefits 
(n=16;Mean rank =2.38) 
Market benefits 
(n=14,Mena rank =2.8) 
Fulfillment of initial objectives of 
the alliance 
(n=12;mean rank =2.86) 
Unanticipated benefits from the 
alliance 
(n=6, mean rank=4.67) 
Performance compared to that of 
other alliance partner 
(n=5;Mena rank=4.88) 
Alliance 
performance on 
chosen measures 
Very high 
(n=118;RELPRO=l;UCL=0.59) 
RELEVANT FACTOR 
RELPRO=1;UCL=0.83 
Alliance 
performance on 
fulfillment of Initial 
objectives 
High 
(n=118;RELPRO=l;UCL=<).59) 
RELEVANT FACTOR 
RELPRO=l ;UCL=0.83 
Table 15 Performance of Alliances 
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Results of the Sign Test 
TEC_F0R2-TEC_F0R 1 
TEC_RD2-TEC_RD1 
TEC_STD2-TEC_STD1 
TEC_MON2-TEC_MON 1 
OPR_MKT2-OPR_MKT 1 
OPR_SOU2-OPR_SOU 1 
0PR_SUP2-0PR SUPl 
OPR_EQP-OPR-EQPl 
Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences "•"*'' 
T i e s ppp-'Ni-^-*'*™'"""'^"' 
Total 
Negative Differences'''' 
Positive Differences"'"''''' 
-T-j ppp.qqqjTT.Sss.tn.uuu.vw 
Total 
Negative Differences '*' 
Positive Differences "•"•'''' 
T i p c PPP-QflflJ"-**^ -"'-"""*^ '^ ^ 
Total 
Negative Differences **" 
Positive Differences "•"^^ 
-r; ppp.qqqJ .^sss.m.uuu.^ •v^ 
Total 
Negative Differences''' 
Positive Differences"'"'''' 
Tif»c ppp.qqqjTT.Sss.ttt.uuu.vw 
Total 
Negative Differences '*' 
Positive Differences """'''' 
•T-: ppp.qqqjTr.sss.in.uuu.v»-v 
Total 
Negative Differences''' 
Positive Differences "-"^^ 
T* „ ppp.qqqjTT.Sss.m.uuu.vw 
Total 
Negative Differences "*' 
Positive Differences "^'''' 
Tipc ppp-qqq-"T,&ss.m.uuu,vv\ 
N 
14 
14 
58 
86 
2 
11 
10 
23 
4 
11 
10 
25 
3 
16 
56 
75 
3 
11 
21 
35 
1 
11 
29 
41 
8 
14 
71 
93 
9 
13 ; 
26 
1 
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OPR_MNP2-OPR_MNP 1 
OPR_REC2-OPR_REC 1 
0PR_VCD2-0PR_VCD 1 
0PR_FC02-0PR_FC01 
Total 
Negative Differences *''' 
Positive Differences """•" 
T i p c PPP'<N<I.'".»ss,ttt,uuu,vw 
Total 
Negative Differences *''' 
Positive Differences "'"•'* 
TiAc PPP'*NQ'"T'*ss,ttt,uuu,vw 
Total 
Negative Differences ''*' 
Positive Differences "^^ 
'T-j ppp,q<)qjTT.sss,ttt,uuu,\'w 
Total 
Negative Differences °"" 
Positive Differences "'"^^ 
I'* f^.qqqjTT.sss,rn,uuu.»'vv 
Total 
48 
4 
17 
25 
46 
2 
0 
5 
7 
1 
11 
76 
88 
1 
11 
6 
18 
a. M0T_CUT2< M0T_CUT1 
b. M0T_SUP2 < M0T_SUP1 
c. M0T_NP2 < MOTNPRO 
d. MOT_NOP2 < MOT_NOPR 
e. M0T_F0M2 < MOT_FOMK 
f. MOT DOM2 < MOT DOMK 
ENV_CAP2-ENV_CAP1 
ENV IMP2-ENVJMP1 
Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences "•"'''' 
Tp- ppp.qqqjTT.sss.ni,uuu.vv\ 
Total 
Negative Differences ^^ 
Positive Differences"'"'''' 
T - ! ppp.qqqjTT.SSS.TTI.UUUA'X-A 
N 
1 
11 
7 
19 
5 
2 
15 
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ENV_CG02-EN V_CGO 1 
ENV_SUB2-ENV_SUB 1 
ENV_NAT2-ENV_NAT1 
ENV_BUS2-ENV_BUS1 
EN V_LAN2-EN V_LAN 1 
EN V_END2-EN V_END 1 
COM_PR02-COM_PRO 1 
COM_MKT2-COM_MKT] 
Total 
Negative Differences *''' 
Positive Differences "^^ 
T i * » s ppp,<W1Jii,sss,ttl,uuu,vw 
Total 
Negative Differences "^^ 
Positive Differences "^^^ 
T i * » c PPP'<l*lQ'"'''*ss,ttt,uuu,vw 
Total 
Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences"""'''' 
Ti*»C PPP'flQ*l'"T'SSS,ttI,UUU.\'\'V 
Total 
Negative Differences''' 
Positive Differences "'"*•'' 
T-* j:^,qqqjTT,sss,m.uuu.vv\' 
Total 
Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences"""'''' 
Ti**C PPP-<l*W-"T,SSS.ttt-UUU,\'V'\ 
Total 
Negative Differences '*' 
Positive Differences "•"'''' 
- p - ppp,qqqjTTjss.m,uuu,vvv 
Total 
Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences"'"'''' 
T i e s PPP'Ni'™-***"'-'"'"""' 
Total 
Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences "'"'^^ 
Tif»C PPP-*19*)JTT.SSS.I1t.UUU.V\'\' 
Total 
22 
1 
0 
5 
6 
2 
0 
2 
4 
1 
1 
5 
7 
2 
0 
6 
8 
1 
1 
5 
7 
9 
16 
58 
83 
18 
12 
35 
65 
11 
13 
36 
60 
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COM_CUS2-COM_CUS 1 
COM_INV2-COM_INVl 
COM_OTH2-COM_OTH 1 
RES_INF2-RES_INF] 
RES_CAP2-RES_CAP1 
RES_BRA2-RES_BRA 1 
RES_PNW2-RES_PNW] 
RES_L0C2-RES_L0C1 
ENV_INV2-ENVJNV] 
Negative Differences *•" 
Positive Differences ">"*'' 
Ties PPP'N<i.f"^ ss."'>'"'«.>'vv 
Total 
Negative Differences *''' 
Positive Differences "-"•" 
T i p c ppp.qq<l/JT.sss,ttl,uuu,vw 
Total 
Negative Differences'"'' 
Positive Differences"-"'''' 
Total 
Negative Differences *'' 
Positive Differences"""'''' 
T-* ppp.qqq,iTr.sss,m,uuu,vw 
Total 
Negative Differences a,b 
Positive Differences ii,jj,kk 
Ties ppp,qqq,rrr,sss,ttt,uuu,wv 
Total 
Negative Differences ''^ 
Positive Differences "•"^^ 
T j p c PPP,<l<l'I,nT s^s,m.uuu,«'v 
Total 
Negative Differences''' 
Positive Differences ">"'''' 
T i e s PPP1'N-"'-sss.m.uuu,\'\'\ 
Total 
Negative Differences a,b 
Positive Differences iijj.kk 
Ties ppp,qqq,rrr,sss,ttt,uuu,wv 
Total 
Negative Differences''' 
10 
13 
59 
82 
7 
0 
6 
13 
7 
17 
3 
27 
3 
15 
116 
134 
2 
3 
129 
134 
23 
11 
100 
134 
3 
15 
116 
134 
6 
13 
113 
132 
5 
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Positive Differences "-"•*" 
nnj ppp,qqq,nT,sss,ttt,uuu,vw 
Total 
7 
55 
67 
ENV FUT2-ENV FUTl Negative Differences a,b 5 
Positive Differences ii jj,kk 3 
Ties ppp,qqq,rrr,sss,ttt,uuu,vw 28 
Total 36 
ENV CUS2-ENV CUSl Negative Differences' 
Positive Differences "•"''''' 
T i f » c PPP'*lfl*l'"'''Sss.ttt,uuu.v\'\' 
Total 
4 
14 
12 
30 
ENV SUP2-ENV SUPl Negative Differences ° 
Positive Differences "•"'''' 
Ties ppp,qqqjiT.sss,ttt,uuu.vv\ 
Total 
Negative Differences" 
Positive Differences ">"'''' 
'T'- ppp.qqqjTr.sss,ttt,uuu.\'\'\ 
Total 
1 
0 
56 
57 
ENV GLP2-ENV GLPl 0 
1 
30 
31 
ENV CON2-ENV CONl Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences "'" '^' 
T i p c ppp.qqqJTr,sss,tn,uuu.v\v 
Total 
0 
11 
12 
23 
ENV GOV2-ENV GOVl Negative Differences ^ 
Positive Differences """'''' 
T - - ppp.q<)qjTT,sss.m,uuu,\'\'v 
Total 
3 
0 
9 
12 
ENV FER2-ENV FERl 
MOT CUT2-MOT CUTl 
Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences "'"'''' 
Ties ppp,qqqJTT.sss.Itl.uuu,^'^'v 
Total 
Negative Differences ^'^ 
Positive Differences "•"'''' 
0 
0 
31 
31 
~9~ 
23 
266 
MOT_SUP2-MOT_SUPl 
MOT_NP2-MOT_NPRO 
MOT_NOP2-MOT_NOPR 
MOT_FOM2-MOT_FOMK 
MOT_DOM2-MOT_DOMK 
MOT_PTR2-MOT_PTTR 
MOT_OTR2-MOT_OTTR 
IMP2-1MP1 
Ties PPP'Wfl.^ s^s.m.uuu.wv 
Total 
Negative Differences'''' 
Positive Differences """-^  
T i e s PPP'<iii'^'5**."*''""''"^ 
Total 
Negative Differences"''' 
Positive Differences "'"•'''' 
Tif>c PPP'*W<l/"'>sss,ttt,uuu,vw 
Total 
Negative Differences''' 
Positive Differences "'"^'' 
T i p c PPP-W*l-"''-sss,ttt.uuu.\'vv 
Total 
Negative Differences '*' 
Positive Differences"'"'''' 
•y* ppp qqq jTT.sss.iti.uuu \ w 
Total 
Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences"""'''' 
Total 
Negative Differences *'' 
Positive Differences "'"^'' 
Total 
Negative Differences "*" 
Positive Differences"'"'''' 
nr- ppp.qqqjTT sss.ttt uuu vvv 
Total 
Negative Differences *'' 
Positive Differences "-"'''' 
Ties '^^ <)qqjTi.ss5 m uuu \v\ 
102 
134 
18 
18 
98 
134 
9 
12 
113 
134 
6 
7 
121 
134 
7 
3 
124 
134 
2 
1 
131 
134 
5 
13 
116 
134 
3 
13 
118 
134 
27 
14 
93 
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RES_PR02-RES_PR01 
RES_TEC2-RES_TEC 1 
M0T_NP2-M0T_NPR0 
MOT_NOP2-MOT_NOPR 
M0T_F0M2-M0T_F0MK 
MOT_DOM2-MOT_DOMK 
MOT_PTR2-MOT_PTTR 
MOT_OTR2-MOT_OTTR 
Total 
Negative Differences'''' 
Positive Differences "^^^ 
Total 
Negative Differences '•'' 
Positive Differences ''•"•'^ 
T i * » c PPP'9*Jfl-"'',sss,ttt,uuu,vw 
Total 
Negative Differences'"'' 
Positive Differences ">"•'''' 
T J # » C PPP»flflfl-"T,SSS,ttt.UUU,\TV 
Total 
Negative Differences '*' 
Positive Differences "^^'' 
-p* ppp.qqqjTr.sss,ttt.uuu.\'\'\ 
Total 
Negative Differences"'' 
Positive Differences """'''' 
'¥'• ppp,qqqjTT.sss.m uuu \'\'\ 
Total 
Negative Differences '*' 
Positive Differences "'"•'''' 
T i e s ^^ q<]qjTr.sss.ra,uuu.\-\-\ 
Total 
Negative Differences ° ** 
Positive Differences "•"•^^ 
T i e s PPP'1<MJ"-sss.m.uuu\\T 
Total 
Negative Differences''' 
Positive Differences"'"'''' 
T i f » C PPP 9*1*1-^ TT SSS Itt UUUAW 
Total 
134 
11 
12 
111 
134 
17 
13 
104 
134 
9 
12 
113 
134 
6 
7 
121 
134 
7 
3 
124 
134 
2 
1 
131 
134 
5 
13 
116 
134 
3 
13 
118 
134 
268 
IMP2-IMP1 
RES_PR02-RES_PR01 
sRES_TEC2-RES_TEC 1 
RES_0PK2-RES_0PK 1 
RES_MNP2-RES_MNP1 
Negative Differences *"" 
Positive Differences "^^^ 
•y' _ i^,qqq,nT,sss,ttt,uuu,vw 
Total 
Negative Differences *"" 
Positive Differences "-"^^ 
T i e s PPP''N<l.'".SM.n'.'"'".vw 
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